P L D 1964 (W (PLP)

FARUQUI, J.

‑This order will dispose of Petition No. 368 of 1964 and Petition No. 374 of 1964, the first one was filed before the supersession of the P & T Co‑operative Housing Society Ltd., Karachi and the second one after the order of supersession was passed. The petitioners in both the cases are the same.

2. The Registrar, Co‑operative Societies, Karachi issued a notice under Rule 48 of the Karachi Co‑operative Societies Rules, 1927, to show cause as to why an order superseding it should not be made. There were eight instances of gross mis management set out in this notice and the Committee was called upon to furnish an explanation within two weeks. This was done on the 14th of April 1964. An exhaustive reply giving an explanation for whatever it was worth was submitted to the Registrar over the signature of the Honorary Secretary of the Society on behalf of the Managing Committee.

3. On the 1st of May 1964, the Registrar sent another notice under Rule 48 specifying some more charges and it was stated that this notice was in continuation of the previous notice dated the 2nd of April 1964. An explanation was called for in respect of these charges as well and this was submitted on the 18th of May 1964. Thereafter the Registrar by his order dated the 6th of June 1964 superseded the Managing Committee for a period of two years in exercise of his powers under Rule 48 (1) Further he appointed one Mr. Azizuddin Ahmad, Additional City Magistrate, Karachi, as Administrator of the said Society to exercise all powers and duties of the Committee under Rule 48 (3) for the period of supersession.

4. Mr. Sami Ahmad, the learned Advocate for the petitioners in these two petitions, has questioned the validity of the order dated the 6th of June 1964 whereby the Managing Committee was superseded by the Registrar. The earlier petition which was directed against the notice to show cause was rightly not pressed because that notice merged into the order which is the subject matter of Petition No. 374 of 1964. Two contentions were urged by the learned counsel, firstly, that the Registrar should have given a personal hearing before passing the order superseding the Managing Committee, and, secondly, that Rule 48 (1) under which the impugned order was passed was ultra vires of the powers of the Provincial. Government in so far as section 71 of the Bombay Co‑operative Societies Act did not empower the framing of such a rule.

5. The first contention of Mr. Sami was based on sub-clause (6) (a) of Rule 48, the material portion of which reads "(6) Before making an order under sub‑rule (1) the Registrar shall (a) give the society an opportunity to show cause why such an order should not be made." The learned counsel contended that the requirement of this rule is that not only a show‑cause notice should be given by the Registrar and the explanation in answer to this notice should be perused by him that it was imperative for him to have given a personal hearing. It was further contended that the principles of natural justice required that the Members of the Managing Committee should have been heard before an order superseding a Committee was passed. We are unable to agree. Sub‑rule (6) (a) merely provides for an opportunity to show cause and from this it does not follow that a personal hearing is contemplated. I fact having regard to the purposes of the Act and the effectiveness of an order under sub‑rule (1) of rule 48 it seems to us that a ; long drawn out inquiry upon a personal hearing might defeat the very purpose of an order of supersession the object of which would be to stop gross mismanagement and mala administration of the property and funds of the Society. Cases were cited by the learned counsel wherein it has been held that it was not enough that a written explanation should have been entertained and that it was necessary that the party affected by the order should have been personally heard. It may, however, be noted that these cases arose under the Sea Customs Act and under the Income tax Act. Both these Acts provide for appeals and revision by the party aggrieved. A personal hearing in a given case arising under these statutes may certainly be necessary. The same considerations do not arise in a case such as the one with which we are dealing. In the present case the Registrar was careful enough to send two notices containing detailed charges and the Committee had the opportunity of giving its full explanation in answer to both. These were duly considered as appears upon the face of the impugned order. In our opinion the requirements of Rule 48 (6) (a) were fulfilled by the procedure followed by the Registrar. We there fore, repel the first contention.

6. With regard to the second point it was pointed out by the learned counsel was that the rule‑making power is derived from section 71 of the Bombay Co‑operative Societies Act which entitles the Provincial Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act and amongst the purposes mentioned in the section item (g) enables the Provincial Government merely to make rules for the removal of the Members of the Committee. It was, therefore, urged that Rule 48 (1) which provides for supersession of the Committee is in excess of the rule‑making power of the Provincial Government. We do not agree. The Provincial Government is empowered to frame rules to carry out the purposes of the Act and subsection (2) of section 71 lays down that in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power such rules may . . . . Then follow a large number of subjects which are expressly stated as being fit matters for the framing of the Rules. The generality of the power of the Provincial Government is not limited to the items mentioned in section 71 so long the rule is framed for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Moreover, in so far as item (g) expressly provides for the making of a rule for the removal of the Members of the Committee it cannot be said that a rule which provides for the removal of the whole committee is ultra vires of the rule making powers of the Provincial Government. We, therefore, repel the second contention as well.

7. No other point was urged. We would like, however, to add that even if there had been some legal defect in the order passed by the Registrar we would not have exercised our discre tionary powers under Article 98 of the Constitution in this case. This is not a fit case in which the Court would have come to the rescue of the Members of the Committee so that they could carry on instead of the Administrator appointed by the Registrar. We, therefore, dismiss both the Petitions summarily. K. B. A. Petitions dismissed.