P L D 1971 Lahore 131 (PLP)

Works Manager, Carriage and Wagon Shops, Moghalpura v. K. G. Hashmat A I R 1946 Lab. 316 and Muhammad Swaleh and another v. Messrs United Grain & Fodder Agencies P L D 1964 S C 97 held not applicable. Khadim Mohy‑ud‑Din and another v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagra and another P L D 1965 S C 459 ref. R. A. Zofar for Petitioner. S. Kazim Ali for Respondent. Date of hearing : 10th April 1970. This is a petition under Article 102 of the late Cons titution of 1962, against an order, dated 14‑3‑1970 passed by Malik Mushtaq Ahmad, Rent Controller, Lahore, where by he disposed of an application of the (tenant)‑petitioner under Order XXVI, rule 4 and section 151, C. P. C. In that application, the tenant‑petitioner had applied for examining Mr. Zafar Altaf Addl. Deputy Commissioner, Pabna, East Pakistan, on Commission. The learned Rent Controller accepted the application and directed that a letter of request should be issued to the District Judge, Pabna, East Pakistan to himself examine the witness or get his examination recorded through some Commission. In the order, the learned Rent Controller further directed that the tenant‑petitioner should deposit the travelling and lodging expenses of the counsel for the landlord. It is against this later portion of the judgment that the tenant has come up under Article 102 of the late Constitu tion submitting that the direction hereinbefore mentioned requiring the tenant‑petitioner to pay the expenses of the counsel for the landlord is without lawful authority and should be quashed.

2. A preliminary question which has come up for discussion is as to whether a Rent Controller is a Court within the meanings of Article 102 of the late Constitution. It has been held in a number of cases that a Rent Controller is not a Court. Reference may be made to The Corporation of the City of Lahore v. Mst. Fahmida Begum (P L D 1952 Lah. 258), Aurangzeb v. Bakhshi Mahmud Ali (P L D 1961 Lah. 619), Ibrahim v. Muhammad Rafique (P L D 1964 Lah. 644), Faqir Muhammad v. Dr. Muhammad Yasin and 2 others (P L D 1964 Lah. 686), Jamal Din v. Hajl Muhammad Aslam (P L D 1965 Lah. 503) and Khadim Mohy‑ud- Din and another v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagra and another (P L D 1965 S C 459). In view of this consistent law on the subject; it is not possible for me to take up a different view.

3. Learned counsel for the tenant‑petitioner argued that since under section 16 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restric tion Ordinance VI of 1959, a Rent Controller has same powers as are vested in a Court for summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, a Rent Controller while acting in such a matter becomes a Court. The contention cannot be accepted because these were only certain powers of the civil Court which had been bestowed on the Rent Controller and it cannot be said that the Rent Controller becomes a Court while exercising those powers. Another argument raised was that since under section 17 of the Ordinance, the orders of the Rent Controller (mentioned therein) are to be executed by a civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were the decree of that Court, therefore, the Rent Controller is a Court. This contention also cannot prevail. The provision hereinbefore referred to, deals with the manner in which the orders of the Rent Controller are to be executed by a civil Court and it does not convert a Rent Controller into a Court.

4. Learned counsel for the tenant‑petitioner then referred to Works Manager, Carriage and Wagon Shops, Moghalpura v. K. G. Hashmat (A LR 1946 Lah. 316), for showing that a Rent Controller is a Court. The case has no relevancy and it is a decision under the Payment of Wages Act and has no bearing to the facts and the circumstances of the present case. He also referred to Muhammad Swaleh and another v. Messrs United Grain & Fodder Agencies (P L D 1964 S C 97). That is also on a different point and does not deal with the question as to whether a Rent Controller is a Court or not. Lastly, learned counsel relied upon some discussion occurring at page 463 of Khadim Mohy‑ud‑din and another v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagra and another. The said discussion does not advance the argument of the learned counsel and rather the decision is positive on the point that a Rent Controller is not a Court.

5. The upshot of the above discussion is that since the Rent Controller is not a Court, a petition under Article 102 of the late Constitution against his order is not maintainable. The same is, therefore, dismissed with costs. A. E. Petition dismissed.