1982 PLP 1100 (PLC)

Sarfraz Khan for Petitioners. Muhammad Anwar Lodhi and Nazir Ahmad Naz for Respondents. Agha Taj Muhammad for Railways. The above captioned two revisions arise from the orders dated 6th June, 1979 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore, whereby the objection of the petitioners that Mr. Muhammad Anwar Lodhi, representative of the respondents, could not appear and represent them was disallowed. Since the point involved in the two revisions is the same, they are being decided through this single judgment.

2. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that according to section 49 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, only an office‑holder of C.B.A. can represent a workman and since Mr. Muhammad Anwar Lodhi is not an office‑holder in any C.B.A., he is not entitled to represent the persons for whom he appeared before the Labour Court. On the other hand, the argument of Mr. Lodhi is that he was competent to represent his clients particularly when he had already filed a special power of attorney executed by his clients in his favour. Since the question involved affects many other labour representatives, who usually appear before the Labour Courts and this Tribunal, they were invited to argue the matter and besides Mr. Lodhi, Mr. Nazir Ahmad Naz has also argued in answer to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Muhammad Anwar Lodhi and Mr. Nazir Ahmad Naz have relied upon 1967 P L C 147, 1977 P L C 587 and P L D 1968 Lah. 269, Before surveying the above‑mentioned Authorities it is necessary to consider section 49 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. This section says that a workman who is a party to an industrial dispute, shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under this Ordinance by an officer of a C.B.A. The remaining portion of this section is not relevant to this case. According to the provisions of the said section, a workman who is represented by an officer of C.B.A. should be a party to an industrial dispute. Since the words `shall be entitled' are used in this section, it shows that its provisions are permissive and not restrictive. So far as the‑ representation by an officer of the C.B.A. isi concerned, it is the right of the workman to be represented by such officer,' but as there is no restriction that such a workman cannot be represented by any other person, this section does not exclude other persons froth representing the workers before the Labour Courts. Where the intention of law is to impose any restriction, a specific provision is made to that effect. Subsection (2) of section 49, specifically restricts the ropresentation by a legal practitioner in conciliation proceedings, whereas subsection (3) allows such a representation before the Labour Court with the permission of the said Court of before the Arbitrator with the permission of the said authority. It is nowhere provided in section 49 that the workman wool not be entitled to engage any other person of his choice to represent him the Labour Court as it has been restricted in subsection (2) with regard to the representation by a legal practitioner only.

3. The next question to be considered is whether only an officer of the C.B.A. of the establishment in which the workman is or was employed, can represent him or the office‑holder of any other C. B. A. can also be engaged. My view is that there is no restriction that office‑holder of only that C.B.A. in the establishment can represent the workman who was or is employed' in the said establishment. The reason is that before the word officer' article 'an' and before the words 'collective bargaining agent' article 'a' have been used. If the intention of the Legislature had" been different, in place of the words 'an' and *a' the word 'the' would have been used and, after the words 'collective bargaining agent' the words `in the establishment where the workman is employed' would have been added. So far as the authorities cited by Mr. Muhammad Anwar Lodhi are concerned, they support his arguments. Learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to cite any authority to the contrary.

4. Although no arguments have been advanced in respect of the words 'an industrial dispute' used in section 49 are concerned yet the matter needs clarification. According to section 49, the workman concerned should be a party to an industrial dispute. According to section 2 (xiii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employer and employer or between employer and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is concerned with the employment or non‑employment, or the terms of employment, or the conditions of work of any person and is not in respect of the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law other than this Ordinance o: any award or settlement for the time being in force. As the grievance petitions in which the question under discussion arose the right asserted flows from Railway Rules and not under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, therefore, it is not covered by the definition of industrial dispute. But subsection (4) of Section 25‑A provides that the Labour Court shall give a decision within seven days from the date of the matter being brought before it as if such matter were an industrial dispute. Since the controversy brought before the Labour Court under section 25‑A is to be decided as if it were an industrial dispute, for the purpose of section 49 also such a controversy cam be treated as an industrial dispute although otherwise it is not covered by the definition.

5. As a result of the observations made above, I dismiss both the revisions. The cases be sent back for decision on merits. Petitions dismissed.