1983 PLP 1210 (PLC(CS))
ALLAH BAKSH Versus KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION LTD. AND 2 OTHERS
| Citation | 1983 PLP 1210 (PLC(CS)) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind |
| Bench Members | Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal |
| Parties | ALLAH BAKSH Versus KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION LTD. AND 2 OTHERS |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1983 PLP 1210 (PLC(CS))?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1983 PLP 1210 (PLC(CS))?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1983 PLP 1210 (PLC(CS)) (ALLAH BAKSH Versus KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION LTD. AND 2 OTHERS). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Judgment & Decree
Khuda Bux v. Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation C. P. Nos. 636 and 1755 of 1980 (unreported) rel. Abdul Majeed for Appellant. Date of hearing : 16th March 1983. DECISION The appellant, who was employed as a supervisor in the Construction Department of the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. was dismissed from service by order, dated 25th July, 1981, on the ground of jointly with other workmen behaving in a disorderly and riotous manner by forcibly entering the office of the Operation Engineer, Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Khan, abusing him, assaulting him and passing derogatory remarks in respect of him. The dismissal orders are stated to be based on a domestic enquiry in which the misconduct of the appellant is said to have been fully established. The appellant challenged the orders of his dismissal before the learned Fifth Labour Court which has dismissed his grievance petition on the ground that as the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, are appli cable to the employment of the appellant, the Labour, Courts have no jurisdiction to deal with the same. In coming to this decision the learned Labour Court has place4 reliance upon the decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court reported as K. E. S. C. Ltd. v. N.
1. R. C. and another (P L D 1982 S C 113) the judgment of a Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in the case of Khuda Bux v. Pakistan Steel Mills Corpo ration, being C. P. Nos. 636 and 1755 of 1980 and the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation v. Fateullah Fahim (1980 P L C 344).
2. It was urged by Mr. Abdul Majeed, the learned representative of the appellant, that 'the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, would not be applicable to the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation which was being run and maintained by the Provincial Government and instead the' provisions of the West Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1958, would be applicable to the same. I regret that i find no force in this contention. Mr. Abdul Majeed was unable to. refer me to any evidence on the record that the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation was being run or maintained -or has been set up by the Provincial Government. The Karachi Electric Supply Corporation appears to squarely fall within item 3 of Part 11 of Schedule Fourth to the Constitution of 1973 and hence the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 would apply thereto. I am fortified in the view that the provisions of the said Act are applicable to the employees of the K. E. S. C. by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of K. E. S. C. v. N. I. R. C. wherein it has been observed as follows :- "Section 5 deals with the cessation of employment either at the behest of the employer or the employee. It would thus include terminations of service according to the terms and conditions dis charge, dismissal, absence or abandonment and retrenchment. The direction issued in terms of rule 3 (2) (d) concerning the termination of employment will also be covered in view of the wide and all embracing language of this section. Any discontinuance of employment has necessarily to be judged from the test laid down to the cessation, namely, that it was "without reasonable excuse". Therefore, if the respondents felt aggrieved either by their termination of service or dismissal, they should have taken steps to institute the proceedings as provided by section 7 and in that event it would ,have been open to the Court to deter mine as to whether the termination, according to the terms and conditions of service, or by way of dismissal or discharge, was without lawful excuse or not as the expression "without. reasonable excuse" signifies an excuse which is not lawful." The above decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, which has been respectfully followed by a Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in the case of Khudda Bux v. Pakistan Steel Mills Cor poration, would appear to set at rest any doubt as to the application of the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, to the employees of the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, though it may be. admitted that the issue whether the provisions of the said 1' Act are applicable to the employees . of the K. E. S. C. Ltd. was not raised before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. There is no dispute on the issue that a Notification was in force at the relevant time applying the provisions of the aforesaid Act to all classes of employment in connection with the generation, transmission, distribution or supply of electricity. There is further no dispute on the issue that the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation is engaged in the generation, transmission, distribution, and supply of electricity. It was next sought to be argued by Mr. Abdul Majeed that the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 are attracted only in the case of, strike, lock-out or voluntary cessation of service. The decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of K. E. S. C. Ltd., the relevant portion where of I have reproduced above, makes it clear that they are also applicable to every type of discontinuance of service, including discharge, dismissal and termination simplicitor, for the words "discontinuance" would embrace all these types of cessation of service.
4. For the reasons discussed by me above, I find no merit in, this appeal and would dismiss the same in limine. A.E. Appeal dismissed.