P (PLP)

(1) Malik Lal Chand v. Crown (2) Gurdas Ram v. Crown. (3) Gurdit Singh, Mehtab Singh and Harbans Singh v. Crown. (4) Salik Ram v. Crown. (5) Fateh Chand v. Crown. shall be disposed of by the present judgment. Malik Lal Chand was charged under Rules 47, 81 (4) and 121 of the Defence of India Rules for contravening the provisions of the Notification No. 30, dated 26th of April 1943, issued by the Government. It may be noted here that the learned Magis trate in his charge had omitted to refer to clause 4 of the said Rule 81 which the Magistrate should now correct. Gurdas Ram was charged under Rules 47 and 81 which should have been 81 (4) for contravening the provisions of Notification No. 30, dated 26th of April 1943, issued by the Government. Gurdit Singh, Mehtab Singh and Harbans Singh were charged under Rules 47, 81 (4) and 121 fur contravening the provisions of the Notification No. 30, dated 26th of April 1943, issued by the Government in two separate cases. Salik Ram was charged under Rules 81 (4) and 121 of the Defence of India Rules for contravening the same Notification. They came up before this Court on the revisional side and in the grounds of revision they have mainly attacked the order of the trial Magistrate for framing charges on facts. We, how ever, presume that during the argument the question arose before the Court whether after the termination of the Defence of India Rules on 30th September 1946 the prosecution of the petitioners for the offences committed by them prior to the ter mination of the Rules could, continue. This question appears to have been referred to the Full Bench. The perusal to the file do not show that any order to that effect came on any of the files in black and white. From certain , notes ,of argument recorded in pencil by A. M. the Ex. Chief Justice, it appears that the Court which heard the revision 'petition at that referred them to the Full Bench. It is regrettable that there are no chronological orders on the files leading from. that date, till the note of the present Deputy Registrar; dated 19th‑ January 1949. This shows that no attention waft ever paid by the office to these files. Such a state of ‑affairs in the high Court is indeed condemnable. We, however, expect that a similar instance shall not come to our notice in future. We now revert to the question which is for this consideration of this Court. As stated‑above, we do not find from the record in what terms the question was referred to the Full Bench and I think we cannot depend on the notes of the Court in argument which had referred the revision petitions for the, consideration of the. Full Bench. From the argument of the learned Crown counsel we are of opinion that the question for consideration of the Court was who other the prosecution of the petitioners under the Defence of India Rules could continue after its expiry for the offences committed by them during the contribution of that measure. We regret that no body, is before us en behalf of the peti tioners, nor we expect that they care ever ‑be'. WE are, therefore, constrained to dispose of these applications practicall ex parte but the law which has come before us satisfies us that the view which we are holding in these petitions is in accordance with the views; that has been adopted by the High Courts of rather provinces on a similar question. We would refer ii this connection to 2 Madras High Court Ruling 48 Cr. L. J. 1947. page

403. While dealing with other points which bad arisen in that case the learned judges had held on this point "that the being no doubt that the , proceedings instituted under the Order made under the Defence of India Act; are the things done under the law as well as things done be for the expiration of the law they could., be continued even after the expiration of the 'said law. In A.I.R 1935 Nag: 210 a similar question had arisen and. it was held "that the amendment to subsection (4) of section 1, Defence of India Act. made by Ordinance, XII of 1946 would save prosecutions against breaches. Of orders forgets of omissions committed prior to the expiration‑of the Act. So also in view of the words "things done or omitted to be done" .in section 102 (4), Government of India Act, offences committed before the expiration of the ‑six month's period after the ceasing of the proclamation of emergency can be‑ prosecuted after the expiration of that period and proceedings instituted before its expiry can be lawfully prosecuted to a conclusion criminal appeals Nos. 1 and 2 of 1947 (F. C.) and A I R 1947 Mad. 325 were followed. The last ruling appears to us to be the same to which we have already referred. Our view, therefore, is that these prosecutions could continue. On question of facts, we do not feel inclined to interfere with the discretion of the trial Magistrate in framing the charges against the petitioners and con9equently dismiss the revisions. The cases shall go back to the trial Magistrate for disposal in accord ance with law. " It has been brought to our notice that the accused in these cases who are all non‑Muslims have migrated to India. It would be for the Government Advocate to see whether any use ful purpose would be served in continuing these prosecutions. The cases are very old and the Government. Advocate will give his serious consideration to this question. We should make it clear that by this we have no intention to hamper any action of the pro secution in this connection. A.H. Petition dismissed.