1984 PLP 1196 (PLC(CS))

Date of hearing : 24th January, 1984. The decision dated 21st August, 1982 recorded by the learned Presiding Offcer, Punjab Labour Court No. 4, Faisalabad has been challenged in the two appeals captioned above. Both the appeals are being disposed of together through this single judgment, in which Muslim Commercial Bank Limited will be described as the appellant and Abdul Hameed as the respondent. The respondent has appealed to the extent of claiming back benefits.

2. The facts are that the respondent was appointed as a typist vide order Exh. R. 1, dated 6th April, 1980. He was charge‑sheeted on the allegation that he had in his application for appointment given his typing speed as 45 words per minute incorrectly and did not sit in the second test. After holding an enquiry he was dismissed from service on 17th January, 1982. The learned trial Court has held that both the charges amounted to misconduct and were proved. The respondent has beets directed to be re‑instated on the sole ground that the charge‑sheet was time- barred. Back benefits have not been allowed for the reason that the respon dent succeed only on a technical ground.

3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the required speed for the post of typist is 45 words per minute and as the respondent's speed was muchless, he could not be retained in service. This argument has no force. The question is not of inefficiency but that the respondent made incorrect assertion about his typing speed and did not join the second test. Even about the allegation of speed being poor here is no evidence. No report of the boss of the respondent has been produced in evidence about his inefficiency.

4. In all circumstances typing speed cannot remain uniform. If a handwritten passage is to be typed, comparatively large time will be required to type it, whereas a typed‑passage can be typed within a shorter period. The respondent may have given his typing speed for typing a typed‑passage. Even otherwise giving a hyperbolic account of one's experience in an application for appointment does not amount to fraud and therefore is not a misconduct. Merely on the assertions made in the applications, appointments are not made but test is taken. The respondent was appointed after the test was taken. It has been further argued that the appointing authority unduly favoured the respondent. If it was so, it was not the fault of the respondent. The appointing authority could have been taken to task but the respondent could not be made to suffer.

5. Failure on the part of the respondent to sit in the second test too does not amount to misconduct. Firstly, since he had been duly appointed by the competent authority and had completed the period of probation, he could not be compelled to undergo any other test. Even if it be said that the second test was justified, the respondent may have been terminated for not standing the test but he could not be said to have committed any misconduct. So, the charges levelled against the respondent did not amount to misconduct.

6. This is, however, wrong that the charge‑sheet was time‑barred. Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is not applicable to Nationalised Banks. In the Wage Commission Award no period is fixed within which charge -sheet may be served.

7. Since there is no technical defect and the very allegations did not amount to misconduct, the respondent was entitled to back benefits also.

8. As a result, the appeal of the appellant is dismissed and accepting the appeal of the respondent, back benefits are allowed to him. A. E. Orders accordingly.