PLD 1971

P L D 1971 Supreme Court 811 (PLP)

LAHORE IMPROVEMENT TRUST, LAHORE THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN-Appellant Versus THE CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 4 OTHERS-Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Decided Date
Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1970
Honorable Judges
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation P L D 1971 Supreme Court 811 (PLP)
Forum / Court
Bench Members Single Bench
Parties LAHORE IMPROVEMENT TRUST, LAHORE THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN-Appellant Versus THE CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 4 OTHERS-Respondents
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This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

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The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Honorable Judges.

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Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1971 Supreme Court 811 (PLP) (LAHORE IMPROVEMENT TRUST, LAHORE THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN-Appellant Versus THE CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 4 OTHERS-Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Mahmood Zaman, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Salim Ahmad Malik, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant (in C. A. No. 3 6 of 1970).
  • Manzur Qadir, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (Muhammad Ismail Bhatti, Senior Advocate Supreme Court with him) instruct ed by Ejaz Ahmad Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant (in C. A. No. 37 of 1970).
  • Hidayatullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Iftikhar-ud-Din Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in both the Appeals).
  • Ghias Muhammad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (Gul Muhammad Khan, Advocate Supreme Court with him) instructed by Tanvir Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 3 (in both the Appeals).
  • Dates of hearing : 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 10th May 1971.

Headnotes / Summary

UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB, LAHORE Appellant versus CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 4 OTHERS -Respondents Civil Appeals Nos. 36 and 37 of 1970, decided on 20th October 1971. (On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court v of West Pakistan, Lahore, dated the 26th May 1969, in Writ Petition No. 1142 of 1965). (a) Punjab Town Improvement Act (IV of 1922), S 36 and Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S. 4 - Creating defect in title of owner - Not an essential ingredient o' notifications under Ss. 36 & 4 of two Acts-Notice under S. 36 in spite of bar contained in S.12 Ordinance XV of 1949, valid- Declared intention of S. 36 of Act IV of 1922 : to notify owners that their land proposed to be included in Scheme and they could, if so advised, file objection to proposed asquisition-Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordi nance (XV of 1949), S.12. The Improvement Trust had issued notices under section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 to the owners whose lands were proposed to be included in a scheme for construction of a new campus for a University and two modern housing colonies. Part of the land comprised in the scheme belonged to evacuees. When the notices were issued the scheme had yet to be finalised by the Trust and yet to be submitted to the Provincial Government for sanction under section 40 of Act IV of 1922. The validity of the notices under section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act was attacked on the ground that qua the evacuee land sanction of the Central Govern ment under section 12 of Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949 was necessary before the Trust could give notice under section 36 of Act IV of 1922. The argument was that the notice under section 36 of Act IV of 1922, created a defect in the title of the owners (Evacuees and Custodian of Evacuee Property as their representative) and, therefore, prior permission of the Central Government under section 12 of Ordinance XV of 1949 was necessary. It was further contended that the notice issued under section 36 of Act IV of 1922, was bad in law as it was a "legal process" which under section 12(1) of Ordinance XV of 1949, could not be issued !n respect of evacuee property. Held : A notice under section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act inter aria notifies boundaries of the land included in the scheme under preparation. Under section 38 it is necessary to give within 30 days of the publication of the notice under section 36, individual notices to the owners of the land who may thereupon lodge objections to the proposed acquisition of their land. Notices under section 38 were issued to all the owners including evacuees by publication in daily newspapers. Separate notices were given to the Custo dian of Evacuee Property and the Rehabilitation Commissioner as representatives of the interest of evacuee owners. No objec tion was filed by the evacuees or the said authorities on their behalf. The declared intention of section 36 is thus to notify to the owners that their land is proposed to be included in a scheme and that if so advised they may file objections to the proposed acquisition. The bar contained in section 12 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949 is to the issuance of a legal process, such as, seizure, distress, ejectment, attachment, etc., and to acquisition of evacuee land by the Provincial Government without prior approval of the Central Government. Subsection (3) expressly preserves the power of the Central Government to acquire evacuee land under any law in force for the time being which includes Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the Town Improvement Act, 1922. It cannot, therefore, be questioned that notwithstanding the bar contained in subsection (1) of section 12 of Ordinance XV of 1949, the Central Government may give order to a Collector under section 7 of the Land Acquisition Act to acquire evacuee land and thereupon he may issue notice under section 4 and enter upon acquisition proceedings. It would not make any difference if the Provincial Government instead of the Central Government directs the Collector to enter upon acquisition proceedings for the operation of subsection (1) of section 12 as this section is not applicable to the Central as well as the Provincial Governments. On its plain reading clause (b) of subsection (3) of section 12 of the Ordinance bars the Provincial Government from exer cising power under any Act for the time being in force to acquire evacuee land. At the stage when notice under section 36 was given, the Provincial Government had directed the Trust to prepare a development scheme for . the construction of a new campus for the University and a modern housing colony. The scheme had yet to be finalised by the Trust and submitted to the Provincial Government for sanction under suction 4) of the Town Improvement Act. In the circumstances it could not be said that at the time when notice under section 36 was given by the Trust the Provincial G3vernment was exercising the power conferred on it by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as modified by the Town Improvement Act to acquire evacuee land. Prior approval of the Central Government was, therefore, not neces sary for giving notice under section

