1990 PLP 366 (PLC)
Messrs ATTOCK CEMENT PAKISTAN LTD. Versus GHULAM RASOOL
| Citation | 1990 PLP 366 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Balochistan |
| Bench Members | Munawar Ahmad Mirza, Appellate Tribunal |
| Parties | Messrs ATTOCK CEMENT PAKISTAN LTD. Versus GHULAM RASOOL |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1990 PLP 366 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1990 PLP 366 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Balochistan bench comprising: Munawar Ahmad Mirza, Appellate Tribunal.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1990 PLP 366 (PLC) (Messrs ATTOCK CEMENT PAKISTAN LTD. Versus GHULAM RASOOL). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Jamil Raja Zaidi for Appellant
- Ghuncha Gul for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 30th July, 1989.
- Mr. Jamil Raja Zaidi, learned counsel for petitioner vehemently urged that grievance petition filed by respondent was inherently defective for want of grievance notice contemplated by section 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. He further emphasised that Labour Court while allowing option for holding enquiry could not legitimately direct payment of back benefits; reliance in this behalf was placed on the observation of Division Bench judgment of Sindh High Court in case Mahmood Shah v. Dawood Cotton Mills 1982 P L C 365.
- On the other hand Mr. Ghuncha Gul, learned counsel for respondent attempted to contend that observation pertaining to holding of fresh enquiry was unlawful. He strenuously canvassed that apparently charge‑sheet was defective, therefore, departmental proceedings against respondent were devoid of lawful authority. However learned counsel did not dispute the legal position that when Court permits holding of fresh enquiry in that event liability for back benefits is always subject to final results of fresh enquiry.
- I have considered the arguments addressed by learned counsel for parties. Apparently objection about non‑service of grievance notice, was not raised in the trial Court. Besides there is nothing on record to substantiate this contention. Similarly arguments of learned counsel for respondent, about defect in the charge‑sheet or direction for holding fresh enquiry cannot be lawfully entertained. Evidently it was open for the respondent /employee to challenge observation of trial Court by way of regular appeal under section 37(3) of I.R.O. or cross‑objections within prescribed period of limitation. Thus having failed or omitted to avail specified remedy, obviously he cannot be permitted to raise said ground while defending present appeal. The principle of law about payment of back benefit when fresh enquiry has been permitted is well‑settled. Additionally relying on the observation of aforequoted judgment and concession made by learned counsel for respondent, I am inclined to partly accept the appeal and hold that direction for back benefits shall be subject to result of fresh enquiry. Impugned order is modified in the above terms and appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑‑Ss. 25‑A & 37(3)‑‑‑Charge‑sheet‑‑‑Worker failing to challenge observations of Trial Court about defect in charge‑sheet or direction in holding fresh inquiry by way of regular appeal under section 37(3), Industrial Relations Ordinance, within prescribed period of limitation was not allowed to raise said question in appeal before Appellate Tribunal. (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑‑Ss. 25‑A & 37(3)‑‑‑Back benefits‑‑‑Fresh inquiry had been ordered in case‑‑ Direction about back benefits, held, was subject to result in fresh inquiry.
Judgment & Decree
‑‑‑Ss. 25‑A & 37(3)‑‑‑Back benefits‑‑‑Fresh inquiry had been ordered in case‑‑ Direction about back benefits, held, was subject to result in fresh inquiry. Jamil Raja Zaidi for Appellant Ghuncha Gul for Respondent. Date of hearing: 30th July, 1989. This appeal challenges order dated 19‑3‑1989 passed by learned Presiding Officer, III Labour Court Balochistan, whereby respondent was reinstated with back benefits from the date of dismissal leaving discretion to appellant for holding fresh enquiry on the basis of show‑cause notice already issued to respondent/employee. Mr. Jamil Raja Zaidi, learned counsel for petitioner vehemently urged that grievance petition filed by respondent was inherently defective for want of grievance notice contemplated by section 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. He further emphasised that Labour Court while allowing option for holding enquiry could not legitimately direct payment of back benefits; reliance in this behalf was placed on the observation of Division Bench judgment of Sindh High Court in case Mahmood Shah v. Dawood Cotton Mills 1982 P L C
365. On the other hand Mr. Ghuncha Gul, learned counsel for respondent attempted to contend that observation pertaining to holding of fresh enquiry was unlawful. He strenuously canvassed that apparently charge‑sheet was defective, therefore, departmental proceedings against respondent were devoid of lawful authority. However learned counsel did not dispute the legal position that when Court permits holding of fresh enquiry in that event liability for back benefits is always subject to final results of fresh enquiry. I have considered the arguments addressed by learned counsel for parties. Apparently objection about non‑service of grievance notice, was not raised in the trial Court. Besides there is nothing on record to substantiate this contention. Similarly arguments of learned counsel for respondent, about defect in the charge‑sheet or direction for holding fresh enquiry cannot be lawfully entertained. Evidently it was open for the respondent /employee to challenge observation of trial Court by way of regular appeal under section 37(3) of I.R.O. or cross‑objections within prescribed period of limitation. Thus having failed or omitted to avail specified remedy, obviously he cannot be permitted to raise said ground while defending present appeal. The principle of law about payment of back benefit when fresh enquiry has been permitted is well‑settled. Additionally relying on the observation of aforequoted judgment and concession made by learned counsel for respondent, I am inclined to partly accept the appeal and hold that direction for back benefits shall be subject to result of fresh enquiry. Impugned order is modified in the above terms and appeal is disposed of accordingly. Parties are left to bear their own costs. M.Y.H./28/Lb. B Appeal partly accepted.