2001 PLP 2060 (YLR)

‑‑‑‑S.439‑‑‑Penal Code (XLV of 1860), 5.302‑‑‑Juvenile Justice System Ordinance (XXII of 2001), S.7‑‑‑Revisional jurisdiction, exercise of‑‑‑Petitioner was unable to point out any jurisdictional infirmity, illegality of approach, irregularity of 'procedure or perversity of reasoning on the part of Juvenile Court‑‑‑Order passed by said Court could not be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Rana Meraj Khalid for Petitioner. The petitioner is the complainant of case F.I.R. No.62 registered at Police Station Lohari Gate, Multan on 15‑3‑2000 for an offence under section 302/34, P.P.C. in which case respondent No.1 is one of the accused persons. Initially the challan in this case was produced before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Multan but subsequently on 22‑3‑2001 the challan in respect of respondent No.1 was segregated and a separate challan in that regard was sent for trial by the learned Sessions Judge, Multan as the Juvenile Court as respondent No. 1 was found to be a juvenile. Before the said Juvenile Court it was maintained by the petitioner that respondent No.1 is not in fact a juvenile and, thus, an application was moved by the petitioner before the Juvenile Court on 12‑4‑2001 seeking an appropriate order regarding medical examination of respondent No. 1 for the purpose of determination of his age. For the purposes of that application the Juvenile Court/the learned Sessions Judge, Multan sent for the Headmaster of respondent No.1's school who then produced the original register ‑pertaining to birth entries of respondent No.1 as well as the original register pertaining to respondent No.1's School Leaving Certificate. Finally vide order dated 18‑5‑2001 the Juvenile Court/Sessions Judge, Multan, after finding that respondent No. 1 was in fact a juvenile, dismissed the petitioner's application regarding respondent No. 1's medical examination for the purpose of determining his age. Hence, the present revision petition before this Court.

2. In support of this petition the only ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner before this Court is that by virtue of the provisions of section 7 of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 it was obligatory for the Juvenile Court to get respondent No. 1 medically examined for the purpose of determination of his age and as the said course was not adopted by the Juvenile Court, therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned Juvenile Court/Sessions Judge, Multan warrants interference by this Court.

3. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and going through the documents appended with this petition it has been noticed that the provision of section 7 of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 require that:‑‑ "If a question arises as to whether a person before it is a child for the purposes of this Ordinance, the Juvenile Court shall record a finding after such inquiry which shall include a medical report for determination of the age of the child. " It is quite noticeable that the language used by the Legislature in the said provision is "after such inquiry" which clearly demonstrates that the choice of proof in respect of age of the accused person is left to the Juvenile Court and the words "shall include a medical report" used in the said provision are only enabling in nature which, to my mind, only suggest one of the modes of proof which may be resorted to or adopted by the Juvenile Court in that regard. The original or authentic school record is generally a safer proof of age than medical proof in that respect which is always approximate in nature. One simple and understandable reason for that is that the age of a child is recorded in the relevant school registers at the time of his admission to that school at a time when there is no contemplation about any future criminality wherein such a child may indulge in times to come. As against that a subsequent medical proof about his age is not only expressed by a medical practitioner in approximate terms but, the same can also unfortunately, sometimes be obtained or manoeuvered for extraneous considerations. It is established law that whenever there is a conflict between medical evidence about age and proof of age recorded in school registers the latter is normally' preferred as a safer proof. A reference in this regard may be made to the cases of Ali Shah v. The State 1990 PCr.LJ 640 (Karachi); Ghulam Hussain alias Khudda v. The State PLD 1989 Lahore 543 and Muhammad Afzal v. Muhammad Saeed 1989 PCr. LJ 2349.

4. It may not be out of place to mention here that the petitioner has not placed anything on the present record and has not even mentioned in his petition as to how he entertains an impression that respondent No.1 was not a child within the meanings of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 so as not to be tried by a Juvenile Court. As against that the claim of respondent No.1 to be a Juvenile was established before the Juvenile Court/Sessions Judge, Multan on the basis of authentic/original school record. In these circumstances the petitioner has remained unable to make out any case for interference by this Court through the present petition.

5. Apart from what has been observed above the learned counsel for the petitioner has remained unable to point out any jurisdictional infirmity, illegality of approach, irregularity of procedure or perversity of reasoning on the part of the learned Juvenile Court/Sessions Judge, Multan so as to call for interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

6. For what has been discussed above this revision petition is hereby dismissed in limine. H.B.T./M‑721/L Revision petition dismissed.