36. Creating of a defect in the title of an owner is not an essen tial ingredient of a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act or section 36 of 'the Town Improvement Act. Section 12 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance XV of 1949, itself safeguarded against any defect being created in the title of the owner of evacuee land or the Custodian of Evacuee Property as his representative in interest. Evacuee land could not be acquired without the prior approval of the Central Government in this case. The notice issued by the Trust,. therefore, only notified to the evacuee owners that their lands were likely to be included in the Scheme and did not go a step further to create a defect in their title in the land. As creation of a defect in the title of the owner of the land which is proposed to be included in a scheme notified under section 36 of the Town Improvement Act is not an essential ingredient of that section, the notice was validly given in spite of the bar contained in section

12. Rameswar Singh v. Secretary of State for India I L R 34 Cal. 470 ; Mercer v. Liverpool St. Helens and South Lanca shire Rail Co. (1903) 1 K B 652 ; Associated Hotels of India Ltd. etc. v. Jodha Mal Kathalia P L D 1951 F C 35 and Feroze Din v. Government of West Pakistan P L D 1961 Lah. 304 considered. (b) Words and phrases-"Legal process"--Meaning. "Legal process" is defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary as "Process in the doing of something in a proceeding in a civil or criminal Court, and that which may be done without the aid of a Court is not a 'process'. This defini tion of 'process' in subsection (1) of section 12 of Administra tion Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 is made clear by the succeeding subsection that "any such legal process as aforesaid subsisting immediately before such commencement shall cease to have effect and all evacuee property in custody of any Court, or Receiver, guardian or other officer or person appointed by it, shall, upon delivery of the same being called for by the Custodian, be delivered to the Custodian." The nature of legal process contemplated in section 12(1) is also illustrated by the description "seizure, distress, ejectment, attachment or sale, injunction". The words "or other order of whatever kind" in the second part of subsection (1) of section 12 are qualified by the words "shall be granted or made by any Court". The notice issued under section 36 of the Town Improvement Act is, therefore, not covered by sub section (1) -of section 12 of Ordinance XV of 1949. Stroud's Judicial Dictitionary ; In re : Delahoyd 11 Ir. Ch. Rep. 407 and R. v. Castle 27 L J M C 70 ref. (c) Punjab Town Improvement Act (IV of 1922), Ss. 24, 28 & 36-Acquisition of land by Improvement Trust for construction of new campus for a University to be developed by University itself-Held, in circumstances, bona fide and not outside purview of Act. A scheme was formulated by an Improvement Trust and in the scheme, the area, in the middle of two other areas reserved for housing colonies, was earmarked for a University Campus. This area earmarked for the Campus was to be developed by the University itself in accordance with the special requirements of a teaching institution. The acquisition of land by the Trust for the University was assailed on the ground that it was outside the purview of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. Held: The Scheme included not only the construction of a New Campus for the University, but also development of two housing colonies. Under section 24 of the Town Improvement Act the Trust may inter alia prepare a scheme for the purpose of deve lopment of any locality within the municipal limits. Construc tion of a new campus for the University and development of housing colonies in the area included in the Scheme was thus amply covered by the provisions of section

24. Moreover the construction of a new campus for the University was for the development of the city and the real beneficiaries of the Scheme were the citizens of Lahore generally and the students community in particular. Manick Chand Mahata v. Corporation of Calcutta A I R 1921 Cal. 159 ; Calcutta Improvement Trust v. Mst. Meherunisa A I R 1932 Cal. 178 and Lynch v. Commissioners of Sewers of the City of London (1885) 32 Ch. D 72 considered. A plain reading of sections 24 and 28 of the Punjab Town Im provement Act makes out that a scheme framed under section 24 may provide for all or any one of the matters provided in it. A scheme may thus provide for acquisition of land only. It could not, therefore, be said that the scheme prepared by the Trust was no scheme in the eye of law at all, because it did not provide for relaying out of land comprised in the scheme or laying out and alteration of streets, earmarking open spaces raising, lowering or reclamation of land, drainage, water supply and lighting. Section 28 expressly provides that the scheme may provide for all or any of the matters set out therein. The scheme in respect of which notice was given was thus amply covered by the provisions of sections 24 and 28 of the Town Improvement Act and the notice issued in respect of it under section 36 of that Act was quite valid in law. (d) Punjab Town Improvement Act (IV of 1922), Ss. 24, 28 & 36-Land, validly acquired by Improvement Trust for develop ment Scheme envisaged by Ss. 24 8c 28-Legality could not be challenged if such land is disposed of to a corporate body by it. (e) Constitution of Pakistan (1962), Art. 98-Order impugned, one passed by public authority-Court to explore possibility of every possible explanation for its validity-Court competent to examine entire record pertaining to proceedings held, action taken and order passed. The Chairman, East Pakistan Railway Board, Chittagong and another v. Abdul Majid Sardar P L D 1966 S C 725 ref. Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 : Ex parte (In both the Appeals).

