SCMR 1998

1998 PLP 1289 (SCMR)

QADIR BAKHSH‑‑‑Petitioner Versus MUHAMMAD ASHRAF and others‑‑‑Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Supreme Court of Pakistan
Decided Date
Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.377 of 1995, decided on 23rd November, 1996.
Honorable Judges
Irshad Hasan Khan and Muhammad Bashir Jehangiri, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1998 PLP 1289 (SCMR)
Forum / Court Supreme Court of Pakistan
Bench Members Irshad Hasan Khan and Muhammad Bashir Jehangiri, JJ
Parties QADIR BAKHSH‑‑‑Petitioner Versus MUHAMMAD ASHRAF and others‑‑‑Respondents
Primary Law Punjab Pre‑emotion Act (IX of 1991)‑‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1998 PLP 1289 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: Punjab Pre‑emotion Act (IX of 1991)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1998 PLP 1289 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan bench comprising: Irshad Hasan Khan and Muhammad Bashir Jehangiri, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1998 PLP 1289 (SCMR) (QADIR BAKHSH‑‑‑Petitioner Versus MUHAMMAD ASHRAF and others‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Punjab Pre‑emotion Act (IX of 1991)‑‑‑

Representation

  • Ch. Muhammad Akram, Advocate Supreme Court with Mehr Khan Malik, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
  • Nemo for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing: 23rd November, 1996.
  • Ch. Muhammad Akram, Advocate Supreme Court with Mehr Khan Malik, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Headnotes / Summary

(On appeal from the order, passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, dated 15‑6‑1995 in W.P. No.3438 of 1995). ‑‑‑‑S. 24(1)‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)‑‑‑Deposit of Zar‑e Soyam‑‑‑Plaintiff failed to deposit Zar‑e‑Soyam as per order of Court made with consent of parties‑‑‑Dismissal of plaintiff's pre‑emotion suit by all the Courts including the High Court‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Plaintiff's contention was that Trial Court could not alter its earlier order about deposit of Zar‑e‑Soyam which he had complied‑‑‑Such contention had no substance since plaintiff's case was not one of variation of Zar‑e‑Soyam but compliance of consent order‑‑‑Trial Court having worked out sale price, had rightly directed plaintiff to deposit the same within specified period‑‑‑Plaintiff having agreed to deposit one‑third of sale price, was bound to deposit the same in terms of consent order passed by Trial Court‑‑‑As for reasonable time for deposit of pre‑emotion amount, such point having not been raised before any Court, could not be raised for the first time before Supreme Court‑‑‑Plaintiff having agreed to price determined by Trial Court, his subsequent conduct in re‑agitating such issue, disentitled him to grant of extension in time‑‑‑Leave to appeal was refused in circumstances. Muhammad Irshad v. Ch. Fazal Haq 1991 SCMR 2149 ref.

Judgment & Decree

IRSHAD HASAN KHAN, J.

This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order dated 15-6-1995 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 3438 of 1995 in a pre-emption matter.

2. The petitioner instituted a suit on 3-11-1994 for pre-emption in respect of the suit property against respondents Nos. l to

5. By order dated 3-11-1994, the learned trial Court issued notice to the Patwari concerned to produce list of five years average sale of the land in the vicinity. Meanwhile, the petitioner was directed to deposit Zare Soyam amounting to Rs.21,034 tentatively. However, on 10-4-1995 one year average sale price was worked out at Rs.6,300 per acre with the consent of the learned counsel for the plaintiff/petitioner. He also agreed to deposit 1/3rd of Zare Soyam amounting to Rs.27,000 after deducting Rs.1,834 earlier deposited. On 15-5-1995, learned counsel for the respondents raised an objection that the petitioner has failed to pay the total Zare Soyam as agreed to by him vide order dated 10-4-1995, inasmuch as Rs.6,300 were worked out as one year average sale price per acre but by order dated 10-4-1995, the petitioner was directed to deposit Zare Soyam in respect of the sale price of one acre alone, therefore, he was liable to pay the balance of Zare Soyam amounting to Rs.92,366 as the total amount comes to Rs.1,13,

400. The trial Court agreed with the counsel for the respondents/defendants and directed the petitioner to deposit the balance of Zare Soyam within one month.

3. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order in revision which was, however, dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Layyah by order dated 11-6-1995. Same was the fate of the Constitutional petition which was dismissed on 15-5-1995. Hence this petition.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the trial Court could not alter its earlier orders dated 3-11-1994 and 10-9-1995 in respect of deposit of Zare Soyam which the petitioner fulfilled. The contention is devoid of any force. This was not a case of variation of Zare Soyam but compliance of the consent order dated 10-9-1995. Admittedly, the average sale price was worked out as Rs.6,300 per acre for one year. The petitioner was, therefore, rightly ,directed to deposit the balance amount within a period of one month. It is true that order for deposit of 1/3rd as sale price, under section 24(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 (hereinafter called the Act) ordinarily once made is not alterable and the Trial Court have restricted powers under section 114 read with Order XLVII to review such order. However, in the instant case, as stated above, this was not a case for review but compliance of the order dated lt1-9-1995 to which the petitioner/pre-emptor agreed.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that in view of the dictum laid down in Muhammad Irshad v. Ch. Fazal Haq (1991 SCMR 2149). even in a case where no application is made for interim order the Court is bound to give reasonable time to the pre-emptor for deposit of pre-emption amount. This point was, however, neither taken in revision nor before the High Court and also find no mention in the petition for leave to appeal. The petitioner is, therefore, precluded to raise this point for the first time at this stage.

6. Be that as it may, we find that there were exceptional circumstances not to exercise discretion by the revisional Court to grant further time to the pre emptor while dismissing his revision petition, inasmuch as, having agreed to the price determined by the Trial Court his subsequent conduct in re-agitating the issue disentitled him to grant of extension in time. ''

7. Resultantly, we find no merit in this petition which is hereby dismissed. Leave is refused. A.A./Q-3/S Petition dismissed.