1994 PLP 99 (PLC)

Mr. Suleman Habibullah, the learned counsel for the petitioners has challenged the order dated 2‑4‑1991 passed by respondent No. 2 in the above petition on the following grounds:‑‑ (i) That the order dated 2‑4‑1991 is wholly without jurisdiction as one of the members of the Full Bench of NIRC was Dr. Muniz Ahmad Mughal who had passed the order dated 10‑1‑1991 which was impugned in the appeal and as such Munir Ahmed Mughal could not sit in appeal against his own order. (ii) That respondent No. 2 while deciding the matter on 5‑5‑1991 could not interpret the order dated 2‑4‑1991 and should have only implemented the same in letter and spirit. (iii) That the effect of the order dated 2‑4‑1991 passed by NIRC was that the order dated 10‑1‑1991 passed by respondent No. 2 was set aside which had the effect of restoring the petitioners in their respective offices as President and General Secretary of the Union, and as such respondent No. 2 could not direct respondent No. 4 as General Secretary of the Union to convene the General Council and should have asked petitioner No. 2 to hold the same. (iv) That respondent No. 2 by his order dated 5‑5‑1991 having first accepted the change brought about by the petitioners in the constitution of Union could not accept the application for a second change filed by respondent No.

4. None of the above contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners has impressed us. The contention of the learned counsel that one of the members of the Bench of NIRC which decided the case on 2‑4‑1991, was Dr. Munir Ahmad Mughal, who was the same gentleman who passed the order dated 10‑1‑1991, is totally misconceived. The petitioners never raised any such contention before the NIRC at the time of hearing of their appeal. The order of the Full Bench of NIRC clearly states that the appeal was filed against the order dated 10‑1‑1991 which was passed by another Registrar of Industrywise Trade Unions, Mr. Abdul Hafeez Amjad and this finding of fact is not challenged by the petitioners in the memo. of petition. We also asked the learned counsel for the petitioners to show from the record that the order dated 10‑1‑1991 was passed by Dr. Munir Ahmad Mughal but he failed to produce any document in support of his contention. He, however, took the stand that as Dr. Mughal was also a Registrar of Industrywise Trade Union he should not have sat at the Bench. This latter argument is equally misconceived as the learned counsel for the petitioners admitted before us that the members of the NIRC are also exercising powers of Registrar of Industrywise Trade Union in NIRC and they also sit in the Bench as members along with the Chairman to decide the case in appeal against the order of Registrar. Since the order dated 10‑1‑1991 was not passed by Dr. Munir Ahmed Mughal, there was nothing in I.R.O. which debarred him from sitting in the Bench of NIRC to hear the appeal against the above order. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the order dated 10‑1‑1991 passed by respondent No. 1 was set aside by respondent No. 1 by the order dated 2‑4‑1991. We have already reproduced above the final conclusion of the Bench of NIRC in the above order which does not support the conclusion of the petitioners. The discussion which preceded immediately before the final conclusion in the impugned order dated 2‑4‑1991 is as follows:‑‑ "(9) As for the argument that the matter in appeal has not yet been decided and the appeal is premature, the same is incorrect. In fact, the names of the respondents Nos. 1 to 11 have already been registered. and even the letter dated 12‑1.1991 does not withdraw the approval of office‑bearers, despite the fact that the very basis of their election the quorum of the electoral college was admitted to be open to question. Further, the learned RITU had no powers to review his own decision. (10) As for the attachment of presumption of regularity to judicial acts, it may be stated that a presumption is of no avail, when the other party has challenged the facts, specifically. (11) Section 8(7) provides a way out of this involved situation. It states that when there is dispute in relation to the change of officers of a trade union or any trade union is aggrieved by the refusal of the Registrar under subsection (5), any officer or member of the trade union may apply or appeal to the Labour Court. The Labour Court may pass an order either directing the Registrar to register the change or alteration in the constitution or in the officers of the trade union or .may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the Registrar. to hold fresh election of the union under his supervision." The above discussion clearly shows that the change brought in the names of office‑bearers of the Union was not interfered with by respondent No. l and that the matter was left to the discretion of respondent No.

2. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the respondent No. 2 having accepted the change in his order dated 5‑5‑1991 in the constitution of union which was requested by the petitioners vide their application dated 26‑9‑1989, he could not afterward on the same date allow the changes made in the constitution on 2‑5‑1991 by respondent No. 4 without hearing the petitioners. This contention is equally without force. Prior to 10‑1‑1991 the petitioners were the duly elected office‑bearers of the union and as such they could amend the constitution in the manner provided in the constitution of the union. The petitioners applied for approval of the amendments in the constitution of Union on 26‑9‑1989. Respondent No. 2 found these proposed amendments in the constitution in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the constitution and accordingly accepted the same and made them effective from the date they were notified to the NIRC, namely 27‑9‑1989. However, after 10‑1‑1991 when the change in the office‑bearers of the union took place as a result of election held on 27‑12‑1990, the petitioners had no locus standi in the matter and any change brought about in the constitution of Union was a matter between the elected office‑bearers of the union and the Registrar. We have already reached the conclusion that the change brought about in the name of the office‑bearers of the union on 10‑1‑1991 was not interfered with by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in their orders dated 2‑4‑1991 and 5‑5‑1991 respectively. In these circumstances the respondent No.2 having found that the amendment proposed in the constitution by respondent No. 4 on 2‑5‑1991 was in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the constitution of Union, there was no bar on accepting the same by respondent No.

2. Similarly as from 10‑1‑1991 the petitioners were not the office‑bearers of the union, they were not entitled to be heard at the time of acceptance of the amendments made by the incoming office‑bearers of the' union. There is no merit in the petition. Dismissed summarily. H.B.T./F‑221/K Petition dismissed.