1995 PLP 429 (MLD)

This First Rent Appeal is directed against the order, dated 1‑9‑1993 passed by the 1st Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi, South, whereby the objections filed by the appellant were rejected and the writ of possession was ordered to be issued. The facts leading to the filing of the above appeal are that the premises bearing No. AK‑12‑A‑5‑S‑7 situated in Rexer Line, Lyari Quarters, Karachi (New number Plot No.1077) was let by the respondent to the appellant. In or about 1984 respondent filed Rent Case No. 3268 of 1984 (New No. 736/85) against the appellant and his brother Noor Muhammad for eviction of the appellant from the premises on the ground of subletting. It was found that the appellant is not a sub‑tenant but is the tenant of the premises. The respondent also filed eviction Case No. 3268/84 (new No.736/85) on the ground of default in payment of rent and personal requirement. The eviction application was allowed by order, dated 30‑11‑1986. The appellant preferred appeal being F.RA. No. 106/87 in this Court., he appeal was partly allowed and impugned decision on, the ground of default was reversed. However, the findings of the Rent Controller on the ground of personal requirement was upheld. Against the said judgment dated 19‑5‑1991 the appellant preferred a petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court but the same was dismissed. It is the case of the appellant that both appellant and respondent being `Baluchees' from the same community, the orders of the community intervened in the matter and due to their intervention, the matter was amicably settled down between the appellant and the respondent whereby the respondent offered the said premises for sale to the appellant and an agreement of sale was executed on 76‑11‑1991. The respondent had agreed to sell the premises to the appellant for a total sale consideration of Rs.45,

000. It is the case of the appellant that the respondent received a slim of Rs.40,000 as part payment towards sale consideration. It is further case of the appellant that up to the time of execution of the agreement of sale, the appellant had been occupying the premises as tenant. On the date of execution of the agreement of sale on 16‑11‑1991, the respondent under clause 7 of the agreement of sale handed over possession of the said premises to the appellant and since 16‑11‑1991 the appellant has been in occupation and possession of the said premises strictly under the agreement of sale as purchaser of the said agreement. The decree- holder filed reply to the objections stating therein that the objections are based on forged and fabricated documents. The Rent Controller after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, rejected the objections. The appellant has challenged the impugned order in this appeal. I have heard Mr. Muhammad Afsar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and perused the impugned order. Learned counsel for the appellant raised the same contention as was raised before the Rent Controller. In order to appreciate the contention of the appellant, it is advantageous to reproduce the explanation to section 22 of the‑ Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which reads as under:‑‑‑ "In the execution proceedings relating to the order of ejectment, no payment, compromise or agreement shall be valid unless such payment, compromise or agreement is made before or with the permission of the authority passing the order." A perusal of the above provisions would show that in the execution proceedings relating to the order of ejectment, no payment, compromise or agreement shall be valid unless such payment, compromise or agreement is made before or with the permission of the authority passing the order. The section makes it obligatory to obtain the permission of the authority passing the order whenever any agreement is made before or after such order. Admittedly in the instant case, no such permission has been obtained. It seems that the Rent Controller has rightly rejected the objections filed by the appellant. For the aforesaid reasons the appeal was dismissed by me in limine by my short order dated 26‑9‑1993 passed on conclusion of the arguments. H.B.T./A‑1499/ K Appeal dismissed.