P L D 1965 Dacca 364 (PLP)

The learned S. C. C. Judge, on consideration of the evidence, came to the finding that the plaintiff did repair works and other things of the truck belonging to the defendant No. I and in fact Rs. 191.00 was still due and accordingly he decreed suit along with compensation amounting to Rs. 9.00. Hence the present Rule at the instance of the defendant No.

1. It is contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the work done by the plaintiff comes under Article 7 of the Limitation Act and as the suit was not instituted within one year from the date of its due, the claim was barred by limitation. In support he relied on the case of R. Sewaram v. Lachminarayan (104 1 C 520) on the case of Navalmal v. Mangal Das and another (501 C 37) and on the case of Namdeo and another v. Ramkrishna Mahadeo (A I R 1934 Nag. 260). Article 7 of the Limitation Act provides for one year's time for recovery of wages of a household servant, or an artisan or labourer not provided for by the 1st Schedule, Article

4. In my opinion the words "for the wages of a household, servant, artisan or labourer", necessarily mean the wages per day, per week or per month fixed by the employer. In the present case the plaintiff is a mechanic and his service was obtained not by engaging him for a day, or for a week or for a month on the basis of daily‑wages but by sending the truck to his workshop without any fixation of wages for a day or so. His remuneration for his skilled work was enumerated as per bill submitted by the plaintiff. I say skilled work, as mechanical skill is not a manual work; it is dependent on the mental capacity of a person. Hence I am of opinion that Article 7 has no application, rather Article 56 or 102 may be applicable in such cases, and preferably Article 56 as no time‑limit was provided for payment of the remuneration for the service rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant. In support, reference may be made to the case of Laxminarayan Nathmal Marwadi v. Shriram Danmal Marwadi (A I R 1938 Nag. 286), where a goldsmith sued for gold as well as wages for preparing ornaments and charges for fixing the precious stones in the ornaments. In those facts it was held that the plaintiff did not come under Article 7, rather, he came under Article 56 and it was observed that `Article 7 appears to be applicable to a case where a household servant, artisan or labourer is hired on wages per day, per week or per month and did not apply to the remuneration of skilled person like a goldsmith. Now coming to the decisions referred to as above, by the learned Advocate for the appellant, I propose to deal with them one by one. In the case of Namdeo and another v. Ramkrishna Mahadeo, it was held that a village carpenter was an artisan within the meaning of Article 7 as the plaintiff was to get his remuneration for repairing ploughs to be paid in grain at the end of the agricultural year. It was further observed that Article 56 had no application as in that case time for payment was fixed and Article 102 of the Schedule had no application as the Article was for wages not expressly provided for by the Schedule. On the face of the facts of the case that case has no application to the present case before me. In the case of R. Sewaram v. Lachminarayan the learned Single Judge Maung Ba, J. of Nagpur High Court held that a motor‑car driver is an `artisan' within the meaning of Article 7 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act. For the purpose of ascertaining what is the meaning of an artisan, reference was made to the Webster's Dictionary and it was observed that an `artisan' was one trained to mechanical dexterity in some mechanical art or trade, and as a motor‑car driver was required at least to know how to start the car, how to steer it and how to stop it, his wages come under Article

7. It was further observed that driver could not be treated differently from a household servant or labourer. So, according to that finding of the learned Judge a driver was nothing but a domestic servant and as such his claim fell under Article 7 but in the present case the plaintiff was neither a driver nor a day labourer on wages. He was a mechanic rendering services in his work ship for certain remuneration without any fixation of date of payment. In the case of Navalmal v. Mangaldas and another it was held that the word `artisan' in Article 7 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act denoted a mechanic or a workman who had acquired some manual skill. It did not apply to the higher classes of work which involved responsibility and intellectual training. This case does not support him but it supports the opposite -party, namely, the plaintiff. The next ground urged by the learned Advocate for the petitioner is that the lower appellate Court has not discussed the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses and thereby wrongly shifted the onus of proof on the defendant. After going through the judgment I do not find any substance in this contention. The plaintiff's case was discussed and his evidence also was in view and after having that in view, the learned S. C. C. Judge discussed the evidence of the defendants and after elaborate discussion came to the finding that the defendant No. 1 was liable for the repair works done by the plaintiff. In this connection it may be pointed out that I went through the evidence of the plaintiff and it does not appear that his evidence in support of his case was challenged in cross-examination. The third and last ground urged is that the owner not being a party in this suit, the suit is not maintainable. I do not also find any substance in this contention. It was the plaintiff's case that the defendants sent the truck to his workshop for repair works and the plaintiff did it. In the transaction the wife of defendant No. 1 was not found in the picture and as the work was done at the request of the defendants, the defendants are liable to pay. I accordingly discharge the Rule with costs. K. B. A. Rule discharged.