1970 PLP 220 (PLC)

M. JAMIL ASGHAR (CHAIRMAN).‑Ghulam Muhammad peti tioner, was employed as a Time‑keeper in the respondent's concern known as Punjab Vegetable Glee and General Mills Ltd., Lahore on 5‑3‑1951 at Rs. 150 P. M. On 31‑7‑1968, the petitioner was laid off by the respondent on the assurance that he would be recalled to duty later on. In April 1969, the respondent, who is the Managing Director of the said firm, recalled some of the employees for work and the petitioner also approached him on 28‑4‑1969 and requested him for employ ment, according to the assurance given to him previously, but the respondent flatly refused to accede to his request, and told him that his services had been terminated with effect from 31‑7‑1968. The petitioner along with other employees of the respondent served a joint notice/representation on 3‑5‑1969, demanding gratuity due to the termination of his service. The respondent ignored that representation. The petitioner thereafter moved this Court under Standing Order 18 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, praying that the respondent be directed to pay gratuity for 18 years amounting to Rs. 1,

035. It was also prayed that the respondent be burdened with cost. This petition was resisted and one of the preliminary objec tions taken by the respondent was that the petitioner was not a workman as defined in the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and as such he had no locus standi to claim any benefit or to file this application. Before dealing with the other preliminary objections as well as the petition on merits, we decided to hear arguments as to whether the petitioner is a workman as denfied under section 2(i) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968' section 2(i) reads as follows :‑ "Workman means any person employed in any Industrial or Commercial `Establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical `labour' for hire or reward." It is an admitted fact that the petitioner was a Time‑keeper. In other words it was his duty to note down the time of arrival of every workman, who came to work in the factory, that is to say that he had to do clerical work. The learned Representative of the respondent, however relied on the definition of labour given in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (third edition, page 1568), wherein it was mentioned:‑"Labour.‑ (1) `The expression used' (in the definition of 'workman' in the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict., C. 90), and Employers' Liability Act, 1880 (43 & 44 Vict., C. 42)", is not manual work; but manual labour'; for many occupations involve the former but not the later, such as telegraph clerks, and all persons engaged in writing (per Smith J., Cook v. Metropolitan Tramways Co., (18 Q B U 684); in which case it was held that the drier of a tram‑car, though engaged in manual work, is not engaged in manual labour, and is, therefore, not a "workman" within the Acts cited: so of a hair dresser (R. v. Louth Justices, (19(30) 2 1 R_ 714) (2) Probably; the true meaning of "labour" is this, "real 'labour' is that which tests a man's muscles and sinews"; (per Easher, M. R., Yarmouth v. Franc 19 Q B D 651)" In view of the above definition the learned representative contended that the petitioner was not engaged in manual labour and, therefore, he was not a workman under section 2(i). This definition of Labour, in our view, is based on the definition of workman given in the acts mentioned above, and as,, such has no bearing on the definition, given in section (1). We, accordingly, held that the petitioner is a workman a defined under section 2(i) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.