2009 PLP 2189 (YLR)

M. BILAL KHAN, J.

The petitioners, namely, Ch. Abdul Ghafoor Tahir son of Ch. Feroze Din and Ghulam Mustafa Naseem son of Mehar Ali, who stood involved in case F.I.R. No. 687, dated 21-7-2006, registered with Police station Peoples Colony, Faisalabad at the instance of Mahmood-ul-Hassan son of Sher Muhammad (respondent No.3), for an offence under section 489-F, P.P.C, have sought quashing thereof.

2. Precisely, the allegation against the petitioners, according to the F.I.R. was that they stood witnesses to the affidavit sworn by Muhammad Ashraf, their co-accused, wherein the latter had promised to pay the amount of Rs. 2,60,000 to the complainant and had issued two cheques in lieu thereof, one of which when presented before the drawee Bank had been dishonoured.

3. Quashing of the impugned F.I.R. has been sought on the grounds that a plain look at the F.I.R. would reveal that the petitioners cannot be burdened with any criminal liability whatsoever and that they have been dragged into this criminal case with a view of pressurizing and blackmailing them so as to extract money from them.

4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also gone through the available record. It has been observed that the petitioners have specifically been nominated in the F.I.R. and stand saddled with definite allegation. If the F.I.R. is taken at its face value, the same prima facie discloses commission of cognizable offence. In the case of Haji Sardar Khalid Saleem v. Muhammad Ashraf and others (2006 SCMR 1192), the Lahore High Court had quashed the F.I.R., which had been registered under section 420, 468, 471, 489-F P.P.C., as according to the High Court the cheque in question had been issued prior to the promulgation of Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance No.LXXXV of 2002, therefore, the accused could not be charged for an act which was not an offence at the time of its commission. While accepting appeal, the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan had observed that it was admitted fact that the cheque in question had been issued, which had been dishonoured and the F.I.R. could not have been quashed for the reason that section 489-F, P.P.C. had been mentioned in the same. Furthermore, in order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, a factual inquiry needs to be undertaken, which, I am afraid, cannot be embarked upon by this Court in the present summary proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Reliance could profitably be made to a pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Col. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq and others (2006 SCMR 276), wherein it was held that High Court has no jurisdiction to resolve disputed questions of fact in constitutional jurisdiction. It was further observed by their lordship that if prima facie an offence had been committed, ordinary course of trial before the Court should not be allowed to be deflected by resorting to constitutional jurisdiction of High Court; that High Court had no jurisdiction to quash F.I.R. by appreciation of documents produced by the parties without providing chance to cross-examine or confronting the documents in question. Even otherwise, it has been observed that the challan has since been submitted and all the pleas raised for quashing the F.I.R. can legitimately be raised before the trial Court. Keeping in view the aforesaid situation and the law laid down by the Honourable apex Court, I am not inclined to enter into the realm of factual controversy, which exercise cannot be undertaken at this stage. The learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to point out any malice on the part of the complainant to involve them falsely in this case.

5. For what has been discussed above, I find no merit in this petition, which is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. N.H.Q. /A-14/L Petition dismissed.