PLC(CS) 1982

1982 PLP 936 (PLC(CS))

BAZ KHAN Versus MESSRS ALLIED TABKEY GROUP LTD.

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Decided Date
N/A
Honorable Judges
Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1982 PLP 936 (PLC(CS))
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Bench Members Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal
Parties BAZ KHAN Versus MESSRS ALLIED TABKEY GROUP LTD.
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1982 PLP 936 (PLC(CS))?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1982 PLP 936 (PLC(CS))?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1982 PLP 936 (PLC(CS)) (BAZ KHAN Versus MESSRS ALLIED TABKEY GROUP LTD.). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Judgment & Decree

Pakistan International Airlines v. Sind Labour Court P L D 1980 S C 323 rel. S. M. Kohistani for Appellant. Date of hearing: 6th April, 1981. The services of the appellant workman, who was employed as a fitter in the respondent Company, which had a construction contract with the Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation, were terminated, vide letter, dated 14th May, 1980, on the ground that the project entrusted to the res pondent corporation was nearing completion and hence there was no further need of the services of the appellant workman. The termination orders, according to the respondent corporation, were sought to be personally delivered to the appellant workman but he refused to accept the same and, accordingly, such endorsement was made on the copy of the retrenchment orders. The appellant challenged the orders of his termination of services before the learned IVth Labour Court which has dismissed his grievance petition by its decision, dated 11th February, 1981, on the ground that the services of the appellant were retrenched bona fide by the respondent corporation alongwith the services of 56 other workmen, as the contract of work taken by the respondent corporation was nearing completion. Aggrieved by this decision the appellant has come up in appeal to this Tribunal.

2. It is the case of the appellant that he was a permanent work man of the respondent Corporation having put in about 2J years service before the orders of termination of services were issued. It is an admitted position that the respondent Corporation is a construction company and had engaged the appellant workmen on its project in the Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation. Since the work on which the appellant workman was employed was for a limited duration and was expected to be fully completed by 30th November, 1980, the appellant, notwithstanding the fact that he may have put in 21 years service with the respondent Corporation, cannot be considered to be a permanent workman in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan International Airlines v. Sind Labour Court (PLD 1980 S C 323).

3. Even if the appellant had been a permanent workman of the respondent corporation, the latter was entitled under clause (t) of Standing Order 12 to terminate his services. However, in such case it would be required to give one month's notice or pay in lieu of notice. This is precisely what has been done by the respondent corporation. The letter terminating the services of the appellant is dated 14th May, 1980, but the termination orders were to take effect more than a month later on 18th June, 1980. Furthermore, as required by clause (3) of Stan ding Order 12, not only is the order of termination of services in writing but further it gives specific reason for the termination of services, reason which appears to be sound and bona fide. As already stated, the reason for the termination of services of the appellant was that the work upon which the respondent corporation was engaged was nearing completion. It has been asserted by witness, Muhammad Hanif Khan, the Manager of the respondent corporation, in his evidence before the learned Labour Court, that alongwith the appellant the services of 56 other workmen had to be retrenched on the ground of the project nearing completion. The respondent Corporation, therefore, appears to have been fully justifiedi8 in terminating the services of the appellant.

4. It was contended by Mr. Kohistani that the respondent corpora tion, in terminating the services of the appellant, has disregarded the provisions of Standing Order 13 in that persons junior to the appellant were retained in service. Mr. Kohistani, however, was unable to refer me to any piece of evidence on record from which it could be inferred that service of persons junior to him in the category to which the appel lant belonged had been retained. No doubt, Manager, Hanif Khan admit ted in his evidence before the learned Labour Court that 14/15 regiers were still employed by the respondent Corporation at the project in question but he denied that any one of them was junior to the appellant workman.

5. It was next contended by Mr. Kohistani that the retrenchment orders had not been served upon the appellant workman and that his services had been terminated by oral orders in contravention of clause (3) of Standing Order

12. It has, however, been asserted by Mr. Shakil Ahmed Peerzada, the Site Incharge of the respondent Corporation, that be personally sought to deliver the retrenchment orders to the appellant workman but the latter refused to accept the same and accordingly he made such an endorsement on the retrenchment orders. There is no reason to doubt the word of this witness. It is further asserted that the delivery of the retrenchment orders was sought to be made to the appel lant in the presence of Mr. Mumtaz, the Time‑keeper. It may, further be stated that the appellant does not appear to be a truthful witness, as found by the learned Labour Court, since he wrongly claimed that he had been allowed one month's annual leave with effect from 7th May, 1980, whereas there is unimpeachable evidence to the effect that he had been allowed leave with effect from 27th April,. 1980 to 27th May, 1980.

6. For the reasons discussed by me above, I find no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed in limine.