P L D 1957 (W (PLP)

AKHLAQUE HUSAIN, J.‑

This appeal arises out of a judgment and decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Mianwali, dated the 4th of November 1954. One Langar made an oral gift of 40 Kanals and 2 Marlas of land out of the property owned by him in Mauza Husainwala to his wife, Mst. Gulai alias Mst. Gullan. Both Langar and Gulai are dead. The sole question involved in this appeal is whether the gift was of a life estate as held by both the lower Courts or of an absolute estate as contended by the appellants. The only facts relating to the gift which are on the record are contained in Exh. P. 5, Intiqual Mauza Husainwala. An entry made therein by the Patwari on the 30th of June 1923 reads: "Langar Khan appeared before me today and stated that he hail gifted the land mentioned in the mutation to his wife. On the 23rd of July the Girdawar noted that column No. 9 relating to the name of the transferee had not been filled in and the omission was rectified on the same day. On the 1st of August 1923 the matter came up before the Revenue Officer who recorded as follows:‑ "Langar Khan who was identified by Sher Khan Lambardar of Ahmadkhanwala acknowledged the gift in public assembly and stated: 'I have separated 40 Kanals and 2 Marlas of land for my wife which will be cultivated on her behalf'. The tatimma should, therefore, be prepared on the spot and should be put up after verification by the Girdawar. (Sd.) Revenue Officer." "Langar Khan again stated: Mst. Gulai shall not have the right to alienate the land and shall only have the usufruct for her life and after her my sons shall divide it in equal shares." 1‑8‑1923. (Sd.) Revenue Officer." Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the gift was complete either on the 20th June or on the 23rd July or by the latest when the first statement of Langar Khan was recorded by the Revenue Officer on the 1st of August 1923; that this gift was of an absolute interest in the gifted property and that it was not open to the donor to subsequently revoke or modify the gift as he attempted to do in his second state ment made before the Revenue Officer on the 1st of August.. It is admitted by both sides at the Bar that the gift was governed by custom according to which it could be completed only by delivery of possession. There is no evidence on the record, outside Exh. P. 5, to show when the possession was delivered to the donee. There is nothing in Exh. P. 5 to show that possession had been delivered before the 1st of August 1923. One mode of delivering possession of immovable property is by having mutation recorded in the name of the donee which in this case was not admittedly done until January 1924. The real question, however, in this case is as to the interpretation to be placed upon the statement made by the donor to the Patwari and that made by him before the Revenue Officer on the 1st of August in the first instance. Neither of these statements was taken down in the actual words used by the donor; nor do they purport to be full and exhaustive. In the statement of the 30th June even the name of the donee is not mentioned. When the donor said that he had gifted the property to his wife he did not say whether it was for life or absolute. In view of the fact that the donor and his family were governed by custom, it is perhaps more likely, or at least as likely, that he intended to give the property to his wife only for life‑especially when he had sons. When the intention of the donor is to be gathered only from the statements recorded by the Patwari and the Revenue Officer during the mutation proceedings, it is not only legitimate but necessary that all the connected state ments must be read together and their cumulative effect determined. If the language used is not clear even the surrounding circumstances may have to be looked into. In this particular case there is no reason, or law, to isolate the donor's first statement made on the 1st of August from that made by him immediately afterwards The second statement was not made to contradict anything contained in the first and was intended only to explain and modify it. For the above reasons, I dismiss this appeal with costs. A. H. Appeal dismissed.