Judgment & Decree

Clause (b) of this subsection shall be deemed to have taken effect on the day this Ordinance came into force." A notice under section 36 inter alia notifies boundaries of the land included in the scheme under preparation. Under ,q section 38 it is necessary to give within 30 days of the publication of the notice under section 36, individual notices to the owners of the land who may thereupon lodge objections to the proposed acquisition of their land. Notices under section 38 were issued to all the owners including evacuees by publication in daily newspapers. Separate notices were given to the Custodian of Evacuee Property and the Rehabilitation Commissioner as representatives of the interest of evacuee owners. No objection was filed by the evacuees or the said authorities on their behalf. The declared intention of section 36 is thus to notify 'to the owners that their land is proposed to be included in a scheme and that if so advised they may file objections to the proposed acquisition. The bar contained in section 12 is to the issuance of a legal process, such as, seizure, distress, ejectment, attachment, etc., and to acquisition of evacuee land by the Provincial Government without prior approval of the Central Government. Subsection (3) expressly preserves the power of the Central Government to acquire evacuee land under any law in force for the time being which includes Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the Town Improvement Act, 1922. It cannot, .therefore, be questioned that notwithstanding the bar contained in subsection (1) of section 12 of Ordinance XV of 1949, the Central Government may give order to a. Collector under section 7 of the Land Acquisition Act to acquire evacuee land and thereupon he may issue notice under section 4 and enter upon acquisition proceedings. Would it, therefore, make any difference if the Provincial Government directs the Collector to enter upon acquisition proceedings. The answer must be in the negative for the operation of subsection (1) of section 12 is applicable to the Central as well as the Provincial Govern ments. We have, therefore, to see whether under clause (b) of subsection (3) of section 12, the Trust could not give notice of a scheme in which evacuee land was proposed to be included.) On its plain reading clause (b) bars the Provincial Government from exercising power under any law for the time being in force to acquire evacuee land: At the stage when notice under section 36 was given, the Provincial Government had directed the Trust to prepare a development scheme for the construction et of a new campus for the University and a modern housing colony. The Scheme had yet to be finalised by the Trust and submitted to the Provincial Government for sanction under section 40 of the Town Improvement Act. As mentioned earlier the Scheme was sent back by the Provincial Government to the Trust with certain objection and it had to be revised and resub mitted for sanction. In the circumstances it could not be said that at the time when notice under section 36 was given by the Trust the Provincial Government was exercising the power conferred on it by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as modified by the Town Improvement Act to acquire evacuee land. Prior approval of the Central Government was, therefore, not necessary for giving notice under section

36. In coming to the contrary conclusion the learned Judges of the High Court relied on the legal incidence of a notice given under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act that it creates a defect in the title of the owner of the land proposed to be acquired. But creating of a defect in the title of an owner is not an essential ingredient of a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act or section 36 of the Town Improvement Act. As contended by Mr. Manzur Qadir section 12 of the Administra tion of Evacuee Property Ordinance XV of 1949 itself safeguarded against any defect being created in the title of the owner vi evacuee land or the Custodian of Evacuee Property as his repre sentative fn interest. Evacuee land could not be acquired without the prior approval of the Central Government in this case. The notice issued by the Trust, therefore, only notified to the evacuee owners that their lands were likely to be included in the Scheme and did not go a step further to create a defect in their title in the land. As creation of a defect in the title of the owner of the land which is proposed to be included in a scheme notified under section 36 of the Town Improvement Act is not an essential ingredient of that section, the notice was validly given in spite of the bar contained in section

