1985 PLP 476 (SCMR)
EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY BOARD‑‑Petitioner Versus MUHAMMAD SHARIF‑‑Respondent
| Citation | 1985 PLP 476 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | High Court |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Afzal Zullah and M.S.H. Quraishi, JJ |
| Parties | EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY BOARD‑‑Petitioner Versus MUHAMMAD SHARIF‑‑Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1985 PLP 476 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1985 PLP 476 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Muhammad Afzal Zullah and M.S.H. Quraishi, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1985 PLP 476 (SCMR) (EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY BOARD‑‑Petitioner Versus MUHAMMAD SHARIF‑‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Fazal‑i‑Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Muhammad Aslam, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
- Nemo for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 22nd August, 1984.
Headnotes / Summary
(From the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, dated 9‑2‑1981 in Settlement Appeal No. 25 of 1969). (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑ ‑‑‑Art. 185(3)‑‑Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958),. S.2(4)‑‑Evacuee Janj Ghar‑‑Determination of status as Trust Property‑‑Concurrent finding of fact by Settlement Commissioner and High Court‑‑Observation that mere use of property as Janj Ghar not to transform it into Trust Property, held, unexceptionable Impugned finding of fact not suffering from any legal defect leave to appeal refused. (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑ ‑‑‑Art. 185(3)‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XLI, r. 27‑ Production of additional evidence in appellate Court denied‑‑Concurrent findings of fact not suffering from any legal defect‑‑Leave to appeal refused holding that petitioner had sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence sought to be led at appellate stage and that it would not have made any difference with regard to findings of fact.
Judgment & Decree
MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑‑ Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment dated 6‑2‑1981 of the Lahore High Court; whereby Auqaf Appeal No.25 of 1969, was dismissed. The petitioner (Evacuee Trust Board) had raised a question before a Settlement Commissioner through reference regarding the status of the property in dispute as an evacuee Trust Property because as asserted, it was a Janj Ghar. The Settlement Commissioner after affording due opportunity to the petitioner held that the building in question which appeared to be a house, was not an evacuee Trust Property. On appeal a learned Judge in the High Court affirmed the finding of fact reached by the Settlement Commissioner. Therefore, now the Evacuee Trust Board has sought leave to appeal. Learned counsel has raised two‑fold contention: One, relating to the merits of the concurrent findings of fact challenged in this petition; and secondly that the petitioner wanted to adduce additional evidence at the appellate stage which opportunity was denied to it. Learned counsel has brought to our notice the material on the basis of which according to his submission the property could have been treated as belonging to an Evacuee Trust. it includes certain photographs of the front part of the house showing that it was used as a Janj Ghar. It has also been pointed out by the learned counsel that one of the rooms in the building, was being used as the office of an Evacuee Trust, but it could be as a tenant of the owner. Be that as it may the concurrent findings of fact impugned before us do not suffer from any legal defect. The observation of the High Court that the mere use of the property as Janj Ghar would not transform it into a Trust property, in our view is unexceptionable. Learned counsel tried to rely on some judgments where the use of the word Dharam Sala led to the presumption that it was a Trust property, but he could not press the arguments any further, when it was pointed out that the expression Dharam Sala in its connotation depending upon the circumstances of each case is totally different from the connotation of the expression Janj Ghar. Regarding the additional evidence suffice it to observe that even if it would have been admitted, it would not have made any difference with regard to the findings of fact. Secondly it cannot be said that the petitioner had not sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence which was sought to be led at the appellate stage. This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. M.I. Petition dismissed.