SCMR 1972

1972 PLP 371 (SCMR)

MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND ANOTHER‑Petitioners Versus DOST MUHAMMAD‑Respondent

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 112 of 1971, decided on 4th October 1972.
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1972 PLP 371 (SCMR)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members N/A
Parties MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND ANOTHER‑Petitioners Versus DOST MUHAMMAD‑Respondent
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1972 PLP 371 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1972 PLP 371 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1972 PLP 371 (SCMR) (MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND ANOTHER‑Petitioners Versus DOST MUHAMMAD‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • S. U. Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Ch. Ghulam Mujtaba, Advocate‑ on‑Record for Petitioners.
  • Nemo for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing : 4th October 1972.

Headnotes / Summary

(On appeal from the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, dated the 10th January 1972, in R. S. A. No. 24 of 1971). Appeal to Supreme Court‑Petition for Special Leave to AppealAppreciation of evidenceSupreme Court reluctant to enter into.

Judgment & Decree

WAHEEDUDDIN AHMAD, J.‑The dispute between the parties is in respect of Sufaida' land measuring 10 marlas with one Kothri, situated in village Bajar, Tehsil Khushab, District Sargodha. This land was purchased by petitioner No. 2 Gul Nawaz. The res pondent filed a suit for possession by way of pre‑emption on the 24th October 1961, against petitioner No.

1. Later on, the plaint was amended and the petitioner No. 2 was ordered to be impleaded as a party by the Civil Judge, Jauharabad. The suit was dismissed by the Civil Judge on the ground that it was barred by limitation, 'The matter was taken in appeal before the additional District Judge, Sargodha and by judgment dated the 21st December 1970, the first Appellate Court held that the respondent's suit was within time and the appeal was accepted. The matter was then taken to the Lahore High Court and a learned Single fudge, by order dated the 10th January 1972, in R. S. A. No. 24 of 1971, upheld the finding of the Additional District Judge and dismissed the appeal. The petitioners seek permission to file an appeal against the said order. Mr. S. U. Chaudbry, learned counsel for the petitioners, has contended that both the High Court and the learned Additional District Judge have taken into consideration the fact of the knowledge of the respondent about the sale in dispute. According to the learned counsel under section 30 of the Pre‑emption Act, the sale being oral, time begins to run from the time the physical possession is taken by the vendee. We have gone through the judgments of both the Courts below and there is no doubt in out mind that they have considered the question of physical possession and have decided the question of limitation on that basis. This contention, therefore, has no force. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the vendee got the physical possession of the land in dispute in April 1960, and the suit was time‑barred. The evidence on this point consists of the receipt of the purchase of bricks for the con struction of the property. This evidence was disbelieved by the "first Appellate Court. The High Court also concurred with this view. The decision of the question whether the bricks were purchased for raising construction on the building rests upon the appreciation of the evidence led by the parties and this Court is reluctant to appreciate the evidence itself. However, we have gone through the evidence with the learned counsel for the peti tioners and are satisfied that cogent reasons have been given by the Courts below to disbelieve the purchase of bricks by the petitioner under receipt, Exh. D/l. The sale in question was oral and no document has been executed between the parties. The onus of proving that physical possession of the land in dispute was taken by the petitioner on a particular date was on him. He has miserably failed to prove this fact. 'In these circumstances, the Courts below were right in decreeing the suit. There is no fore, in the petition which is dismissed. Leave refused.