PLC 1976

1976 PLP 920 (PLC)

MUHAMMAD ASHRAF ALI KALOO Versus MESSRS ABDULLAH SILK MILLS, KARACHI

Jurisdiction / Court
Had Labour Court Sind
Decided Date
Applications Nos. 465, 467 and 468 of 1976, decided on 2nd September, 1976.
Honorable Judges
Makhdoom Saifuddin Siddiqui, Presiding Officer
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1976 PLP 920 (PLC)
Forum / Court Had Labour Court Sind
Bench Members Makhdoom Saifuddin Siddiqui, Presiding Officer
Parties MUHAMMAD ASHRAF ALI KALOO Versus MESSRS ABDULLAH SILK MILLS, KARACHI
Primary Law Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1976 PLP 920 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1976 PLP 920 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Had Labour Court Sind bench comprising: Makhdoom Saifuddin Siddiqui, Presiding Officer.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1976 PLP 920 (PLC) (MUHAMMAD ASHRAF ALI KALOO Versus MESSRS ABDULLAH SILK MILLS, KARACHI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)

Representation

  • S. M. Yaqoob for Respondent.

Headnotes / Summary

S. 25-A-Scope-Termination of service by resignation-Dues also paid by employer-Relationship of master and servant ceasing-Re instatement specifically not prayed -Claim only for some dues -Application under S. 25-A not entertainable-Proper forum Authority under Payment of Wages Act, 1936-Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936), S. 15. Amjad S. Khan for Applicant.

Judgment & Decree

These are the three separate cases under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, filed by three applicants Muhammad, Kaloo and Ashraf Ali for the enforcement of their rights guaranteed and secured to them under the law in respect of re-instatement in service with back benefits. By consent of the parties the cases were amalgamated and the cross -examination in case of applicant Kaloo was treated as cross-examination in the rest of the cases and the evidence adduced in case of applicant Kaloo was also treated as evidence in other cases. Therefore it becomes necessary to dispose of all the three cases by one common order. The case of the applicants shortly put is that they were the permanent workers of the respondent and that the respondent closed down the mill without prior permission of the Labour Court and thereafter sought resignations from them by force which was clear cut infringment of rights guaranteed and secured to them under the provisions of law for which they put forth their grievance petitions to the respondent vide Annexure A but their request was not considered by the respondents hence the instant applications. I have gone through the evidence adduced by the parties and heard the arguments of learned representatives of the parties. At the very outset I would make it clear that although in the applications the relief sought by the applicants is also for the re-instatement in service. Whereas the applicant Kaloo in his cross-examination confined his relief to the extent of getting the benefits of bonus and the payment of unavailed leave. According to him he had written a letter Exh. 7 that he did not make any demand of re-instatement. So then on their own show in the case of applicant is not for reinstatement obviously because they are already employed in other companies, therefore all that they had demanded is the legal dues in respect of bonus and payment of unavailed leave. In rebuttal the respondent have produced the resignations tendered by the applicant Exh. 4 which were accepted by the respondent vide acceptance letter Exh.

5. Similarly the respondent has produced the vouchers Exh. 6 showing that all legal dues were paid to the applicants towards full and final settlement. The execution of these documents is admitted by the applicants but all that they have said is that the said documents were got executed from them by force. There is no evidence adduced by the applicant on this point showing that any force was used against them in extracting the documents from them. Therefore the applicants having resigned themselves and having received the payment in full and final settlement and after their resignations were accepted as rightly argued by learned Representative of the respondent the relationship of Master and Servant ceased to exist between the parties and as such the applicants had no cause of action and therefore they could not make applications in this Court. The relief of re-instatement having been foregone and abandoned by the applicants there remains the question of payment of certain amount which although the respondent proved by documentary evidence as discussed by me above that they have paid all legal dues to the applicants yet assuming (not admitting) 4 that any dues were payable by the respondent then in that cast the prone forum for the applicants was to make the application before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. Similarly it is contended on behalf of the applicant that the respondent closed down the mill without prior permission of Labour Court and after closing down their mill in December, 1975 resignations were obtained from the workers later on which fact would clearly show that their resignations were not bona fide. There is nothing on the record to show that the mill was closed in the month of December, 1975. therefore this allegation hardly gains any ground to be relied upon implicitly. So far as the closing down the mill without prior permission of the Labour Court is concerned the offence if any, would not be determined by way of application under section 25-A by the applicant but the proper action to be taken against the respondent would be by the Labour Directorate who after verifying this allegation would be competent enough to make application under section 7 (3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Therefore whichever way the case of the applicants is looked at the decision must go against them. Accordingly finding no force in the contentions raised by the applicants I dismiss all the three applications.