P L D 1967 Dacca 689 (PLP)

At the hearing of the appeal, the only argument which was advanced before me is that the appellate Court below seriously misdirected itself in dismissing the appeal on an untenable ground and that it should be sent back to the said appellate Court for a re‑hearing of the appeal in accordance with law. Learned Advocate for the appellant has placed the aforesaid provision of the Ordinance before me and has argued that the appeal was not hit by it although he had preferred the appeal at a time when the parent Ordinance as well as the amendment thereof had already come into existence. The question that I have to decide is: Does the Ordinance contemplate that a member of the minority community is debarred from defending themselves in a suit filed against him? This is really the crux of the question. In order to decide as to what is the meaning and purport of the term "suit", as used in section 6(2) of the aforesaid Ordinance, one has to interpret the term in its context. In East Pakistan Ordinance No. I of 1964 the preamble expressly recites as follows:‑ "Whereas it is expedient to provide for the speedy rehabi litation of persons affected by the civil disturbance in East Pakistan in January 1964, and for the protection of the immovable properties of the minority communities in the manner hereinafter appearing; The purpose of the enactment is stated to be protection of the members of the minority communities and to provide for their speedy rehabilitation. It was not designed to impose additional disabilities and burden on them. It is important to remember this. In this background if one turns to the provisions of section 6(2) of the amended Ordinance as quoted above, the meaning would be clear and patent. The Ordinance merely puts an embargo upon a litigation to be started against a member of the minority community. The relevant words read thus:‑ "No Court shall entertain any suit for . . . . ." Now the question is whether the term "suit", includes an appeal and also an application. It is true that under various circumstances the term "suit", includes an appeal. In this particular case, if plaintiffs had lost in the trial Court in the sense that their suit had been dismissed, and the plaintiffs then subsequently preferred an appeal when the said Ordinance had come into force, it could be argued that plaintiffs could not proceed with the appeal which would amount to a continuance of the suit because the said Ordinance had come into force in the meantime. In such a sense the term "suit" would include an "appeal", but, as I have stated above, the Ordinance is not designed to put an embargo upon members of the minority community to defend themselves against a suit brought against them. The embargo is on prosecution of a suit and not upon defending oneself against such a suit. Turning to this appeal the proper course would be to look, fairly and squarely, into the facts of the case. Defendant No. 2 whose, predecessors‑in‑interest, happen to be members of the minority community defended the suit instituted against him. Having lost in the trial Court he preferred an appeal which is a mere continuation of his defence. It is true that an appeal involves a continuation of the suit, but, in the present case it is a continuation of the defence. Can it be held that a member of the minority community is debarred, by the aforesaid provision of law, from defending himself? I do not think, such an interpretation is possible. The real question is not whether a suit would include an appeal but what is the nature of the embargo contemplated under section 6 (2) of the Ordinance. If I am right in interpreting the meaning and purpose of the Ordinance, it must be held that the intention of the enactment is not to prevent a member of the minority community from putting up his defence against an attack upon what he claims to be his properties. This being so, it is clear that the appeal preferred by defendant No. 2 could not be said to be hit by the aforesaid provision of the Ordinance. The term "suit" would l not include an appeal preferred by a defendant‑appellant, who happens to be a member of a minority community. The result, therefore is, that I allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court below. It is directed that this case be sent back on remand to the said Court for a re‑hearing of the appeal on its merits and its disposal in accordance with law and consonant to the observations made above. I make no order as to costs of this appeal. Let the records of this case be sent down to the Court below as early as possible. In view of the order mentioned above, no order is necessary in C. R. 618 (s) of 1966. K.B.A. Appeal accepted.