12. Before we part with this aspect of the case it may be pointed out that even before the Trust notified the Scheme under section 36 the Central Government had expressly agreed to the acquisition of evacuee land for the University and directed the Vice-Chancellor to move the Provincial Government for this purpose. Reference may be made in this behalf to the following letter written by the Minister Incharge, Refugees and Rehabilita tion Department, Government of Pakistan, to the Vice-Chancellor on 18-2-1954 "My dear Mr. Bashir Ahmad, Please refer to your d.o. letter dated the 25th January 1954, regarding acquisition of certain evacuee land in connection with the construction of new buildings for the University of the Punjab. The Central Government would agree to sanction the acquisition of the evacuee land in question provided the Government of the Punjab undertake to provide suitable alternative land to the refugees settled on that land. The acquisition proceedings are conducted by the Provincial Govern ment under the Land Acquisition Act. No proposal has so far been received from the Government of the Punjab and I would, therefore, suggest that you may approach the Rehabilita tion Commissioner (General), who is also Secretary to the Government of the Punjab in the Rehabilitation Department, to move in the matter. The proposal will be dealt with promptly in this Ministry on its receipt from the Provincial Government. The papers received with your letter are herewith returned. Yours sincerely. (Sd. ) (Shuaib Qureshi) Bashir Ahmad, Esquire, Vice-Chancellor, The University of the Punjab, Lahore." The Central Government had thus in principle agreed to the acquisition of evacuee land included in the University New Campus Scheme. However, under section 12 it was necessary for the Provincial Government to obtain prior approval of the Central Government and the record bears out that as soon as the letter written by the Secretary to the Provincial Government reached the Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, the requisite permission was given. The Scheme framed by the Trust thus had the prior approval of the Central Government and it could not be said that the Trust acted in breach of the law which provided protection to evacuee property from being compulsorily acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The learned Judges next held the notice issued under section 36 of the Town Improvement Act bad in law as it was a legal process which under section 12(1) of Ordinance XV of 1949 could not be issued in respect of evacuee property. "Legal Process", is defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary as "Process is the doing of something in a proceeding in a civil or criminal Court, and that which may be done without the aid of a Court is not a 'process'. Therefore, a distraint, whether for rent or any other payment, and whether the right of distress be given by the common law or statute is not a `process', nor is it 'execution or other legal process, within the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict., C. 71). "Process" does not include an order made by a Court in the exercise of its punitive jurisdiction; therefore, a Justice's order, under Distress for Rates Act, 1849 (12 & 13 Vict., C. 14) commit ting a person to prison for non-payment of rates, or an order of imprisonment for either of the defaults in payment mentioned in the Exceptions to Debtors Act, 1869 (32 and 33 Viet., C. 62), section 4 is not a `legal process against the property or person of the debtor.' Similarly, a committal for non-payment of debt under section 5, Debtors Act, 1869, is punitive, and is not a 'legal process'. Obviously, "all the steps taken in an execution the seizure and the sale-are, in the natural meaning of the word, comprehended in the term 'process'," (Lynch, J, : Re Delahoyd (11 Ir. Ch. Rep. 407). A mere notice, though headed with the name of a county Court, is not a 'process' within County Courts Act, 1846 (9 & 10 Vict., C. 95) section 57 (R. v. Castle (27 L J M C 70)). This definition of `process' in subsection (1) of section 12 is made clear by the succeeding subsection that "any such legal process as aforesaid subsisting immediately before such commence ment shall cease to have effect and all evacuee property in custody of any Court, or Receiver, guardian or other officer or person appointed by it, shall, upon delivery of the same being called for by the Custodian, be delivered to the Custodian." the nature of legal process contemplated in section 12 (1) is also illustrated by the description "seizure, distress, ejectment, attachment or sale, injunction". As notification of the Scheme was not covered by any of these legal processes Mr. Ghias Mohammad relied on the words "or other order of whatever kind" in the second part of subsection (1) of section

12. This clause, however, is qualified by the words "shall be granted or made by any Court". The notice issued under section 36 of the Town Improvement Act was, therefore, not covered by subsection (1) of section 12 of Ordinance XV of 1949 and the learned Judges erred in arriving at the contrary conclusion. We may now turn to the finding by the learned Judges that acquisition of land by the Trust for the University was outside the purview of the Town Improvement Act. In support of this proposition they placed reliance on the provisions of sections 24 and 28 of the Town Improvement Act which are reproduced below for facility of reference. "

24. Development and expansion schemes.-(1) The trust may, for the purpose of development of any locality within the municipal limits contained in its local area, prepare "a develop ment scheme", and (2) Such trust may, if it is of opinion that it is expedient and for the public advantage to promote and control the development of land to provide for the expansion of a municipality in any locality adjacent thereto, within the local area of such trust prepare "an expansion scheme". (3) "A development scheme" or "an expansion scheme" may provide for the Jay-out of the locality to be developed, the purposes for which particular portions of such, locality are to be utilised, the prescribed street alignment and the building line on each side of the streets proposed in such locality, the drainage of insanitary localities and such other details as may appear desirable." "

