SCMR 1990

1990 PLP 1034 (SCMR)

MUHAMMAD TUFAIL and others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus Civil Petition No. 32 of 1990, decided on 30th January, 1990.

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
Civil Petition No. 32 of 1990, decided on 30th January, 1990.
Honorable Judges
Nasim Hasan Shah, S. Usman Ali Shah and Abdul Shakurul Salam, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1990 PLP 1034 (SCMR)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members Nasim Hasan Shah, S. Usman Ali Shah and Abdul Shakurul Salam, JJ
Parties MUHAMMAD TUFAIL and others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus Civil Petition No. 32 of 1990, decided on 30th January, 1990.
Primary Law Punjab Pre‑emption Act (I or 1913)‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1990 PLP 1034 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: Punjab Pre‑emption Act (I or 1913)‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1990 PLP 1034 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Nasim Hasan Shah, S. Usman Ali Shah and Abdul Shakurul Salam, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1990 PLP 1034 (SCMR) (MUHAMMAD TUFAIL and others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus Civil Petition No. 32 of 1990, decided on 30th January, 1990.). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Punjab Pre‑emption Act (I or 1913)‑‑

Representation

  • Sh. Abdur Rasheed, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Tanveer Ahmad, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners.
  • Nemo for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing: 21st January, 1990.

Headnotes / Summary

(On appeal from the judgment and order dated 31‑10‑1989 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, in Civil Revision No: 519‑D of 1983). ‑‑‑‑S. 15(c)‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)‑‑‑Pre‑emption suit was based on the ground that the land in question was situated in that Patti, where pre‑emptor owned land‑‑‑Trial Court decreed the suit and finding was sustained by First Appellate Court‑‑‑High Court in revisional jurisdiction set aside the decree and dismissed the suit‑‑‑Leave to appeal‑‑‑High Court's finding was that four Pattis of the village were not distinct sub‑divisions within the meaning of S.15(c) Secondly, of Punjab Pre‑emption Act, because those Pattis were meant more for fiscal purpose than for the purpose of Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913‑‑ Similar contention was raised in Yaqoob Ali's case reported as 1988 SCMR 999, wherein observations of High Court to the effect: "What actually is required for the purposes of Pre‑emption Act is that a Patti should have homogeneity of descent and area, meaning that the land owners of every Patti should he separate. no stranger should own land in the said Patti and that the land‑owners should bolong to the same caste," wets approved by Supreme Court holding that it s the trend of authority was clear and consistent and was against the petitioners' contention Supreme Court would refuse to examine the plea advanced on pre -emptor's side to reverse the trend of authority so consistent and clear‑‑‑Held; order of High Court being based on ratio of the provision as enunciated by it previously and approved by Supreme Court in cases reported as 1988 SCMR 999 and 1973 S C M R 254, no interference was called for‑‑‑Leave to appeal was refused. Wazir Din v. Hidayat 1973 S C M R 254 and Yaqoob Ali v. Ch. Muhammad Sultan 1988 S C M R 999 rel.

Judgment & Decree

2. The relevant issue was whether the petitioner had preferential right. It was based on the ground that the suit land was situated in Patti Yousaf where he owned land, whereas the respondent vendee owned land in another Patti Miani of the same estate. Each Patti having a separate Lambcrdar and Revenue Patwari constituted a separate and independent Sub‑Division of the village.

3. The learned judge in the High court held that: if the criteria of homogeneity of area or descent of the proprietors and other similar features be applied to the facts of the case in hand , one comes to no others conclusion except that the four patties of the village are not distinct sub-divisions within the meaning of section 15(c) secondly of the Punjab pre-emption Act because these patties are meant more for fiscal purpose than for the purpose of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. It may be mentioned here that the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent has not been able to refer to any judicial precedent having a view mentioned was Wazir Din v. Hidayat,1973 SCMR 254

4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the relevant provision of section 15 (e) is:1 if no person having a right of pre-emption under clause (a ) or clause (b) seeks to exercise it:.. Firstly . Secondly, in the owners of the Patti or other sub‑division of the estate within the limits of which such land or property is situated." He made the submission that the right would vest in the owners of the Patti or other sub‑division of the estate. If the case falls in either, that is to say, in Patti or in the other sub‑division it will be covered by the aforesaid provision "Secondly".

5. A similar contention was raised in Yaqoob Ali v. Ch. Muhammad Sultan, 1988 S C M R

999. The observation of the learned Judge of the High Court to the effect: "What actually is required for the purposes of Pre‑emption Act is that a Patti should have homogeneity of descent and area meaning that the land owners of every Patti should be separate, no stranger should own land in the said Patti and that the land‑owners should belong to the same caste", was approved by this Court. It was observed in the judgment that the learned counsel for the petitioner in that case very fairly conceded that the view taken by the learned Judge was based on judgments of the Lahore High Court. These were few in I number. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court held that "as the trend of authority is clear and consistent and is against the petitioner's contention, learned counsel submitted that the view taken in these three Lahore judgments required examination because the word, `other' in the clause which we have quoted had not been properly examined. We would be reluctant to reverse a trend of authority so consistent and clear and in any event we find that the Lahore view has been approved by the Court in Wazir Din v. Hidayat and two others 1973 S C M R

254. Therefore, we are unable to accept learned counsel's submissions.

6. Notwithstanding the specious submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the order of the learned Lahore High Court being based on the ratio of the provision as enunciated by it previously and approved recently by this Court, no interference is called for.

7. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. AA./M‑1311 /S Petition dismissed.