P L D 1964 W (PLP)

Route‑permit‑

R. T. A. and not Chairman can grant temporary permits‑Order of Chairman granting temporary permit subse quently ratified by R. T. A. Such orders cannot be sustained Temporary permit can be granted on conditions laid down in S. 62, Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1939). This is an appeal against the decision of R.T.A., Quetta, granting a temporary permit to Rode Mulla‑Zai Transport Company. On receipt of a report from P. A. Quetta, and the survey report of MM.P.I. Quetta, the R. T. A. in its meeting held on 4th February 1963, decided "to advertise Quetta Malta‑Zai route to invite applications for the grant of permits to run a daily bus service". Subsequently on a petition by some people of the locality, the Chairman passed an order on the petition itself granting a temporary permit. This order was subsequently ratified by the R.T.A. It is against the grant of this temporary permit that the present appeal has been filed. It is not relevant for the purposes of the present appeal to decide whether or not there is any justification for having a permanent service on this route. In this case, I am only concerned with the temporary permit, the legality of which deserves examination. It may be stated straightaway that the grant of temporary permit by the Chairman, does not appear legally justifiable. The representative of the R.T.A. was not in a position to state that f such a power had in fact ever been delegated to the Chairman of the R.T.A. and since the power of granting temporary permit vests in the R.T.A. itself and not its Chairman, the order of the Chairman appears to be without jurisdiction. And the subsequent order of the R.T.A. itself cannot be sustained. The only provision for the grant of temporary permits is contained in section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. This section lays down three specific conditions under which temporary permit can be granted. The first cover cases of such a grant on "special occasions such as to and from fairs". The second is for "seasonal business". Obviously these two clauses do not apply. The present case can only be considered under clause (c), which is "to meet a particular temporary need". The important word in this subsection is "temporary". In the present case the R.T.A.'s own finding is that the need is permanent. The school children need transport to go to higher schools which are situated at more than walking distance. Obviously this is a permanent need and as such, would call for the grant of permanent permits. This cannot, by any stretch, be considered a "temporary need" and as such, is not covered by subsection (c) of section

62. The order in question is thus not one under section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act and cannot, therefore, be sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of R.T.A. granting temporary permit to the respondent set aside. K. M. A. Appeal accepted.