1990 PLP 1721 (SCMR)

‑‑‑‑Para. 25‑‑‑Locus standi of appellants/defendants challenged on ground that they having re‑sold land in question to third person who had a better title and ground to resist a suit for pre‑emption, appellants had lost title in the land so as to sustain any grievance or appeal against impugned judgment‑‑‑Another equally formidable objection had been raised that land having once been transferred to third party such third party was a necessary party and that appeal was liable to be dismissed on such preliminary questions‑‑‑Legality of‑‑‑Appellant's assertion that land in question had again been resold to them by third party, even if supported by some material, it was not certain that third party if a party to present appeal would have in any case accepted appellant's claim with regard to re‑sale‑‑ Notwithstanding material relied upon by appellants, such third party could and was entitled to challenge the same on more than one grounds and was thus an absolutely essential party‑‑‑Supreme Court upholding preliminary objection dismissed appeal. Ch. M. Hussain Naqshbandi, Advocate Supreme Court and Rana Maqbool Ahmad Qadri, Advocate‑on‑Record (absent) for Appellants. M. Ismail Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court and S. Wajid Hussain, Advocate‑on‑Record (absent) for Respondent No.l. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 2 and

3. Date of hearing: 3rd April, 1990. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, CJ.‑‑‑This appeal through leave of the Court is directed; against the dismissal by the High Court, of appellants/defendants' Constitutional petition. The respondents/plaintiffs' suit for pre‑emption on the ground of tenancy was dismissed, the appeal, however, was allowed and the case was remanded to the Collector for fresh decision. The appellants' Civil Revision and writ petition having been dismissed, leave to appeal was granted to examine the validity of the impugned judgment. Learned counsel for the respondents' side has raised a preliminary objection that the appellants/defendants/vendees in a suit for pre‑emption had, as first vendees, sold the suit land to a lady named Mst. Jannat who had a better title and ground to resist a suit for pre‑emption. And as the appellants had lost the title in the land so as to sustain any grievance or appeal against the impugned judgments, they have no locus standi in this appeal. Not only this learned counsel raised another equally formidable preliminary argument; namely, that the land having once been transferred to Mst. Jannat she is a necessary party. And that being so, this appeal is liable to be dismissed on these two grounds. Learned counsel for the appellants has in reply contended that although the suit land had been sold by the appellants to Mst. Jannat but she had re‑sold it to them. And this assertion, according to him, gets support from material placed on record by both sides. Even if it be assumed that there is some material to support the assertion of the appellants that the suit land was purported to have been resold to the appellants it is not certain that Mst. Jannat, if she would have been a party to this appeal, would have in any case accepted the appellants' claim with regard to resale. Notwithstanding the material relied upon by the appellants she could and was entitled to challenge the same on more than one grounds. She was, therefore, an absolutely essential party. In the circumstances of this case, therefore, we uphold the preliminary objections raised from the respondents' side. This appeal, accordingly, is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. A.A.,/A‑740/S Appeal dismissed.