1988 PLP 1256 (SCMR)

NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.‑‑The only question involved in this appeal is whether the High Court was justified in dismissing; the appeal of the appellant herein as barred by time? The relevant facts bearing on this question are that the judgment of the District Judge was announced on 29‑3‑1968. The appellant submitted an application for obtaining the certified copies of the judgment and decree on 8‑4‑1968. The copies were ready on 27‑6‑1968 but the same were actually collected on 12‑7‑1968 and the second appeal filed in the High Court on 20‑9‑1968, which has been dismissed as time‑barred. It is an admitted position that the appeal before the High Court would be barred by time only if the time spent between the date of the application for supply of the copies and the date when p the copy was ready for delivery is only excluded but it would be in time if the entire period between the date on which the application for supply of the copies was made until the date when the copies were actually collected (12‑7‑1968) is excluded. The High Court held relying on this Court's judgment in Fateh Muhammad and others v. Malik Qadir Bakhsh 1975 S C M R 157 that the time taken between the date on which the copy is ready for delivery and the date on which the applicant chooses to take delivery cannot be considered as time "requisite" (u/s 12 of the Limitation Act) for obtaining the copy and the delay cannot be condoned under section 5 of the said Act if the conduct of the litigant has been negligent and the delay is not due to circumstances beyond his control. The same view had also been earlier expressed by this Court in West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi v. Aziz Qureshi P L D 1973 S C 222 wherein it was held that the "time requisite" for obtaining the copies which car, be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act is the time which is taken between the date of application and the date when the copies are ready. However, the time can be further extended if the further delay has taken place by reason of the carelessness of the office in giving wrong information to the applicant as to the date on which the copies would be ready or no information at all is given in this respect. In the present case, we find that the appellant has not established that he was given any wrong information as to the date on which the copies would be ready or that he was not given any information about the date when they would by ready for delivery. The High Court has on the other hand, taken pains to examine the official of the copying agency to ascertain the exact position in this case and after perusing his evidence observed as follows:‑ "In the present appeal, however, not only the contention of the appellant that he was not given any specific date by the 1 Copying Agency to take the delivery of the copies has been vehemently disputed but the appellant has also failed to establish that he was in fact not given any particular date by the Copying Agency for the collection of the copies." (underlining is ours). After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and perusing the record we find that there is no inaccuracy in the above observation of the High Court. In these circumstances, the finding of the High Court that the second appeal filed by the appellant before it was barred by time is not open to exception. The result is that this appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed hereby with costs. M.Y.H./F‑49/S Appeal dismissed.