1986 PLP 1619 (MLD)

(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ‑‑‑5. 115 & O.XXXIX, Rr.l, 2 & 4‑‑Temporary injunction, vacation of‑‑Petitioner neither had been allotted property in dispute nor had been paying rent of same‑‑Mere fact that petitioner had raised construction without permission of Authority concerned, held, would not confer any right of title on such petitioner Interim in junction granted to petitioner by trial Court, having rightly been vacated by Appellate Court was not liable to be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction of High Court. H. Ameer Ahmed Khan for Applicant. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th. March 1986. This revision is directed against, the judgment of IIIrd Additional District Judge, West Karachi, dated 29‑1‑1986, whereby he allowed the appeal of the respondent No.1 and set aside the order of the IXth Senior Civil Judge, dated 17‑9‑1984 who had allowed the application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. and granted an injunction restraining the respondent No.1 from ejecting the appellant and respondent No.2, who were in occupation of two shops in Block 'B' Hasrat Mohani Colony, Manghopir Road, Karachi since 1965. They had been paying taxes to this. appellants. They had filed suit against the respondent No.1 (Civil Suit No.2276. of 1968) which was decreed on 28‑8‑1978, against respondent No.1. No appeal was filed against this decree and, therefore, it became conclusive. In March, 1983, the respondent No.1 attempted to demolish this shop hence appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 filed the present suit on the ground shown above as well as on the. ground that area was declared Katcha Abadi and would be transferred to the appellants in due course. An application for interim injunction was also made before the learned Civil Judge which was allowed as shown above. Against the said order, the respondent No.1 filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge which was allowed as has been shown above. The said order is being impugned in this R.A. before this Court. Mr. Muslim Naqvi who has appeared for respondent No.1 has taken me through the facts of the case. He has supported his contention by D.B. judgment (unreported Ch. Muhammad Sharif and others v. K.M.C. and another Constitutional Petition No.D‑1330 of 1978) where Article 15 of the P.C.O. was taken in the consideration and it was held that jurisdiction of this Court to go into the validity of an order was barred. He further relied upon the judgment of another D.B. in Constitutional Petition No.D‑374 of 1981, Sultan son of 'Mir Zaman v. K.M.C., where the jurisdiction to interfere with the orders passed under Martial Law Ordinance was completely, barred under Article 15 of P.C.O. He then cited the case 1982 C L C 1979 where another D.B. of this Court had gone to the extent of holding that even wrong application of Martial Law Ordinance or Martial Law Regulation by competent authorities was beyond the power of judicial review of this Court. I find myself in an agreement with contention of Mr. Muslim Naqvi the actions taken by Martial Law Authorities under the various Martial Law Orders have been save under Article 270‑A(1) of Constitution. Mr. Amir Ahmed Khan was not able to controvert this contention. In reply he has cited Malik Iftikahr Ali v. Pakistan through Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division 1986 S C M R 1434, This ruling is distinguishable from the facts of the present case because it is a case under Articl 270 (4) of the Constitution and relates to the jurisdiction of Tribunal quo. In a case reported the 1982 S C‑ M R 375 it was held that the jurisdiction of the Courts including this Court to challenge any order passed under Martial Law Ordinance or Martial Law Regulation was completely barred. Apart from it, the applicant has no case on merits as well, because he had not produced any documentary evidence to show that he had raised constitution as alleged by him: This plot was never allotted to the petitioner. He was not paying ground rent for the building. Mere fact that the application had raised construction without permission of the K.M.C. would not confer any right of title on him. I am, therefore, of the view that the learned Additional District Judge had rightly dismissed the application of the appellant and had rightly vacated injunction order granted in his favour by the trial Court. Hence, I dismiss the R.A. in limine. H.B.T. Revision petition dismisseds.