1984 PLP 686 (PLC(CS))
LAHORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (WASA). Versus MUHAMMAD SARWAR
| Citation | 1984 PLP 686 (PLC(CS)) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | LAHORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (WASA). Versus MUHAMMAD SARWAR |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1984 PLP 686 (PLC(CS))?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1984 PLP 686 (PLC(CS))?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1984 PLP 686 (PLC(CS)) (LAHORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (WASA). Versus MUHAMMAD SARWAR). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Judgment & Decree
‑‑ S. O. 15 (4)‑Dismissal or removal from service due to miscon duct‑Holding of inquiry‑Mandatory ‑ Employee of Lahore Development Authority (Clerk) involved in anti‑corruption case‑from service without inquiry‑Removal being on account of involvement in corruption case, held, means a charge of mis conduct‑Order of Labour Court striking down impugned removal order, in circumstances, upheld by Appellate Tribunal‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), Ss. 25‑A & 38(3). Mahboob Ahmad for Appellant. Date of hearing : 8th November, 1982. The appeal arises from the decision, dated 12th June, 1982 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. 2, Lahore, whereby the respondent was directed to be re‑instated in service without back benefits.
2. On account of being involved in a corruption case the respondent was removed from service without being charge‑sheeted and holding inquiry against him. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that according to section 1(4)(c) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 the said Ordinance is not applicable to the L. D. A. He has cited two rulings namely 1980 P L C 115 and 1980 P L C
426. The first mentioned ruling arose from a service case and no such question was involved in it. 1n the second authority it has been held that District Council Sargodha is not an industry. So in this ruling also no question of the applicability of Standing Orders Ordinance was involved. According to proviso to section 1(4)(c) establishments run by or under the authority of Government which have statutory rules are not governed by the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. There is no evidence that L. D. A. is working by or under the direct authority of the Government. It has come into being and is running under L. D. A. Act. Establish ments working under the authority of the enactment do not require the authority of any sovereign body. So the conditions‑laid down in proviso to section (4)(c) do not stand fulfilled and thus L. D. A. is not exempt from the applicability of Standing Orders Ordinance. Although the learned counsel for the appellant has not raised the point in his arguments that L. D. A. is not an industry but since in the written statement this assertion was denied I propose to discuss the point. It is asserted in the 25‑A petition that L. D. A. (WASA) is the successor of Lahore Water Supply, Sewerage and Drainage establishment which the turn in successor or Lahore Improvement Trust. It is also mentioned that L. D. A. does the business of the water supply drainage system, construction of roads and to instal tube‑wells for supply of water to the city on heaviest charges. These assertions were not controverted in the written statement. On account of not denying the above‑mention ed no evidence was produced by the respondent on the points as L. D. A. (WASH) does business it is an industry. The definition of 'Industry i given in section 2(xiv) of Industrial Relations Ordinance which reads a under :‑ "Industry' means any business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation." In the written statement it was also contended that L. D. A. was governed by Essential Services Act, but no notification has been brought on the file to show that the Essential Services Act was made applicable to L. D. A. (WASA). So the contention stands unproved. The learned lower Court has rightly held that since Standing Orders Ordinance applies the period of probation was, under the said Ordinance, 3 months and since beyond the said period service of the respondent was terminated he had become permanent and was not a probationer. According to copy of termination Order P‑2 the service of the respondent was terminated on account of his involvement in a corruption case meaning that this was a charge of misconduct against him. Since he was not charge‑sheeted and no inquiry was held against him the order of termination was rightly struck down by the learned lower Court. There is no force in the appeal which is dismissed to limine. A.E. Appeal dismissed.