28. Combinations of schemes and matters which may be provided for in the scheme.-(1) A Schemo under this Act may combine one or more types of schemes or any special features thereof. (2) A scheme under this Act may provide for all or any of the following matters: (i) The acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act,- 1894, as modified by this Act, or the abandonment of such acquisition under sections 56 and 57 of this Act, of any land or any interest in land necessary for or affected by the execution of the scheme, or adjoining any street, thoroughfare open space to be improved or formed under the scheme; (ii) the acquisition by purchase, lease, exchange, or otherwise of such land or interest in land; (iii) the retention, letting on hire, lease, sale, exchange or disposal otherwise of any land vested in or acquired by the trust; (iv) the demolition of buildings or portions of buildings that are unfit for the purpose for which they are intended and that obstruct light or air or project beyond the building line; (v) the relaying out of any land comprised in the scheme and the redistribution of sites belonging to owners of property comprised in the scheme; (vi) the laying out and alteration of streets; (vii) the provision of open spaces in the interests of the residents of any locality comprised in the scheme or any adjoin ing locality and the enlargement or alteration of existing open spaces; (viii) the raising, lowering or reclamation of any land vested In or to be acquired by the trust for the purposes of the scheme and the reclamation or reservation of land for the production of fruit, vegetables, fuel, fodder and the like for the residents of the local area; (ix) the draining, water-supply and lighting of streets altered or constructed; (x) the provision of a system of drains and sewers for the improvement of ill-drained. and insanitary localities; (xi) the doing of all acts intended to promote the health of residents of the area comprised in the scheme, including the conservation and preservation from injury or pollution of rivers and other sources and means of water supply; (xii) the demolition of existing buildings and the erection and re-erection of buildings by the trust or by the owners or by the trust in default of the owners; (xiii) the advance to the owners of land comprised within the scheme upon such terms and conditions as to interest and sinking fund and otherwise as may be prescribed under the scheme of the whole or part of the capital requisite for the erection of buildings in accordance with the scheme; (xiv) the provision of facilities for communication; (xv) all other matters which the Provincial Government may deem necessary to promote the general efficiency of a scheme or to improve the locality comprised in such scheme" In the opinion of the learned Judges the Act gives the Trust the power to acquire land only if it is required for executing one of the schemes under the Act. The scheme for the construction of a new campus for the University which was to be developed by the University and not by the Trust was !n this view considered to be outside the purview of the Town Improvement Act. The willingness of the Trust to exercise this power at the request of the Government for, the benefit of the University was on this hypothesis held to be ultra vires of the intent of the Act itself. The learned Judges relied on the dictum in Manick Chand Mahata v. Corporation of Calcutta (A I R 1921 Cal. 159), Calcutta Improvement Trust v. Mst. Meherunisa (A I R 1932 Cal. 178) and Lynch v. Commissioners of Sewers of the City of London ((1885) 32 Ch. D 72) and concluded thus:- "We have no doubt that the Trust was exercising its power not for statutory purpose of executing the scheme, but that the land should be handed over to the University for building the New Campus. The Trust it appears was conscious of this position They had been asked by the Government to acquire the land for the University. They could not legally do so, but to carry out the wishes of the Government which they thought, though wrongly, they could not ignore, they, by giving the transaction as ostensible name of Development Scheme, proceeded to acquire the land under the Act. The Trust did not act bona fide." We are unable to concur in the view expressed by the learned Judges that the acquisition of the land by the Trust was not for any one of its purposes and that in making the acquisition the Trust did not act bona fide. The finding on this point of the case is based solely on the assumption that the entire land acquired by the Collector was handed over to the University fur develop ment and that in making resort to the provisions of the Town Improvement Act land was acquired at less than the 'market value and thereby a wrongful gain was conferred on the University. In the plan accompanying the revised scheme to which reference has been made earlier the area of 2478 acres included in the Scheme is divided into three parts:- (1) University Campus 1615 acres (2) Development Scheme adjacent to Muslim Town. 221.84 acres (3) Development Scheme adjacent to Garden Town. 606 acres In the middle is the area earmarked for the University Campus and on the other two sides adjoining areas are earmarked for housing colonies. The area earmarked for the University Campus was made over to the University authority to be developed by them in accordance with the special requirements of a teaching institution. The University had prepared a comprehensive scheme for the construction and development of the New Campus and printed its copies in early 1954. Five copies of the scheme were sent to the Chairman of the Trust. One of the copies was placed on the file of the Scheme with which we are concerned. In a meeting held in the Office of the Chief Minister of the Punjab on 16th February 1954, which was attended by the Hon'ble Chief Minister, Minister for Education, Minister for Revenue, Minister for Agriculture, Vice-Chancellor, Director of Public Instruction, Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, Chairman, Lahore Improvement Trust, Secretary, Lahore Improvement Trust, Registrar, Punjab University, Town Planner, Lahore, Deputy Registrar (Administra tion), Punjab University, and the University Engineer. It was inter alia resolved:- "After discussing the pros and cons of the proposal, it was unanimously decided that the proposed site beyond Muslim Town, between Multan and Ferozepur Roads, comprising 3000 acres be acquired. The Chairman of the Improvement Trust was instructed to proceed with the acquisition of the land. It was decided that out of this total area of 3000 acres, approximately, 2200 acres will be for the University Campus and the rest will be developed by the Improvement Trust as a modern residential area under their own Scheme." It has been mentioned earlier that the Scheme was revised by the Trust in the light of the objections raised by the Provincial Government and resubmitted by the Chairman to the Commis sioner, Lahore Division, on the 8th December, 1956. In his covering letter the Chairman proceeded to say:- Sir, I have the honour to refer to the West Pakistan Government Memo. No. 495 C &T 56/1708 dated the 25th February 1956, to your address a copy of which was also endorsed to me under No. 495-C&T-56/1709 of even date and to state as under:- Vide this office letter No. SB-153-7145 dated the 7th December, 1955, the sanction of the Government was sought to the acquisition of the land included in the scheme shown on the plan and described in the notification sent herewith. Para* 6 of this letter clearly lays down the reasons for not preparing a layout. Out of the land included in the scheme an area measuring approximately 320 acres has been utilized by the P. W. D. for the construction of their colony known as "Wahdat Colony". A portion of the land included in the Scheme measuring approximately 1500 acres was proposed to be developed as a Satellite Town by the Urban Development Department, but as will be evident from D. O. letter No. E. S. P. A-179/56 dated the 20th November 1956, from the Secretary to Government, West Pakistan, Education Department, to my address and his Memo. No. A-3/61-56 dated the 6th November 1956, to the address of Secretary to Government, West Pakistan, Social Welfare and Local Government Department (Copies attached) the Government have now decided to drop the scheme for building a Satellite Town in this area. Now, therefore, after excluding the area taken by the P. W. D. under the "Wahdat Colony" and the contiguous area along the Kacha Multan Road the boundary of the scheme has been changed as shown on Drawing No. D. S. 93/1-54 attached herewith. The remaining area after excluding the Wahdat Colony will be developed as under (1) Land measuring 1650 acres for setting up the New University Campus. (2) Land measuring 221.84 acres to be developed as , a Trust development scheme as framed by the Trust in its Resolution No. 23 dated 23-3-1954 which was notified by the Trust on 31-3-1954 a copy of which was sent to you and the Government under endorsement No. SB-153/13972 dated 21-3-1954.

