1994 PLP 582 (SCMR)

SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J: ‑‑On a petition received from jail leave to appeal was granted to the convict to examine whether on the benefit of amnesty being available to him and the sentence of death on five counts converted into life imprisonment the sentence was to run concurrently or consecutively.

2. For an occurrence which took place on 29‑5‑1985 the appellant Shah Muhammad alias Manna was convicted by the trial Court by its judgment dated 1‑3‑1986 under section 380, P.P.C. and section 302, P.P.C. on five counts. On each charge under section 302, P.P.C. he was sentenced to death. For conviction under section 380, P.P.C. he was sentenced to 7 years' R.I. The trial Judge ordered "the sentence awarded under section 380, P.P.C. shall run consecutively alongwith the sentences which may be awarded to the accused, in case the death sentences are not confirmed by the High Court."

3. The High Court while seized of the appeal and the question of confirmation of the death sentence noted in the opening part of its judgment that the "sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently if death sentence was not confirmed". The High Court by its judgment dated 13‑11‑1989 maintained the convictions and the sentence of the appellant and confirmed the sentence of death, on all five counts.

4. On his petition from jail it was noticed that in view of the decision of this Court in Eid Muhammad and another v. The State (PLD 1993 SC 17) he was entitled to the benefit of commutation of the sentence of death into life imprisonment. The question remained whether after such commutation the sentences of life imprisonment were to run concurrently or consecutively.

5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we have come to the conclusion that on commutation the sentences must run concurrently. As held by this Court in the case of Gullat Shah v. The State (1992 SCMR 1424) neither section 35 nor section 397, Cr.P.C. are attracted to a situation where power of commutation of sentences is exercised by an authority which is not the Court. The Court is not required to pass any order with respect to a commutation order, nonetheless the power of the Court to interpret the commutation order as was done in the case of Eid Muhammad (PLD 1993 SC 17) or to determine its legal effect remains intact. It is the effect of the commutation order which is to be determined in the case now before us. On the principle approved in Bashir and three others v. The State (PLD 1991 SC 1145) that the order of commutation takes effect immediately, the commutation order on all the five counts will take effect forthwith i.e. concurrently. This will make the sentence ultimately in conformity with what this Court has held in Bhai Khan and others v. The. State (PLD 1992 SC 14). It follows, therefore, that after commutation the sentences of life imprisonment will run concurrently. This appeal stands disposed of accordingly. N.H.Q/S‑793/S Order accordingly.