1989 PLP 3526 (MLD)

Date of hearing: 4th February, 1989. This revision petition assails the judgment/decree dated 8‑9‑1987 passed by the learned District Judge, Okara, whereby he reversed the decision passed by the trial Court to the extent of the present petitioners‑plaintiffs.

2. The land in question was inherited by the parties. According to the version of respondent No. 1‑defendant, he had purchased it from all the four sisters. Two of them brought the present suit to challenge that they in fact had made no such sale in his favour. One of them abandoned the suit in the course of the present revision; whereas the petitioner pursued it maintaining, inter alia, that she had never appeared before the Revenue Officer and further that she was minor at the time of sale. According to her, she was born on 29‑10‑1949, while the sale mutation was attested on 6‑7‑1966. She brought the present suit on 24‑3‑1983.

3. Respondent No. 1‑defendant contested the suit pleading that the petitioner had willingly made the sale and had even received some consideration amount. He pleaded bar of limitation as well.

4. The trial Court decreed the suit to the extent of Mst. Bahishtan, the present petitioner and dismissed it as on behalf of Mst. Rajjan. Both of them preferred appeals. The learned appellate Court dismissed the suit as a whole.

5. Mst. Bahishtan, petitioner has challenged it before this Court in the present revision petition urging mainly that she was a minor on 6‑7‑1966: Assuming so she could bring the suit latest within three years after attaining majority which she had attained in 1967. Under section 8 of the Limitation Act she had a period of further three years counting from the date of attaining majority. It expired on 28‑10‑1970. She brought the suit on 24‑3‑1983, i.e. thirteen years after the expiry of the limitation provided by section 8 ibid. It was rightly dismissed.

6. Mr. Muhammad Rafique Chauhan submitted that the allegation of fraud was also levelled and that the evidence was totally misread. It is a question of fact. I have gone through the judgment and could not find anything conspicuously wrong with the appreciation thereof as made by the learned District Judge. The main point urged here was that she did not appear before the Tehsildar and that he attested the mutation acting only on the Puppet Roznamcha Exh. P.

8. Incidentally she did not annex copy of the Parat Sarkar of the mutation and the one produced was only Parat Patwar which obviously was not admissible. Conversely, the Tehsildar had appeared to state that she had conceded the transfer before him. There was nothing substantial shown against the Tehsildar's testimony.

7. Mr. Chauhan claimed that the mutation attested in the absence of the petitioner‑transferor being void could be challenged any time as no limitation was prescribed for such a suit. He placed reliance upon Hussain Bakhsh and others v. Settlement Commissioner and another P L D 1969 Lah. 1039 in this behalf but the contrary view has now been explicitly laid down in S. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee 1987 S C M R 367 where it was enunciated that "a writ may be refused against a void order if this would enable the petitioner to circumvent the provisions of a statute of limitation". Similarly in Abdur Rehman Janjua v. Punjab Bar Council P L D 1983 Lah. 47 a writ was refused against a void order on the ground of laches. Consequently it was not easy to ignore a long delay of thirteen years. The suit was rightly dismissed.

8. The revision petition is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. H.B.T./R‑167/L Revision dismissed.