1995 PLP 1405 (MLD)

(b) Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act (XV of 1975)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S.7‑‑‑Appeal against acquittal‑‑‑Maintainability‑‑‑Provincial Government had authorised the Advocate‑General only to institute the appeal‑‑‑Appeal against acquittal of accused instituted/presented by the Assistant Advocate- General was, therefore, not maintainable and was dismissed accordingly. K. M. Nadeem, Asstt. A. G. for the State. By this order we intend to dispose the objection raised with regard to proper institution and presentation of the present appeal. The facts relevant for the purposes of the above point are that the present appeal has been instituted under section 7 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Act, which memo. is signed by the Assistant Advocate‑General (Mr. K.M. Nadeem). The said signatures are made by the Assistant Advocate‑General on his own behalf and not on behalf of or for the Advocate‑General, Sindh. The objection that has arisen is that this signing of the memo of appeal or presentation of appeal by the Assistant Advocate‑General is not according to the provisions of section 7 of the Act and, therefore, the same cannot be said to be a valid and legal institution of the appeal. Mr. K.M. Nadeem, A. A. G. has submitted that the definition of Advocate‑General, Sindh as provided in section 4(a), Cr.P.C. would show that the Advocate‑General, Sindh includes Assistant Advocate‑General also as 6e is a Government Advocate and, therefore, the authorisation in favour of the Advocate‑General can also be deemed to be in favour of the Assistant Advocate‑General. The learned A. A. G. has further submitted that even otherwise this could be an irregularity which can be cured subsequently. The basic question which requires consideration is firstly as to whether any mode of filing and presentation of the appeal has been provided in the Act. It may be observed at the very outset that it is established law that in case of special law the general law will not be applicable. Even otherwise the act provides that the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code would be applicable only when there is no relevant provision in the Act as far as the procedural law is concerned. The provisions of section 7 provides that an acquittal appeal may be filed before the High Court from the orders passed by the Special Court by a person appointed by the Provincial Government for the purpose to present such appeal. This is a very specific provision whereby only person appointed by the Provincial Government for the purpose can institute or present the appeal before the High Court. Keeping this provision in mind we refer to the Sanction Order bearing No. OP: 7(95)/92/289, dated 21‑12‑1992. This order is issued from the office of the Secretary to Government of Sindh, Law Department and is addressed to "the Advocate‑General Sindh" and shows that it is the Advocate‑General, Sindh who has been authorised to institute the appeal. In these circumstances and in view of the specific provisions provided under section 7 of the Act there is hardly any scope left for assuming that this authorisation includes the authorisation in the name of the Assistant Advocate -General. The learned A. A. G. has also referred to Article 140 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. These provisions of the Constitution has no bearing .to the present case as it deals with the appointment of the Advocate‑General, Sindh by the Governor. The learned Assistant Advocate‑General has referred to section 419, Cr.P.C. and submitted that under the said provisions an appeal can be instituted but the same is silent with regard to signing of the memo of appeal. We do not intend to enter into this controversy at this stage as already pointed out above, we have observed that the present appeal is instituted under section 7 of the Act and not under Cr.P.C and, therefore, this provision, Cr.P.C. would not be applicable to the present case. In view of the above observations, we are of the considered opinion that this appeal having been instituted/presented by the Assistant Advocate -General, Sindh who had not been authorised or appointed as provided under section 7 of the Act by the Provincial Government, the same is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed. N.H.Q./S‑1135/K Appeal dismissed.