1988 PLP 999 (SCMR)

Ram Partap v. Kishen Singh A I R 1937 Lah.32; Raja Painda Khan v. Sardar Kahan Singh A I R 1937 Lah. 703; Gul Muhammad v. Sadaruddin and others P L D 1951 Lah. 437 and Wazir Din v. Hidayat and 2 others 1973 S C M R 254 ref. Zaheer Ahmad Khan, Advocate and Rana M.A. Qadri, Advocate- on‑Record for Petitioner. S. Wand Hussain, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent. Date of hearing: 9th July, 1980. DORAB PATEL, J.‑‑On 30th September, 1958, the respondent purchased land in Chak No.3 of Mauza Paigah, Tehsil and District Dera Ghazi Khan, therefore, the petitioner immediately filed a suit for pre‑emption on the ground that he was a Zamindar and owner in Chak No.3 Mauza Paigah, whilst the respondent was not. The trial Court accepted the petitioner's claim and decreed his suit. Therefore, the respondent filed an appeal in the District Court, Dera Ghazi Khan, and as the learned District Judge allowed the respondent's appeal, the petitioner filed a second appeal in the Lahore High Court, which was dismissed on 8‑7‑1974. The petitioner filed an application for the review of this judgment of 8‑7‑1974, but as the review was dismissed on 28‑8‑1974, the petitioner has filed this petition for leave against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing his appeal on 8‑7‑1974. Learned counsel based the petitioner's claim on the second clause of subsection (c) of section 15 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913. This clause confers a right of pre‑emption "in the owners of the Patti or other sub‑division of the estate within the limits of which such land or property is situate". Learned counsel relies on the evidence of Mr. Abbas Ali, Patwari, and, according to learned counsel, the evidence of this witness established that there were three Chaks in Mauza Paigah, three lambardars, three Patwaris and separate jamabandis for the three Chaks. Therefore, as the respondent did not own land in Chak No.3 learned counsel's claim was that the petitioner had brought his case 'within the meaning of the aforesaid clause, because the Chak No.3 fell within the words "other sub‑divisions" in the said clause. New sub‑divisions may be created for purely fiscal purposes and in dismissing the petitioner's second appeal, the learned Judge observed: "What actually is required for the purposes of Pre‑emption Act is that a Patti should have homogeneity of descent and area meaning that the land‑owners of every Patti should be separate, no stranger should own land in the said Patti and that the land‑owners should belong to the same caste." Learned counsel very fairly conceded that the view taken by the learned Judge was based on judgments of the Lahore High Court reported in Ram Partap v. Kishen Singh A I R 1937 Lah.32, in Raja Painda Khan v. Sardar Kahan Singh A I R 1937 Lah.703 and in Gul Muhammad v. Sadaruddin and others P L D 1951 Lah.

437. As the trend of authority is clear and consistent and is against the petitioner's contention, learned counsel submitted that the view taken in these three Lahore judgments required examination, because the word, "other" in the clause which we have quoted had not been properly examined. We would be reluctant to reverse a trend of authority so consistent and clear and in any event we find that the Lahore view has been approved by this Court in Wazir Din v. Hidayat and two others 1973 S C M R

254. Therefore, we are unable to accept learned counsels submission. The petition is without merit and is dismissed. M.I. /Y‑11/S Petition dismissed.