3. Proposals for the development of the remaining area measuring about 606.76 acres which is mostly comprised of Muslim ownership will be formulated later. As, a matter of fact it is contemplated to leave this land with the owners after its development by the Trust at their (owners) cost on exemption basis. (i) The University authorities are arranging to obtain the necessary funds for the acquisition of the land through the Trust. (ii) Since the area under the University Campus will be developed by the University itself, the Trust has not drawn up any lay out plan for the Campus at this stage. The finaliza tion of such a' lay out will take some considerable time and the Vice-Chancellor is very anxious to have the foundation stone of the New University Campus laid at a very early date. This would not be possible until the land is acquired and placed at the disposal of the University Authorities and the case is being submitted without a lay out plan for the areas. (iii) As stated in (i) & (ii) above the Trust contemplates to develop an area measuring 221.84 acres and when forwarding separately that scheme for Government sanction it will submit the rough cost estimate on the lines of P. W. D., giving specifications of works to be done, the streets to be paved, the schedules of rates on which the expenditure will be incurred etc. For the remaining area a separate scheme will be prepared under section 28 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, later on and submitted with the desired cost estimates as required under section 40 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. (iv) The land taken by the P. W. D. under "Wahdat Colony" and contiguous land along the Kacha Multan Road not required by the Trust has been excluded and Public Notice is being issued accordingly. (v) The land measuring 221.84 acres will be developed by the Trust from its own resources within the next two years and their remaining areas will be developed after another two years thereafter. (vi) University Authorities and the Government are pressing hard for the immediate possession of the land and therefore a notification by Government under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is an absolute necessity. D. O. No. A-3-61-5 dated 7/11-10-56 from the Secretary to Government, West Pakistan Education Department speaks for itself. (vii) The Trust has vide Resolution No. 2 dated 15-9-1955 decided to give freely, exemptions to Muslim Owners in all its scheme. The land falling. within the New University Campus is mostly comprised of evacuee land and Government land under the Artillery Rifle Range (an application for the transfer of which free of cost has since been made vide my letter No. SB-153/2940 dated 8-7-1954 to your address-corres pondence resting with late Punjab Government endorsement No. 3613-C & P-55/24366 dated 19-4-1956 to you refers). (viii) After the sanction of the scheme the Land Acquisition Collector will be advised to deal with the land of the Corpora tion under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as modified by the Punjab Town Improvement Act or the land will be acquired by private treaty. (ix) A revised draft notification is enclosed herewith as desired. It is now requested that the Government may kindly be approached to sanction at a date as early as possible the acquisition of the land by the Lahore Improvement Trust also authorise the L. I. T. to take possession of the land under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894. Your obedient servant (Sd.) Abdur Rahim, Chairman, Lahore Improvement Trust." The Scheme thus included not only the construction of a New Campus for the University, but also development of two housing colonies. This was in accordance with the decision taken in the, meeting held by the Chief Minister on 16-2-1954 to which reference has been made above. Under section 24 of the Town Improvement Act the Trust may inter alia prepare a scheme for the purpose of development of any locality within the municipal limits. Construction of a new campus for the University and development of housing colonies in the area included in the scheme was thus amply covered by the provisions of section

