P L D 1952 Baluchistan 17 (PLP)

R K. M. SAKER, J. C.‑‑his is a second appeal under section 100, Civil Procedure Code read with section 32 of the British Baluchistan Courts Regulation, 1939 against the judg ment of the District Judge in B31uchistan dated 8th July 1950 upholding on appeal the judgment of the Sub‑Judge, Quetta dated 31st March 1950 whereby the suit brought by the appellants against the respondent was dismissed with costs. It was contended before me on behalf of the appellants that the appeal was competent under section, 32 of the British Baluchistan Courts Regulation on the grounds that although the value of the suit was only Rs. 380 in the Sub‑Judge's Court and though the decretal amount was only Rs. 260 the suit in question related to property of very much greater value. It is clear from the wording of section 32, British Balu chistan Courts Regulation that there is a limitation in second appeal relating, among other things, to suits of value of Rs. 1,000 or more or where the appellate decree involves directly some claim to, or question respecting, property of such value. The suit is obviously for ejectment only and the appellate decree of the District judge does not in any way involve directly any claim to, or question respecting, the property in question. Moreover the judgment of the louver appellate Court does not reverse or vary the decree passed by the Court of the first instance. This being the case, the appeal before me is not competent under clause (b) of section 32 of the British Balu chistan Courts Regulation. Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code to which a reference has been made in this appeal, does not apply to Baluchistan since we have a special provision for second appeals for this Province as contained in section 32 of British Baluchistan Courts Regulation. Learned counsel for the appellants then prayed that in the event of the appeal not being competent under section 32, British Baluchistan Courts Regulation the appeal should be treated as a revision petition under the provisions of section 115 Civil Procedure Code. It has been mentioned on frequent occasions both by my learned predecessors and myself that the provisions of this section will only be operative if the lower appellate Court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law or that the Court has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. After perusal of the record I can find no grounds for assuming that any material irregularity has been committed and no plea leas been raised before me questioning the jurisdiction of the lower Court. It has been held in A I R 1917, P. C. 71 (74), that unless some question of jurisdiction is involved the provisions of this section are not directed against conclusions of law or fact. This ruling correctly enunciates the intention underlying the revisional powers of a High Court under section 115, Civil Procedure Code and I have no reason to take any other view from that stated in the above ruling. In the light of these remarks I find no grounds to interfere and the appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. K. M. A.