P (PLP)

The suit was tried as a small cause suit and dismissed with the following order:‑ "The only question for determination in this case is whether the defendant was let in possession of the house in dispute and is liable to pay rent? My finding on this issue is against the plaintiffs. The suit is; therefore, dismissed with costs" It was argued that this was not a proper order according to law, and reliance was placed on A. I. R. 1943 Bombay

416. Now, Order 20 rule 4, sub‑rule (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly lays down that judgments of a Court of Small Causes need not contain more than the points for determination and the decision thereon, whereas under sub‑rule (2) it has been made clear that judgments of other Courts should also contain the reasons for the decision. At the same time section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act provides that the High Court, for the purpose of satisfy ing itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to law, may call for the case and pass, such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit. It was observed in the Bombay case aforesaid that if the High Court is empowered to satisfy itself that a decree or order of the judge of a Small Cause Court was in accordance with law or not, "a correlative duty is impliedly cast on that judge to make his judgment sufficiently intelligible to enable the High Court to perform its duty properly". It was pointed out that the Judge might, without giving his reasons for the decision, elucidate the points for determination in such detail as to make the decision intelligible. That, I respectfully agree, would be the proper way of looking at the two provisions of law. In the present case, for instance, the learned judge might have said that "the points for determination were whether the rent note executed by the defendant was not binding on him in view of the fact that possession of the property was with Charagh Din as mortgagee and that Charagh Din had actually rented out the property to Sardar Muhammad and Muhammad Jan." Upon an examination of the record I find that Charagh Din as D. W. 2 has claimed to be the mortgagee and to have let out two portions of the property to Sardar Muhammad (D. W. 3) and Muhammad Jan (D. W. 4) who support him. The plaintiffs witness, Hasam‑ud‑Din (P. W. 1), who is brother of the first two plaintiffs and father of the third plaintiff, admitted in cross‑examina tion that Charagh Din was a mortgagee with possession and that the plaintiffs had instituted a suit against him for a declaration. Learned counsel, Mr. A. R. Niazi, argued that the suit in question had been decided in favour of the plaintiffs and offered to produce a copy of the decree which was passed in January 1949. Now, since the evidence for the parties was examined on the 13th August 1949, I do not understand why this copy was neither produced in evidence nor referred to in the re‑examination of the plaintiffs' witness, although actually re‑examination was conducted on a less important point. I see no reason to interfere and dismiss the petition with costs. A. H. Petition dismissed.