2003 PLP 1560 (YLR)

L.D.A. v. Khalid Javed & Co. 1983 SCMR 718 ref. Akhtar Ali Mahmood for Appellant. Khalid Jawaid Khan for Respondent. Date of hearing 27th March, 2002. ATA‑UR‑REHMAN, J.‑‑‑By this common judgment, we propose to dispose of the two Appeals Nos. 125 and 136 of 2000, arising out of the common judgment dated 6‑7‑1998 in Suits Nos.704 and 705 of 1994.

2. The facts are that the parties entered into two contracts in 1978 and 1990 for raising construction on two projects of the appellant. After the construction, both contracts were completed and the respondents had obtained maintenance certificate from the Engineers appointed by the appellant;' respondents raised certain claims, which were disputed by the appellants. The respondents filed two suits bearing Nos. 818 of 1987 and 69 of 1988 before the High Court. The provisions of Arbitration clause was invoked in these suits and the Court in both the suits appointed Mr. Justice (Retd.) Durab Patel as sole Arbitrator.

3. The learned Arbitrator after taking the pleadings on record, framing the issues and examining the witnesses of the parties announced the common award, which was filed in the Court sometime in October, 1994. The appellants filed an application under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, praying therein for setting aside the award. The respondents filed their counter‑affidavits. The learned Single Judge heard the parties and passed the impugned judgment.

4. The main ground raised by the appellants is that the claim of the respondents was barred by time. We have perused and examined the award and also the impugned judgment. The learned Arbitrator discussed each and every point raised by the appellant before him, more particularly the ground of limitation. We refer to paras. 28, 29, 30 and 31 of the award wherein the learned Arbitrator took into consideration the contention raised by the parties as to which of the Article i.e. 65 or 115 of the Limitation Act will apply. After discussing the scope of the two Articles and clauses 16 and 19 of the contract he held that the starting points of the Limitation in the two Arbitrations were the dates on which the plaintiff received the maintenance certificates from the appellant's Engineers.

5. The learned Single Judge while passing the impugned judgment also held the same view. He while discussing scope of the adjudication of the objection on the award referred to the case of Joint Venture KG v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 108), wherein it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the Court while examining validity of the award does not act as a Court of appeal. Where reasons recorded by the Arbitrator are challenged as perverse, the perversity in the reasons has to be established with reference to the material considered by the Arbitrator in the award. The learned counsel for the respondent referred to various case laws including the case of State Life Insurance Corporation v. Abdul Latif Construction Company and others (1984 CLC 155‑157) wherein it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that the Arbitrators are to decide all questions of law and fact which include determination on the point of limitation. It was further held that the determination of question of limitation entirely depends upon assessment of evidence.

6. As stated hereinbefore, we examined the award, the impugned judgment and in our view neither the finding of the Arbitrator nor of the trial Court can be said to be perverse or p suffering from any illegality, requiring; any interference in appeal.

7. In the end we refer the case of L.D.A. v. Khalid Javed & Co. (1983 SCMR 718‑719) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that despite the declared policy of Government for ensuring speedy and inexpensive justice even Government Depart ments and statutory bodies, so frequently, are indulging in wasteful and unnecessary litigation; and that it is at their behest that in all contracts entered into by them a clause is inserted to the effect that any dispute which may arise during the completion of the contract between the parties will be decided through arbitration and other than by the ordinary Courts. Here also the appellants being a statutory body is raising merely technical objections and protracting the proceedings and thereby depriving the respondents from their rightful claim.

8. We do not find any substance in these appeals, the same are dismissed and the impugned judgment is maintained. The parties are left to bear their own costs. M.B.A./P‑68/K Appeals dismissed.