1980 P Cr (PLP)

The brief facts of the case are that Mukhtar Ahmad was accused of accepting a sum of Rs. 25 as illegal gratification from one Mohammad Pervaiz for making a favourable report in respect of the buildings plan of Mohammad Pervaiz. The petitioner at that time. i. e. in July. 1%7 was posted as a Building Inspector, Municipal Committee. Lyallpur (now Faisalabad). The Anti‑Corruption, Establishment after investigation recommended that the petitioner should be dealt with departmentally, but the District Anti‑Corruption Committee decided that the petitioner should be prosecuted in a Court of Law. The Chairman, Municipal Committee: Lyallpur who was the competent authority, however, refused to grant sanction for prosecution. These orders of the competent authority were conveyed to the Anti‑Corruption Establishment. Subsequently the Anti Corruption Establishment again moved the Chairman, Municipal Com mittee, Mr. Taqi‑ud‑Din Pal, who had succeeded Mr. Rashid Ahmad Khan, as Chairman of the Municipal Committee, Lyalipur. He reviewed the orders of his predecessor and granted sanction for prosecution of the petitioner.

2. The present petition has been moved on the ground that the competent authority having once refused sanction, it was not open him or to his successor to review that order and grant a fresh sanction. It has been urged that once a question of sanction has been decided upon the power to grant or refuse sanction has been exhausted and it cannot be revised unless any new ground or fresh material has been discovered It has been stated that in the present case Mr. Taqi‑ud‑Din Pal ha reviewed the order of his predecessor without any such exigency.

3. A similar question carne up before the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. K‑31 and K‑32 of 1969. Stare v. Mohammad Ismail an another (1980 S C M R 268). The Supreme Court applying the principle of locus poenitentia came to the conclusion that since a decisive step had beep taken in not the appeals, there was nothing left in the Government to revise the order of refusing to grant sanction for prosecution. The principle applied by the Supreme Court in Appeals Nos. K‑31 and K‑32 of 1969 is attracted to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the sanction for prosecution had been refused by the competent authority and had been conveyed to the Superintendent of Police, Anti‑Corruption, Establishment. Under these circumstances it was not open to the successor Mr. Taqi‑ud‑Din Pal to revise the earlier orders of his predecessor and to grant sanction.

4. In view of the above considerations, the prosecution of the petitioner is illegal. The petition is therefore, allowed and the proceedings pending before the Special Judge, Anti‑Corruption are quashed. Proceedings quashed