1989 PLP 852 (SCMR)

MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑‑This appeal through leave of the Court is directed against the judgment dated 26‑10‑1981, of the Punjab Service Tribunal whereby, appeal of the respondent against the order of his dismissal, was allowed. There was allegation against the respondent of having received illegal gratification in the performance of his duties as a traffic Constable. He was served with a show‑cause notice to which a reply was submitted. The Superintendent of Police acting as competent authority proceeded against him under sub‑rule (3) of Rule 6 of the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, and, after examining the allegation in the light of the reply, submitted by the respondent, held him guilty and accordingly awarded the punishment of dismissal from service. His departmental appeal failed but the Service Tribunal in the impugned judgment held that in corruption cases generally and in the circumstances of this case in particular, the competent authority instead of proceeding under Rule 6(3), should have proceeded under rule 6(4) which required that the normal regular inquiry procedure was to be applied. Leave to appeal was granted to examine; whether, by making some of the observations in the impugned judgment the Tribunal did not render Rule 6(3) as redundant in cases involving corruption. After hearing both sides, we feel that it is not necessary to decide in this case the relevant importance, strength and inter action of the two lines of action. One under rule 6(3) and the other under Rule 6(4). Notwithstanding some very wide and general observation made by the Tribunal in the impugned judgment regarding Rule 6(3), it has to be held that the same has not at all been rendered redundant by Rule 6(4) ‑ not even in corruption cases. The application of one or the other would depend upon the circumstances of each case in accordance with the relevant provisions thereof. In the present case we feel that the two circumstances, highlighted by the Tribunal, did make out a case for the competent authority to proceed under Rule 6(4). We would hesitate dealing with the two points because, in our view, the case needs to be remanded and we would like not to prejudice the case of either side by making any comment in that behalf. However, suffice it to say, that one circumstance related to the alleged attempt of the respondent to return the bribe and the second relates to the partial involvement and interest of local D.S.P., whose relations were responsible for the complaint against respondent. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the order of the Tribunal to the extent that it was a proper case for proceeding under Rule 6(4) and not under Rule 6(3), is unexceptionable. However, as a result of this finding, as a normal course the Tribunal should have remanded the case for further proceedings under C Rule 6(4). Nothing is discoverable from the impugned judgment as to why it was not remanded. We accordingly allow this appeal partly, set aside the impugned order and remand the case for further proceedings (which shall be deemed to be pending throughout) in accordance with the law. A.A./D‑37/S Appeal allowed.