1994SCMR1968 (PLP)

M. Munir Piracha, Advocate Supreme Court and Ejaz Muhammad Khan, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 7th October, 1992. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, CJ.‑‑‑This petition for leave to appeal by the defendants' side in a suit for redemption has called in question the acceptance by the High Court of respondents/plaintiffs/mortgagors' revision. The trial Court had decreed the suit but the petitioners' appeal having been allowed the respondents/plaintiffs succeeded before the High Court in its Civil Revision jurisdiction. The controversy now raised before us mainly relates to the factual aspects of the case. The trial Court and the High Court have held that the mortgage was created in 1926 and in this behalf have relied upon the date of the attestation of the mortgage mutation. The so‑called mortgage deed of 1922 which was relied upon by the intervening appellate Court has not been given preference over the mutation entries which have been carried over to the subsequent Jamabandis also. Learned counsel raised two points. One, that the High Court had limited jurisdiction as a Revisional Court and should not have interfered with the appellate judgment. And secondly, that on merits the High Court judgment is erroneous. With the help of the learned counsel, we have gone through the record. The learned counsel himself also like the appellate; Court has misread the entries in the Jamabandis regarding the mutation of 1926. According to him, relying on some recent judgments of this Court, the date of the attestation of the mutation is not the date of the transaction which is attested in the mutation proceedings, and further that, in reality the date of transaction is one which is stated by the parties to the mutation to be the actual timing of the transaction. Prima facie, this reading of the Revenue Record seems correct but the mistake lies in the fact that in the present case there is no evidence at all that the transaction attested in the mutation of 1926 which was entered and accepted in he subsequent Jamabandis was of a different date than that of the mutation. Learned counsel, after some discussion agreed that there could be some cases in which the date of transaction, the date of statement by the parties and the date of attestation may be the same. He further agreed that there might be many cases in which the date of transaction might only be a couple of days prior to the date of attestation. In that context he could not exclude a strong possibility that the transaction in this case might be of the same year, if not of the same date as is mentioned in the Jamabandis with reference to the mutation of 1926. That being so, the petitioners would have no case on the question of limitation which has been the main stay of defence during the arguments. The second point raised by the learned counsel thus has no force on account of the element of misreading. The foregoing discussion shows that the appellate Court had fallen into error in not correctly reading the entries in the Revenue Record. Therefore, the interference of the High Court was fully justified. It may be a, mentioned that the afore-discussed aspect of the case is in addition to the other reasons advanced in the impugned judgment which additionally furnished sufficient justification for the High Court for interference. Accordingly, there is no justification for interference. Leave to appeal thus is refused. A.A./S‑831/S. Leave refused.