1994 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

ABDUL HAMID KHAN (MEMBER).‑‑‑The appellant, Muhammad Sadiq, while posted as Inspector/SHO, Police Station Saddar, Faisalabad was retired compulsorily from service vide Deputy Inspector‑General of Police, Faisalabad/respondent No.3's order dated 14‑9‑1988 on the charge of preparing with forged signatures of DSP/SDPO M. Akram Niazi, Case Diary No.14 in case FIR No. 151, dated 27‑4‑1987 under section 303/325/148/DPC, PS Saddar, Faisalabad. The departmental appeal preferred by him before the Inspector‑General of Police, Punjab/respondent No. 2 was accepted in part and the penalty of compulsory retirement was converted into reduction in rank. The present appeal has been filed against the aforesaid orders.

2. The facts of the case are that during the course of hearing of bail application in the above case, Mr. Justice Muhammad Rafique Tarar, the then Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, summoned Muhammad Akram Khan Niazi, DSP/SDPO for verification of correctness or otherwise of the aforesaid case diary which had purportedly been written and signed by him in favour of the accused persons. The DSP, however, disowned the said case diary and took the position that neither it was written in his hand nor was it recorded on his dictation.

3. In these circumstances the Court directed the Department to conduct an enquiry into the matter and submit a report. Accordingly, the Superintendent of Police City was appointed as Enquiry Officer before whom the Deputy Superintendent of Police put up the defence that the said case diary had not been written by him as it contained only his "initials" and not his full signatures whereas since 1983 onwards he had never affixed his initials on case diaries. He, however, admitted that these diaries used to be recorded by his Readers.

4. The appellant, Muhammad Sadiq, on the other hand submitted that he had worked under the above named DSP for about 10 months. In so far as the case diary in question was concerned he stated that the DSP had visited the site a number of times and had also been summoning the parties to the case. Ultimately on 1‑9‑1987 he summoned the appellant in his office and expressed his satisfaction over the investigation and directed him to write the relevant case diary on his behalf. Accordingly, the appellant put up a case diary on behalf of the DSP the same day as the case was already with him as Investigation Officer. He further stated that after a few days he was again summoned by the DSP who asked him to change the case diary but the appellant refused to do so on which the DSP got annoyed. He further alleged that the DSP was expert in affixing ‑his signatures in different styles and in order to prove this he produced a number of files/documents before the Enquiry Officer in which the DSP had affixed his signatures variously. The appellant demanded that the specimen signatures of the DSP and those of the appellant should be sent to the handwriting expert for an expert opinion.

5. In his findings the Enquiry Officer did not accept the contentions of the accused official on the ground that the previous signatures of the DSP on other documents referred to and relied upon by the appellant had no relevance to the present case. Specimen signatures were also sent to the handwriting expert and in the light of his report it was held by the Enquiry Officer that the disputed signatures were not those of the DSP. He further held that since the R other Investigation Officer was the accused Inspector, an opinion could, therefore, be formed that the disputed signatures on the Case Diary No. 14 were affixed either by the appellant or the latter got the same affixed by someone else.

6. The appellant contended that the impugned order dated 17‑3‑1990 itself was sufficient to exonerate him from the charges. He particularly referred to paras. 3 to 6 of the order wherein according to him the DSP had clearly been held responsible. He heavily relied on para. 3 of the impugned order, which is reproduced below: "There is unfortunately a prevalent practice among the SDPOs to have case diaries initially prepared by their Readers/SHOs and then sign the documents. I find it difficult to believe that an SHO would forge an entire case diary of his superior and the said superior officer would sit on it without taking any action. Recording of a fake case diary would have been instantly in the notice of the SDPO or his Reader if even the most cursory glance had been given while entering the same in the Crime Register, which was the prime responsibility of the SDPO. Further, if it was fake, then the question arises as to where the original case diary of the DSP was?"

7. He argued that not only that the Inspector‑General of Police did not hold the appellant guilty in the aforesaid order but also had given a positive finding of guilt against the DSP. Similarly, the I.‑G.P. had further observed that in spite of the appellant's insistence the Enquiry Officer failed to examine the parties viz. Manzoor Hussain and Azmat who had given affidavits to the effect that the DSP had promised to help them through the case diary to facilitate their bails. The appellant also maintained that the DSP had a tendency to change case diaries in the past and cited a particular case in which he had committed this irregularity.

8. The appellant further argued that para. 5 of the impugned order removes all doubts about the authorship of the said case diary wherein it had categorically been held by the I- G. Police that the case diary in dispute tallied with the one recorded in the crime register maintained by the D.S.P. The I.‑G. Police has further pointed out that according to the report of the DSP Legal the appellant's contention that these documents were not prepared in normal working style and signatures put on these were different on original and carbon copies had been accepted.

9. Lastly, it was argued that the I.‑G. Police's observation given in para. 6 of the impugned order that both the appellant and the SDPO were partly guilty so far as writing of the case diary in question is concerned was quite abrupt and inconsistent with his own conclusions given in the earlier paragraphs of the same order. According to the appellant this observation was not substantiated by any material on record nor was it consistent with the findings recorded by him in paragraphs 3 to 5 which were positively against the DSP. Even in the later part of para. 6 the conduct of the DSP had again been criticised by the I.‑G. Police.

10. The respondents have offered very brief parawise comments/written objections on the contents of this appeal. It has been stated therein that even though the allegations against the DSP had not been established but his conduct had been termed as doubtful by the I.‑G. Police. They further stated that the punishment awarded to the appellant was fully justified.

11. Although the Enquiry Officer in his report dated 25‑5‑1988 had held Muhammad Akram Khan Niazi, DSP not guilty but at the same time he did not find the appellant guilty beyond any shadow of doubt. His finding was that the aid Case Diary No. 14 had been signed either by Muhammad Tariq, Inspector himself or this was got signed by someone else. This finding of the Enquiry Officer read with the observations of the Appellate Authority / I.‑G. Police in his order dated 17‑3‑1990 make the above finding that the case diary in question was signed by the appellant himself highly doubtful. The fact that the DSP remained sitting for about one month on a case diary which he considered to have been forged; that the Enquiry Officer did not record the statements of Manzoor Hussain and Azmat accused despite repeated requests by the appellant; that the DSP had a tendency to change the case diaries; that the said case diary tallied with the entries recorded in the Crime Register being maintained by the SDPO and that the latter was also partly held to be guilty by the I.‑G. Police, clearly indicate that it was the DSP who perhaps was the guilty party in this case. It is unfortunate that the Department did not consider it appropriate to hold a joint enquiry against the appellant and the DSP. Although a separate enquiry has been ordered against the DSP but its result has not been made known to this Tribunal.

12. In view of the foregoing, we do not find that the charge has conclusively been proved against the appellant. Thus giving the benefit of doubt to the appellant the appeal is accepted, the impugned orders are set aside and the appellant is restored to his original rank of Inspector. There are no orders as to costs. H.B.T./466/Sr.P Appeal accepted.