1981 PLP 289 (PLC)

2. I have heard at length the counsel for the parties and have also perused the entire material available on the record.

3. Mr. Asghar Mahmood, learned counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection that the present appeal is not competent. Appeal before this Tribunal is provided under section 37(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordnance, 1969, which is reproduced below alongwith subsection (4) of the same section:‑ "(3) Any party aggrieved by an award given under subsection (1) or a decision given under section 25‑A or section 34 or a sentence passed under clause (c) of subsection (5) of section 35 may prefer an appeal to Labour Appellate Tribunal within 30 days of the delivery or passing thereof and the decision of the Tribunal in such appeal shall be final. (4) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Ordinance, all decisions of, and all sentence passed by, a Labour Court shall be final and shall not be called` in question in any manner by or before any Court or other authority." A perusal of the above shows that appeal lies before the Labour Appellate Tribunal only against‑ (a) an award given under subsection (I) of section 37 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969; (b) a decision given under sections 25‑A and 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969; and (c) a sentence passed under clause (c) of subsection (5) of section 35 of ‑the Ordinance. And all other decisions of, and sentences passed by, a Labour Court are not appealable. The impugned decision in the instant case has been passed by the Labour Court under Standing Order 11‑A of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, which is not covered by the above subsection (3) of section 37 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and therefore, is not appealable. It is not denied that unless a right of appeal is specifically created under the statute, no party can claim that right. The learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to point out any provision of law under which such an appeal lies before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Consequently, it is held that against an order passed by a Labour Court under Standing Order 11‑A of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, no appeal is competent before the Labour Appellate Tribunal under section 37(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordi nance, 1969.

4. Confronted with the above situation, Mr. Fazle Mahmood, learned counsel for the appellants, had verbally prayed that‑ the present appeal may be treated as a revision petition under subsection (3a) of section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. This subsection reads as under:‑ "(3a) The Tribunal may, on its own motion at any time, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Ordinance in which a Labour Court within its jurisdiction has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of such order, and may pass any such order, in relation thereto as it thinks fit." No doubt unfettered power is given to the Tribunal under the above sub section to call for the record of any case or proceedings at any time on its own motion, but the words "under this Ordinance" after the word "proceed ings" are very significant and confine the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to such orders and proceedings Which are under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. In other words, the order or the proceedings, against which a revision petition can lie before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, must be passed or be pending under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, before a Labour Court. Conversely, if a Labour Court has passed some order or the proceedings are pending, under some law other than the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, such order or proceedings will not be revisable before the Labour Appellate Tribunal under section. 38(3‑a) of the Ordinance. In the instant case admittedly the impugned decision has been passed by the Labour Court under Standing Order 11‑A of the W. P. B Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and, therefore, it is not revisable under section 38(3‑a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

5. The upshot of the above discussion is that an order passed by a Labour Court under Standing Order 11‑A is neither appealable under section 37(3), nor revisable under section 38(3‑a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, before the Labour Appellate Tribunal.

6. In view of the above, this appeal is dismissed being incompetent. Appeal dismissed.