1973 PLP 140 (PLC)

P L D 1970 S C 292 rel. Ghulam Hassan for Appellant. F. M. Azad for Respondent No.

1. Date of hearing: 19th May 1972. This is an appeal against an order of the learned Chairman of the Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi dated the 14th of March 1971, whereby the learned Court came to the conclusion that none of the demands were barred on account of the Memorandum of Settlement or any other legal ground. The learned Court in the result ordered that the demands to come up for adjudication before it in due course.

2. A preliminary objection has been taken by Mr. F. M. Azad, the learned Representative for the respondents that ear appeal lies under section 37 (3) of the Industrial Relations Ordi nance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance). The contention is that the impugned order not being an award is not appeal able. It is contended that under section 37 (3) of the Ordinance only awards are appeal able and not decisions. Decisions under section 37 (4) of the Ordinance have been made final.

3. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Representative for the respondents, it would be useful to reproduce the definition of award as given in the Ordinance. Award means- "the determination by a Labour Court, Arbitrator or Appellate Tribunal of any industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes an interim award."

4. Mr. Ghulam Hassan, the learned Representative for the appellant, contended that the preliminary objection raised by him before learned Labour Court and the decision given thereon i covered by the words "or any matter relating thereto", as given in the definition of 'award'. In this connection, Mr. Ghulam Hassan relied on the case of Hotel Metropole Limited. Karachi v. Employees' Union (1964 P L C 629=P L D 1964 S C 632) in support of his contention that the' decision on the preliminary objection raised by him was in respect of an industrial dispute. In that case, Cornelius, C. J. observed that the "point of locus standi, and the consequential point of the existence of an "industrial dispute" were, in the circumstances, matters requiring adjudication, which an Industrial Court appointed under Ordinance is to deliver, in the first instance, under the existing law. This case has no application in the circumstances of the present case. The question before me is as to whether the decision given on the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Ghulam Hassan is an award within the meaning of the definition of award reproduced above The learned Represen tative for the appellant also relied on two other cases, one that of East Pakistan, 1963 P L C 1032, and the other of West Pakistan High Court, 1968 P L C

270. I have gone through these two cases. These cases do not hold that a decision on the point raised by the appellant before the Labour Court would amount to an award. On the other hand, Mr. F. M. Azad, the learned Representative for the respondents, - relied on the decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, reported in P L D 1970 S C X92, which is directly on the point in issue. In that case, the phrase "any matter relating thereto occurring in the defini tion of award tame for interpretation before their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Sajjad Ahmad, J. observed that the phrase was ejusdem generi, with the words "industrial dispute" to cover only controversies with regard to the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person. Keeping in view the observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the question before me is as to whether the decision on the question that the demands could rtut be raised by the Union during the pendency of the settlement was art award or not. I am clearly of the view that the decisions on this question cannot be said to be a determination of the industrial dispute, so as to amount to an award. In that view of the matter, I will hold that the appeal is not maintainable under section 37 (3) of the Ordinance and it is accordingly dismissed.