1985 PLP 1657 (SCMR)

Respondent No. 1: Ex parte. Munir A. Shaikh, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent No.

2. Date of hearing: 3rd June, 1985. MUHAMMAD HALEEM, C.J.‑‑The dispute in this appeal relates to the eviction of the petitioners from House No. 6, Street No. 6, Muslim Ganj, Lytton Road, Lahore. In the earlier eviction proceedings initiated in the mid‑sixties, the landlord had succeeded, but in appeal he agreed to accept the enhanced rent and allowed them to stay in the, house. Six years later in March, 1981 another eviction application was filed by the respondents on the ground that the disputed premises were required in good faith for his personal need. This application was dismissed by the Rent Controller on the following three considerations: (a) that the house in occupation of the landlord comprises of a sufficient number of rooms, which could, indeed, meet the requirements of his family members (b) that he had already once tried to obtain the ejectment of the tenants by an eviction application and it, therefore, appeared that he desired their ejectment on any cost; and (c) that the landlord had made an attempt to sell away the house in question but the stumbling‑block to the sale was that the prospective vendee was insisting on being given vacant possession and, therefore, he was interested to getting the disputed premises vacated in order to accomplish the sale." But in appeal the order of dismissal was reversed and the appellants were ordered to be ejected. Against this order the appellants filed a constitution petition but that too was summarily dismissed. Leave to appeal was granted to consider as to whether in failing to consider the questions at (b) and (c) hereinabove, "the learned Additional District Judge had not contravened the relevant provisions of section 13(3) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance in coming to the conclusion that the plea of the landlord that he required the premises for personal need was indeed bona fide". The learned counsel for the appellants referred us to the evidence on record to show that, in fact, the respondent had wanted to sell the disputed premises and for that reason he desired the ejectment of the appellants. But the evidence on this aspect of the case is inchoate and does not conclusively lead to the conclusion to which the learned counsel wanted us to draw. We also find from the order of the Additional Sessions Judge that he has commented on the contention of the appellants as to the bona fides of the respondent vis‑a‑vis his personal need, in that, he had entered into an agreement with Muhammad Jamil to sell the disputed premises. But it seems that this contention did not prevail with the Court as Muhammad Jamil himself was not produced. Further, we find from his order that he had also considered the need for the accommodation and in the ultimate result had held that it was bona fide. Before the High Court, the only point urged was that the respondent could not succeed unless it was established on record that the premises in his occupation was not suitable for his need. The entire discussion in the judgment revolves on this submission. The points formulated for consideration were not urged. Therefore, we see no reason as to why we should allow them to be raised at this stage when the High Court has not expressed any opinion on them. Nonetheless the Additional Sessions Judge had considered the bona fides in the context of the questions formulated and rejected the submission of the appellants. Accordingly, we find no substance in this appeal which is dismissed, but with no order as to costs. However, on the undertaking given by the appellants, four months time is allowed from today to hand over vacant possession of the disputed premises to the respondents without the aid of execution proceedings. M.B.A. Appeal dismissed.