1988 PLP 1405 (MLD)

This Regular Second Appeal arises from the judgment/decree dated the 20th of November, 1982, of the learned District Judge, Faisalabad, whereby the appellant‑defendant's appeal was dismissed.

2. The respondent‑plaintiff sued the appellant‑defendant for specific performance on the strength of two written agreements respectively dated the 28th of March, 1972 (Exh.P.1) and the 22nd of April, 1972 (Exh.P.3) accompanied with two receipts, maintaining that she had agreed to sell the house in question in his favour for a sum of Rs.30,500; that she had received in all Rs.16,000 vide receipts (Exhs.P.2 and P.4); and that the remainder was agreed to be paid before the Registrar at the time of registration of the sale‑deed. Allegedly she backed out and hence the suit.

3. The appellant in her written statement denied having executed these documents or entered into any agreement to sell the house in favour of the respondent. She maintained that being an illiterate and 'pardahnasheen' lady having no independent advice, she was duped and defrauded.

4. Appropriate issues were framed on these pleadings. Both the Courts below did not accept her version particularly because the evidence disclosed that she had all along been accompanied by her son Niaz who had been mechanical in bringing about the contract by having approached the property dealer. She did not examine him to show that he did not accompany her on all important occasions. The impression taken was that this omission was deliberate. The learned District Judge in his judgment considered the objection raised on the strength of National Bank of Pakistan, Karachi v. Dawood Yousuf Mithani and 2 others P L D 1978 Kar. 42 and noted that even if she was illiterate or `pardahnasheen', she had ample means to seek independent advice through her grown‑up son and that avoidance in this behalf to produce the son suggested some deliberateness. I do not think the view adopted by the learned District Judge in this context was in any way fanciful or perverse so as to call for interference in the second appeal. The rule laid down in Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another P L D 1970 S C 139 and Kanwal Nain and 3 others v. Fateh Khan and others P L D 1983 S C 53 provides that in the absence of arbitrariness in the conclusions drawn by the lower Appellate Court, interference may not be made with its judgment in Revision or even for that matter the Second Appeal. In Shah Muhammad v. Sardar Habibullah Khan and others 1988 S C M R 72, interference made in the second appeal by the High Court just because it took a difference view of evidence recorded in the case was upset holding that the same shall not be made with a conclusion drawn legitimately from the evidence by the Courts below,

5. The R.S.A. is dismissed. S.Q./7‑61/L Appeal dismissed.