1987 PLP 367 (SCMR)
MUHAMMAD YOUNIS‑‑Petitioner Versus THE CHAIRMAN, WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, LAHORE and another‑‑Respondents
| Citation | 1987 PLP 367 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | High Court |
| Bench Members | Aslam Riaz Hussain and Saad Saood Jan, JJ |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD YOUNIS‑‑Petitioner Versus THE CHAIRMAN, WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, LAHORE and another‑‑Respondents |
| Primary Law | Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1987 PLP 367 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1987 PLP 367 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Aslam Riaz Hussain and Saad Saood Jan, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1987 PLP 367 (SCMR) (MUHAMMAD YOUNIS‑‑Petitioner Versus THE CHAIRMAN, WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, LAHORE and another‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Muhammad Hussain Awan, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Rana Maqbool Ahmad Qadri, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
- Nemo for Respondents.
- Date of hearing: 15th December, 1986.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, dated 9‑9‑1982 in Appeal No. 10(L) of 1981). ‑‑‑Art. 212(3)‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5‑‑Leave to appeal, grant of‑‑Limitation‑‑Leave to appeal granted to consider question whether Service Tribunal could on its own take up the bar of limitation when departmental appellate authority had not chosen to base its orders on such ground.
Judgment & Decree
SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.‑‑These are four petitions for special leave to appeal from the orders dated 9‑9‑1982 of the Federal Service Tribunal.
2. The petitioners were meter readers working under the Executive Engineer (E), Sahiwal. There were allegations against them that they were a party to the theft of electric energy. Departmental proceedings were initiated against them and as a result thereof they were dismissed from service. They filed appeals before the Executive Engineer but before they could receive a reply from him they challenged the orders of their dismissal from service before the Labour Court. The Labour Court dismissed their petitions for want of jurisdiction. The Executive Engineer returned the appeals on the ground that they lay before the Superintending Engineer. They then lodged the appeals before the Superintending Engineer, who kept the appeals pending for a long time. The petitioner then filed appeals before the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed them on the ground of limitation. Later, by identically worded orders, the Superintending Engineer dismissed the appeals. His order reads as follows:‑‑ "Your appeal has been considered for decision in this office and found unsatisfactory, hence the same is hereby rejected." The petitioners then again filed appeals before the Federal Service Tribunal from the order of the Superintending Engineer. The departmental representative objected to the competency of the appeals on the plea of res-judicata. The Tribunal rejected this plea and held that the order of the Superintending Engineer gave a fresh cause of action to the petitioners to come to the Tribunal. However, it dismissed the appeals on the ground that the petitioners' appeals before the Superintending Engineer were barred by time and that there was no justification for the condo nation of the delay. The petitioners have now sought leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Service Tribubal.
3. It is to be noticed that the Superintending Engineer had not dismissed the appeals of the petitioners on the ground of limitation. The question for consideration is whether the Federal Service Tribunal could on its own take up the bar of limitation when the departmental appellate authority had not chosen to base its orders on this ground. We would accordingly grant leave to appeal to the petitioners. M. I.??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Leave granted.