24. Mr. Mahmood Zaman, appearing for the Trust maintained and rightly so that construction of a new campus for the University was for the development of the city of Lahore and that the real beneficiaries of the scheme were the citizens of Lahore generally and the students community in particular. We will now examine the two other grounds on which the acquisition proceedings were invalidated by the High Court (i) that the scheme framed by the Trust was no scheme at all under sections 24 and 28 of the Town Improvement Act and, therefore, no notice under section 36 could be given in respect of it ; and (ii) the Trust could not acquire land for another corporate body. Earlier we have reproduced in extenso the provisions of sections 24 and 28 which inter alia authorise the Trust to frame a development scheme within a municipal area. A plain - reading of these sections makes- out that a scheme framed under section 24 may provide for all or any one of the matters provided in it. A scheme may thus provide for acquisition of land only and that seems to be the case here. The University Campus was to be developed by the University, the scheme for developing a housing colony in 221.84 acres had been prepared separately and submitted to the Government for sanction as mentioned in the letter of the Chairman, reproduced earlier, while the scheme for development of 608.70 acres was to be prepared at a later stage. It would not, therefore, be said that the scheme prepared by the Trust was no scheme in the eye of law at all, because it did not provide for relaying out of land comprised in the scheme or laying out and alteration of streets, earmarking open spaces, raising, lowering or reclamation of land, drainage, water supply and lighting. The learned Judges pointed out that no estimate of costs was prepared, but that was necessary only in respect of that part of the scheme which was to be executed by the Trust itself. The University Campus was to be constructed by the University Authoiities. No estimate of costs for this part of the scheme was, therefore, necessary. Estimate of costs of the housing scheme in 221.84 acres had been submited along with the scheme. The third part of the scheme had yet to be prepared. The omission to submit an estimate of cost for the entire scheme was, therefore, no fatal defect in the scheme as held by the learned Judges. In dealing with section 28 of the Town Improvement Act, reproduced above, the learned Judges again fell in error in making the assumption that a scheme which did not make provision for all the matters enumerated in the section was no scheme at all may provide for all or any of the matters set out therein. The scheme in respect of which notice was given was thus amply H covered by the provisions of sections 24 and 28 of the Town Improvement Act and the notice issued in respect of it under section 36 of that Act was quite valid in law. A word may be said about the observations by the learned Judges that in acquiring the land for the University the Trust did not act bona fide and that the scheme was a fraud on the Town Improvement Act. It has been noticed that while compensation for evacuee land was fixed by the Collector at the rate of Rs. 550, per kanal, and the Custodian of Evacuee Property accepted this price grudgingly, the portion of the same land was sold by him to the Society, seven years later, when prices had appreciated considerably, at Rs. 250, per kanal. Could it, therefore, be said that in acquiring the land for the University the Trust wanted to confer a wrongful gain on the University or that it was an abuse of the Town Improvement Act. On the contrary in their letter dated 18th April 1957, the Central Government had expressly provided that approval was accorded to the acquisition of evacuee land by the Government of West Pakistan under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as modified by Second Schedule to the Town Improvement Act. It has also been seen that a scheme for shifting the University Campus was first framed by the Trust in 1944 which was abandoned because of Partition in 1947. The Trust had thus acted in accordance with law and not mala fide in acquiring land inter alia for the construction of a new campus for the University. The last ground that the Trust could not acquire land under the Town Improvement Act for another corporate body is equally untenable. The decided cases on which they have relied have been mentioned earlier. The entire reasoning on this part of the cases proceeded on an erroneous assumption. As seen the Trust was required by the Provincial Government to prepare a scheme inter alia for the construction of a new campus for the University. Possession of the land was given under the orders of the Collector to the Trust and thereupon title in the land passed to it under section 17 of the .Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The total area of land acquired by the Collector in the four villages of Bhakewal, Davisabad, Dhana Singh Wala and Ichhra as given in the chart at page 601 of the Collector's File is 1192.67 acres. The rest of the land belonged to the Government. It had been used in the past as Rifle Range by Armed Forces. At the request of the Punjab Government, the Government of Pakistan surrendered it for construction of the University Campus. The letter of the Central Government is in the records of the Trust. The learned Judges have themselves emphasised that the University did not claim any title in the land in dispute. It was therefore, incorrect to say that the Trust had acted as an agent of the University in acquiring the land comprised in the scheme. The University paid Rs. 20 lacs to reimburse the Trust for the compensation payable by it to the Custodian of Evacuee Property, but that is true in all cases inwhich theTrust acquires land Included in a development scheme and subsequently transfers it to others for building houses. shops, factories, etc. It does not mean that land, is acquired by the Trust for those individuals as an agent. In the instant case the land was acquired for a development scheme as envisaged in sections 24 and 28 of the Town Improvement Act and its legality could not be challenged on the ground that it was subsequently disposed of to other persons including a corporate body. As held earlier the acquisition of land by the Trust was within the purposes of the Act and on that ground alone the acquisition of the land comprised in the scheme was valid. None of the decided cases on which the learned Judges of the High Court have relied in support of this ground is, therefore, applicable to the facts of the present case. After the arguments were concluded and judgment was reserv ed Mr. Ghias Mohammad filed a miscellaneous petition forehearing the appeals on the ground that his clients had succeeded in laying their hands on two housing colony schemes framed by the Trust on part of the land acquired under the scheme with which we are concerned at later dates. It was intended to show that the original scheme included only the construction of a campus for the University, the assumption made by the petitioners is palpably incorrect. We have reproduced for this purpose in this order the letter of the Chairman of the Trust No. SB-153/4688 dated the 8th December 1956, written to the Commissioner, Lahore Division, under which he submitted the revised scheme for sanc tion of the Provincial Government. The plan accompanying the scheme shows in different colours the areas earmarked for the two housing colonies and the University Campus. The area of each sector is mentioned in the plan and is referred to in the letter. The proposals of the two housing colonies schemes at later dates on which the respondents rely, therefore, has no bear ing on the decision of these appeals. We did