P L D 1967 Lahore 696 (PLP)

(1) Whether the respondent has been paying or tendering rent to the petitioner regularly? (2) Whether the petitioner requires the shop in dispute bona fide for his personal occupation? (3) Whether the respondent has damaged the property in dispute? (4) Relief.

3. The learned Rent Controller decided all the issues against the petitioner and by his order dated the 5th of May 1961 dismissed the petition with costs.

4. Bashir Ahmad filed an appeal against it which was accepted with costs by the learned Appellate Authority on the 25th of January, 1964 and the tenant was directed to put the landlord in possession of the premises forthwith. Hence,‑ this second appeal.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the applica tion for ej2ctment was based on a default in the payment of rent for a period of twenty months on the 13th of July 1959. In other words, it was claimed that rent had not been paid from October 1957, to the 30th of June 1959. The West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 came into operation on the 23rd of February 1959. It was submitted that the Ordinance was not retrospective in operation and no application under section 13 of this Ordinance could, therefore, be presented for, the ejectment of the tenant on the basis of rent due for a period antecedent to the 23rd of February 1959. This is an entirely incorrect argument. Section 1 (4) of the Ordinance runs as follows: "Subsection (5) of section 13 and section 19 shall come into force at once and the remaining provisions of this Ordinance shall be deemed to have taken effect on and from the date of expiry of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1957." The present application for ejectment was presented under section 13, subsections (2) and (3) of the Ordinance which came into operation from the date that the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1957 expired. ‑That Act had been promulgated in pursuance of the West Pakistan Provincial Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Act, 1957. The Proclamation was revoked by the President on the 15th of July 1957. Under clause (4) of Article 193 of the late Constitution, the Act made by the President ceased to have effect on the expiration of six months after the Proclamation had ceased to be operative. The law thus became inoperative by the 15th of January 1958. Section 13, with the exception of its subsection (5), therefore, became operative on the 15th of January 1958. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, holds no water.

6. It was then contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Appellate Authority based his finding of default of rent on an alleged admission made by the learned counsel for the tenant in the following words "The learned counsel for the respondent admitted, as indicated in the Rent Controller's order on the 28th of September 1959 that his client had been in arrears so far as the period between October 1957 to February 1959 was concerned and consequently the respondent had rendered himself liable for eviction under section 13 (2) (i) of Ordinance VI of 1959." Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no such observation in the order of the Rent Controller passed on the 28th of September 1959. This submission of the learned counsel is correct. That, however, does not alter the position as the fact remains that Bashir Ahmad applicant appeared as his own witness and stated that the tenant had not paid him rent since October 1957. The tenant controverted this statement saying that he had paid the rent but that he had never demanded any receipt because he had faith in the landlord. In cross‑examination he admitted that he was submitting accounts to the Income‑tax Department since 1951 but that there was no entry in his account books regarding the payment of rent.

7. In this state of the evidence a mere assertion that rent had been paid would not carry the day.

8. I, therefore, agree with the learned Appellate Authority that the appellant is a defaulter. The appeal has, therefore, no force and is dismissed with costs throughout. A. H. Appeal dismissed.