1971 PLP 541 (PLC(CS))

(1) Is the application maintainable? (2) Is the removal of the petitioner from service illegal and inoperative? (3) To what relief, if any, is the petitioner entitled'? For convenience of discussion I take up all the 3 points together. It is submitted by the second party that the Standing Orders Act, 1965 has got no application in this case. Messrs Surridge and Beecheno is a legal firm. Definition of "Shop" is wide enough to include a legal firm where services arc rendered to clients on payment of fees. It is not necessary that a shop is always to‑deal in commodities. To cite an hypothetical case, a cycle repairing establishment is also a shop. Definition of shop includes also a premises where services are rendered to customers. So, a legal firm's notice may come within the definition of a "Shop". Then again, legal advice and legal assistance are rendered on payment of fees. The business of a legal firm is, therefore, or a commercial nature. So, a legal firm can very well come under the definition of a "Commercial Establishment" as defined in the East Pakistan Shops and Establishments Act, 1965. Section 1 of the East Pakistan Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1965, says that it shall apply to every shop or commercial establishment to which the East Bengal Shops and Establishments Act applies that being the position of law I am of opinion that this application under section 25 of the Standing. Orders Act, 1965 is quite competent. There is no doubt that the petitioner is a worker as defined in the Standing Orders act, 1965. His job was of clerical nature, Necessarily under the Act, on the expiry of his period of proba tion for 6 months, the petitioner became permanent. The petitioner's length of service is over 1 years. He has been removed from the service without giving any opportunity to explain his conduct. Whatever the allegations be against the petitioner there was no charge‑sheet, there was no enquiry and there was absolutely no opportunity for the petitioner to explain anything. That being so, the removal of the petitioner from service is apparently illegal and invalid. It is said that on the prayer of the petitioner his probationary period was extended. No paper has, however, been produced to show that the petitioner ever prayed for extension of the period of his probation. On the other hand, the petitioner categorically avers in his application that he was serving under the second party with the entire satisfaction of his superiors. The petitioner has prayed alternatively for termination benefits. The order for re‑instatement being a matter for discretion of the Court. I am not, in the circumstances of the case, inclined to thrust the petitioner on the second party by way of re‑instatement, rather I am inclined to give full termi nation benefits to the petitioner in this case. In giving the benefits to the petitioner I have considered the opinion of both the learned Members in this regard, who are also in c3mplete agreement with my views. The petitioner will therefore, get the following benefits from the second party (1) Notice pay for 90 days at the rate of Rs. 280.00 per month‑Rs. 840.00. (2) Wages for 28 days as compensation‑Rs. 26100. (3) Unpaid wages for 26 days of the month of December 1960‑Rs. 235'00. and (4) Salary for earned leave, if any, due. The second party do pay up the amounts indicated above to the first party petitioner within one month from this date.