not, therefore, consider it necessary to reopen the hearing of these appeals.' It remains to mention one more ground urged by Mr. Ghias Mohammad. During the hearings of the appeals, he made a grievance that this Court should not make reference to any docu ment of which copy was not produced in the High Court by the Trust and of which he had no notice. As the matter raised is of substance, we will examine it in detail. In its writ petition the Trust relied among others on the Resolution passed by the Trustees approving the scheme framed under sections 24 and 28 of the Town Improvement Act, the Notification issued by it under section 36 of the Town Improve ment Act in which the boundaries of the land included in the scheme were delineated; the No-Objection Certificate issued by the Rehabilitation authorities for acquisition of evacuee Land included in the scheme ; Notification issued by the Provincial Government according sanction to the scheme under section 42 of the Town Improvement Act ; the permission granted by the Central Govern ment under section 12 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance XV of 1949 ; orders passed by the Governor declaring that the scheme for which land was to be acquired was covered by section 50 of the land Acquisition Act and application of section 17 to the acquisition proceedings under which the Collector could take possession of arable and waste land before delivery of award ; order given by the Provin cial Government to the Collector to enter upon acquisition proceedings ; notices issued by the Collector under sections 9 and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act ; entry an the Roznamcha of the Patwari recording delivery of possession to the Trust on 26-6-1957; the concurrence given by the Custodian to the tentative award drawn up by the Collector ; and finally the awards delivered by the Collector and payment of Rs. 20 lacs by the University to the Custodian of Evacuee Property as compensation for evacuee land acquired by the Trust. Copies of these documents formed annexures to the writ petition. Nothing more was needed on the part of the Trust to make out its case that the Custodian of Evacuee Property as well as the evacuee owners having been divested of title in the land acquired by the Trust, the Custodian could not in law resell the same land to the Society. The onus was thereafter on the Society to show that the acquisition proceedings in which the land sold to it was acquired earlier by the Trust was illegal and void. The Society filed documents to show that it had acquired the land after obtaining No-Objection Certificates from the Rehabilitation Department and the Town Planner of the Trust though the latter had no legal authority to issue such a certificate and that permission of the Central Government was obtained under section 12 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance XV of 1949 for acquisition of evacuee land. Copy of the sale deed executed by the Custodian and the receipt showing payment of Rs. 6,27,037.50 by the Society to the Custodian as price of the land were also placed on record. None of these documents, however, reflected on the legality of the acquisition proceedings in which the same land had been earlier acquired by the Trust. The pleas taken up by the Society in their written statement were different from the pleas urged during the hearing of the writ petition. Initially the Society maintained that the land, in dispute, was withdrawn from the scheme prepared by the Trust, that the approval given by the Central Government under section 12 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordi nance XV of 1949 for acquisition of evacuee land by the Trust was revoked, that no price for the land, in dispute, was paid by the Trust to the Custodian, that the Trust having issued a No-Objection Certificate to the purchase of the land, in dispute, by it was estop ped from challenging the legality of the sale of that land and finally that the writ petition filed six years after the sale in favour of the Society had been completed was liable to be dismissed on grounds of laches. The last ground was factually incorrect. Sale deed in favour of the Society was executed in March 1964, and the writ petition was filed on 1965. On perusal of the pleadings of the parties the learned Judges in the High Court directed counsel for the Trust to produce the file relating to the acquisition of the disputed land by the Trust. This fact is mentioned in clause (d) of the replication filed by the Trust to the preliminary objections raised by the society. It reads However, in view of the objections raised by respondent No. 3. and as directed by this hon ble Court, the record relating to acquisition of the land, in dispute, has-been produced. All the grounds on which the acquisition proceedings were later on declar ed by the High Court to be illegal thus arose from the perusal of the record by the learned Judges of the High Court and not on the basis of the written statement filed by the Society or any docu ment produced by it. The learned Judges themselves make mention of the fact that they had perused the records of acquisition of the land by the Trust on which their conclusions are based. In summoning the record and using it for the purpose of determining the legality of the acquisition proceedings, the learned Judges acted with jurisdiction. This, however, does not mean that examination of 'the record by this Court should be limited only to those documents on which the learned Judges have relied. The entire record was before the High Court and a fortiori the same is open to examination by this Court. Another principle attracted in the case is that before an order passed by a public authority is struck down it is the duty of the; Court to explore every possible explanation for its validity and examine the entire field of powers conferred on the authority in pursuance to which the impugned order has been passed See The Chairman, East Pakistan Railway Board, Chittagong and ano ther v. Abdul Majid Sardar, Ticket Collector (P L D 1966 S C 725). It was remarked in this judgment "Acts performed and orders made by public authorities deserve due regard by Courts and every possible explanation for their validity should be explored and the whole field of powers in pursuance to which the public authorities act or perform their functions examined and only then if it is found that the act done, order made or proceeding undertaken is without lawful authority should the Courts declare them to be of no legal effect." To satisfy the requirement of this rule it is the duty of the Court to examine the entire record pertaining to the action taken, order passed and proceedings undertaken which are challenged as without lawful authority under Article 98 of the Constitution. Otherwise grave miscarriage of justice may take place in the exercise of this beneficial jurisdiction. The objection raised by Mr. Ghias Mohammad that the appellants or the Court sun motu could not make resort to any document on the record of the Collector, the Trust and the University which was not relied upon in the High Court has, therefore, no substance. For the foregoing reasons we allow both the appeals, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court passed in Writ Petition No. 1142 of 1965 on 26th May 1969, and declare that the sale of the land described in the writ petition by the Custodian of Evacuee Property to the Society under the sale deed executed by him on 1st of. May 1964, was without lawful authority and direct him to cancel the sale-deed and to refund to the Society the sum of Rs. 6,27,037.50 paid by the Society to him as sale price. In the circumstances of the case, we refrain from burdening the respondents with the costs of these proceedings. Appeals accepted.