1979 PLP 730 (CLC)

2. The impugned order was made in consequence of an application, under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, filed by the respondent,, in which it was inter alia alleged that the house in dispute was needed by him for his own occupation. This plea did not find favour with the Rent Controller who heard the application. The respondent, therefore, went in appeal before the learned Additional District Judge who upheld the respondent's plea and ordered the ejectment of the appellant. Feeling aggrieved by the verdict of the first Appellate Court, the appellant has come up in second appeal to this Court.

3. The house in dispute is in the town of Rawalpindi where the respondent is employed in the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army. At present he is residing in another house in Rawalpindi which has burn allotted to him in his official capacity. The view taken by the learned Rent Controller was that as the appellant has the official accommodation with him he "does not require the disputed house for his personal bona fide use and occupation". The learned Additional District Judge has, however, held that since the departmental authorities were pressing hard for the vacation of the official accommodation by the respondent his requirement was bona fide. It was also noted by the first appellate Court that the respondent was occupying the official residence as a licensee and .could be ejected therefrom at any time-wit19h assigning any reason.

4. While assailing the order of the first appellate Court learned counsel for the appellant (tenant) contended that the ground on which the appellant's ejectment has been ordered, namely, the order of the Departmental authorities requiring the respondent to vacate the official residence became available to the respondent after the making of the ejectment application by him and as it did not "exist at the time when the application was filed, the appellant's ejectment could not be ordered on that ground. He pointed out that the ejectment application was filed in the year 1966, and it was long thereafter that in the year 1976, the G. H. Q. authorities asked him to move out of the official accommodation. He urged that since he had no cause of action at the time of the making of the application for ejectment he could not succeed on the basis of the cause of action which accrued to him thereafter.

5. In order to appreciate the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, I asked him to read out, from his brief, the statement of the respondent, Muhammad Yousaf (P. W. 3), which he did. It is in his statement that at the time of the filing of the application for ejectment of the appellant he was living in a rented house and, therefore, he sought eviction of the appellant with a view to occupying the disputed house himself. During the pendency of the application, in the year 1973, he was allotted official accommodation but he is now being asked to vacate it. He placed on record letter, dated the 16th November 1976 (Exh. A. 5), in which he has been asked to do so. There is no rebuttal of the aforesaid evidence. It can, therefore, be safely inferred from the respondent's evidence that he initiated ejectment proceedings against the appellant in order to shift from a rented house to his own house, that is, the house in dispute. For seven long years he could not dislodge the appellant as the ejectment proceedings were not finalised. In the meantime, however, he was able to secure allotment of official accommodation which he occupied as a stopgap arrangement. He had hardly lived there for two years that the Departmental authorities started pressing him to vacate the official accommodation because, under the relevant rules, a Government employee cannot enjoy that accommodation at a place where he himself owns a house. He is occupying the official accommodation as a licensee, and can be thrown out of it at any time without notice. His need for the house in dispute has, therefore, always been there right from the time when he took out ejectment proceedings against the appellant. In other words, he had cause of action, namely, his personal need for the house in dispute, at the time of the making of the ejectment application and that cause of action continued to persist till the disposal of the, application. I am. therefore, unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the cause of action accrued to the respondent after the filing of the ejectment proceedings.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant also urged that the respondent had a house other than the house in dispute and, therefore, his request was not bona fide. In this connection, he invited my attention to the statement of a witness (R. W. 1) examined by the appellant who said :- The witness did not explain as to whether the house referred to by him was the house allotted to the respondent by his Department or some other house. He did not give particulars of the house alluded to by him. There is no other evidence showing that apart from the house in question the respondent is owner of any other house. The respondent was not cross -examined on this point. Therefore, the above vague statement of one witness of the appellant, which is not corroborated even by the appellant himself, is of no consequence.

7. As pointed out earlier, the respondent is presently living in an official accommodation allotted to him by his department. Since he owns the house in dispute, his Department is insisting for vacation of the official accommodation. It has not been disputed that according to the relevant rules the respondent cannot retain official accommodation in Rawalpindi where he himself owns a house, namely, the house in dispute. The official accommoda tion is held by him as a licensee and he can be evicted therefrom at any time without notice. 1, therefore, agree with the learned Additional District Judge that the respondent needs the house in dispute, in good faith, for his own occupation.

8. In this view of the matter, the order of ejectment passed against the appellant does not call for any interference. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed in limine. The appellant is, however, allowed two months' tin-.e to vacate the house in dispute. M. A. K. Appeal dismissed.