1990 PLP 621 (PLC)

Date of hearing: 20th February, 1990. This is an appeal against the order of the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No. III, Karachi, dated 19‑9‑1989, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant was dismissed.

2. I have heard Mr. Mehmood Habibullah, Advocate for the appellant and Mr. S. Izhar Ahmed, Advocate for the respondents and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.

3. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant's services were terminated on 29‑10‑1988. Being aggrieved by termination order, the appellant had served grievance notice upon the respondent. Failing to get any relief the appellant filed grievance petition before the learned Labour Court.

4. Admittedly the appellant was not served with any charge‑sheet nor her services were terminated because of retrenchment. The respondents had removed her from service because the appellant was allegedly temporary employee. Only two points require consideration:‑‑ (1) Whether the appellant was temporary or permanent worker? (2) Whether the appellant received full and final payment/dues and, therefore, was not entitled to file the grievance petition?

5. The appellant claims to have been appointed as worker with the respondent in July, 1983, whereas according to the respondent the appellant was appointed on 2‑8‑1988. The appellant mainly relies upon her statement on oath and Social Security Card which is Exh. "4‑A". This Social Security Card is dated 5‑7‑1984, and the witness of the respondent Mr. Sabir Hussain, Factory Manager admits, that this card was issued by the respondent. Mr. Sabir Hussain, who is the only witness examined by the respondent, further admits that he was appointed in 1988 and he did know the facts prior to his appointment. He has stated that he did not know if the appellant was appointed in July, 1988 and that there was no previous record with the respondent. He also admitted that he had not checked the record. He further stated that the appellant might be in the factory in the year 1983, because he had come in 1988. It was suggested in the cross‑examination of the appellant, that her services were terminated and that she was again reappointed in 1988, which suggestion the appellant has denied. No termination order has been produced by the respondent, showing that her services were terminated at any time prior to her alleged reappointment on 2‑8‑1988. Such record if any would be deemed to be in possession of the respondent. The evidence which respondent could produce but did not produce would raise presumption against the respondent.

6. The respondent mainly relies on three documents viz. (i) the application of appointment by the appellant, dated 2‑8‑1988, which was produced as Annexure "C" with the written statement of the respondent, (ii) the letter of appointment which is Exh. "3‑B", dated 2‑8‑1988 and Voucher Exh. "3‑A", dated 29‑10‑1988. All these documents admittedly bear the signatures of the appellant, but the appellant alleges, that the signatures were taken from the appellant by force on blank papers. Mr. S. Izhar Ahmed argues, that in the application the appellant has alleged that her signatures were taken only on two papers, whereas when three documents were produced, she stated in the cross‑examination that her signatures were taken on three papers. Admittedly the appointment letter is not signed by any authority and similarly the voucher is also not signed by any authority. It is submitted by Mr. Mehmood Habibullah that these circumstances support the contention of the appellant, that her signatures were taken on blank papers.

7. Keeping in view all these evidence and circumstances the contention of the appellant, that she was appointed in the year 1983 looks more probable and believeable. There being no evidence of termination of her services after her initial appointment, the documents viz. application for appointment or letter of appointment do not have much value. No doubt the appellant admits her signatures but signature alone is not very material in the circumstances of the case, but it is date on these documents which is important. Neither it is suggested to the appellant, that this date was also in her handwriting nor is there any evidence to show that this date was in her handwriting. Appellant was working from 1983 to 1988. As such she would be a permanent worker. Therefore, the appellant could not have been removed from service as the temporary worker. without observing the formalities and requirements under the law for the removal of permanent employees.

8. It leaves us with the voucher Exh. "3‑A", which also admittedly bears the signature of the appellant and which shows, that the appellant had taken full and final payment of her dues and had severed her connections with the respondent. Again this document is not admittedly signed by any authority and there is no evidence to show that the writing on this document and the date thereupon are in the handwriting of the appellant. There is no evidence to show that the appellant had tendered her resignation. The appellant as employee would naturally have signed the number of vouchers. Under the circumstances it is not possible to believe that under this voucher the appellant had severed her connections with the respondent, that also apparently without any reason or cause.

9. For the aforesaid reasons, I allow the appeal and set aside the impugned orders and order the appellant to be reinstated in service. There being no clear evidence as to whether during the intervening period, the appellant was gainfully employed, or was sitting without work, therefore, 50% back benefits are awarded to her. The order be complied with within one month. M.Y.H./1685/Lb.S Appeal allowed.