1981 PLP 845 (PLC(CS))

Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind

2. The respondent‑Union had filed an application under section 34, I. R. O., on 15th October, 1977, for payment of wages and other legal dues to the workers whose services had been terminated by the appellant establishment. This application unfortunately continued to be pending till 25th June, 1979, when the Registrar of Trade Union passed an order cancelling the registration of the respondent Union on the ground that it had ceased to exist. The appellants establishment thereupon submitted an application to the learned Labour Court on 6th August, 1979 praying that the respondent‑Union's application under section 34, I. R. O., be dismissed on the ground that its registration had been cancelled. The learned Labour Court took the view that the only requirement of law was that such an application must be filed by the C.B.A., and since admittedly the respondent‑Union was the C. B. A., when the said application had been filed/instituted, it was properly instituted and was required to be disposed of on merits even though the Union which had filed the applica tion had ceased to exist. In taking this view the learned Labour Court appears to have misconstrued the legal position. An application under section 34 is not only required to be filed by the C. B. A., or an employer but further can only be for the enforcement of any right guaranteed of secured to it or him by any law, award or settlement. If any relief is to be granted to the party making such an application, the right claimed by it must continue to subsist at the time of the decision. 9bviously no relief can be granted to a party if at the time of the decision it has ceased to be entitled to the relief or the right claimed by it. Since in the instant case, the respondent‑Union had ceased to exist and to be a legal entity, not only it could have no right, which could be enforced by the Labour Court, but further it could no longer institute, maintain or continue any legal proceedings. The case would be akin to the death of a party who was pursuing a cause of action which was personal to it. In the case of Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works v. Mst. Shamim Akhtari decided on 16th December, 1979 this Tribunal has held that an applica tion filed by a worker under section 25‑A, I.R.O., abated on his death as such an application can only be filed and maintained by the worker himself and not by his successors. A more pertinent decision is the one in the case of National Steel Mills v. Employees' union (1975 P L C 427). In that case, an application purporting to be under section 34, I. R. O., was filed by the General Secretary of the C.B.A. However, during the pendency of the proceeding on that application, the Union lost its character as the C. B. A. It was held by my learned predecessor that the Union, upon losing the character of the Collective Bargaining Agent, could not continue the proceedings and must either withdraw or apply to the Court for being substituted by a new C.B.A. In the instant case, the position of the appellant Union is much worse as its very registration has been cancelled and accordingly it has ceased to exist as a illegal entity. Furthermore, no application was made by it for sub stitution in its place of the new Collective Bargaining Agent. As such, the proceedings before the learned Labour Court must abate.

Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal