1982 PLP 228 (PLC)

By its decision, given on 1st March, 1981 the learned Vth La bour Court, has dismissed the grievance petition of the appellant, chal lenging the termination of his services, on the ground that being Chowki dar he was not a workman for the purposes of, the Standing Orders and thus was not entitled to file and maintain such grievance petition under clause (3) of Standing Order

12. In coming to this decision the Learned Labour Court has relied upon the decisions of‑this Tribunal in the cases of Johnson and Johnson v. Zubair Ahmed (1980 P L C 622), Syed Lai Khan v. Rex Talkies and Khudadad Khan v. National Construction Company, in the Johnson & Johnson case it was held by this Tribunal that except in those cases where the termination of services of a worker is in conse quence of or has led to an industrial dispute, the worker was not entitled to file ‑a grievance petition against such termination unless he was a work man for the purposes of the Sind Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. In the latter two cases it way held by this Tribunal that a Chowkidar is not a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders as he is not employed to do any manual or clerical work.

2. As Mr. S. P. Lodhi, the learned Reprsentative of the appellant is absent. I have not had the benefit of hearing has arguments but have heard the appellant in person.

3. It is not disputed that the appellant was employed by the respondent Corporation as Chowkidar. However, it has been claimed on behalf of the appellant that besides the work of Chowkidar he was emp loyed to perform the following duties :‑ (a) To count the cotton bales received and removed from the plots at T P X Godown while and at which godowns he was on duty. (b) To count loose cotton boras placed and removed at the go downs. (c) To mark cotton bales with the following marks: (i) Lot No. of the factory from where received ; (ii) C E C lot No; (iii) Station from where received; (iv) Quality of Cotton; (v) Number of Bales in the lot; and (vi) Date of receipt of the bales.

4. Even if it be conceded that the appellant was also' required to perform the above duties he would not fall within the definition of "workman" as given in the Standing Orders. It is not disputed that his primary and principal duty was of Watchman. The duties detailed" above were merely incidental to his main or principal duty. In the case of Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd. v. General Secretary, Union Karkunane, Brooke Bond (P L D 1969 Lah 717), a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, while rejecting the plea that a salesman in the Brooke Bond Company was a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders, merely because he had to perform some manual or clerical labour, observed as follows:‑ "According to this definition a `workman' is employed in an industry to do skilled or unskilled work which is 'manual or cleri cal'. Manual work entails physical exertion to distinguish from the mental or intellectual exertion involved in the clerical work. But both the manual and clerical work. in the sense these terms are used here, connotes that it is more or less a routine work, not requiring any great amount of initiative, .imagination, direction control and supervision in discharging the same. The true nature of the duties performed by the employee is the determining factor in ascertaining if he was a workman or not within this definition. In case the manual work forms only a small and an anxiliary art of his responsibilities or he is incidentally required to prepare a state ment, maintain a register or submit a report, he cannot be consi dered to be a workman if otherwise his main and primary duties do not belong to this category. The true test, therefore, is to look to the direct, immediate and the substantial part of the work for which he is employed and not the sundry duties inciden tally performed by him."

5. Since the duties detailed above, assuming that the appellant was required to perform the same, were merely incidental to his main and primary duties of Chowkidar, the appellant cannot be considered to be a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders. I would, accordingly, uphold the finding of the learned Labour Court and dismiss the appeal in limine.