1989 PLP 1358 (SCMR)
Department, Lahore Petitioner Versus AWAMUN NAS OF PAKISTAN Respondent
| Citation | 1989 PLP 1358 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | Shariat Appellate Bench |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Afzal Zullah, Nasim Hasan Shah, Shafiur Rahman, Pir Muhammad Karam Shah and Maulana Muhammad Taqi Usmani, JJ |
| Parties | Department, Lahore Petitioner Versus AWAMUN NAS OF PAKISTAN Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1989 PLP 1358 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1989 PLP 1358 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Shariat Appellate Bench bench comprising: Muhammad Afzal Zullah, Nasim Hasan Shah, Shafiur Rahman, Pir Muhammad Karam Shah and Maulana Muhammad Taqi Usmani, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1989 PLP 1358 (SCMR) (Department, Lahore Petitioner Versus AWAMUN NAS OF PAKISTAN Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- M. Nawaz Abbasi, Assistant Advocate‑General, Punjab, and Rao M. Yousaf, Advocate‑on‑Record (absent) for Appellant.
- Nemo for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 13th January, 1988.
- 4. Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Abbasi, Assistant Advocate‑General, Punjab. has contended before us that without establishing repugnancy of the existing provisions such directions as were given with regard to the amendment of the Act particularly on the two points taken note of, could not have been given. The mere desirability, betterment or improvement in the law could not have justified the Federal Shariat Court in exercising a jurisdiction which was conditioned arid made dependent on ascertainment and identification of repugnancy with the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet.
- 5. We have heard the learned Assistant Advocate‑General, at some length and find that the questions raised in this appeal directly relate to questions arising in Shariat Appeal No.4 of 1983 relating to Capital Development Authority (Ord. XXIII of 1960) on which our judgment of remand Pakistan v. Public at Large (P L D 1986 S C 240) already exists. The question common being whether the value of the land to be acquired could be fixed by relating it to the notification or to the date when what is intended is only survey of the land for determination of its suitability for acquisition and has not much to do with the actual acquisition of the land. In the judgment under appeal we find that this aspect of the question has not at all been taken into consideration. Instead a notification under section
Headnotes / Summary
(Against the judgment and order of the Federal Shariat Court dated 27‑3‑1984 in S. S. No.14/P of 1983). (a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)‑‑ ‑‑‑Ss.4, 5, 6, 18, 19, 20 & ~31‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (173), Art.203‑D‑ Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam‑‑Federal Shariat Court's directions to Government to make amendments in specified provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, so as. to bring them in conformity with Injunctions of Islam‑ Contention, that without establishing repugnancy of the existing provisions, such directions as were given with regard to the amendment of the Act particularly on the two points taken note of, could not have been given; that mere desirability, betterment or improvement in the law could not have justified the Shariat Court in exercising a jurisdiction which was conditioned and made dependent on ascertainment and identification of repugnancy with Islam‑‑Contentions raised in present appeal directly related to questions arising in Shariat Appeal relating to Capital Development Authority on which Supreme Court's judgment of remand entitled Pakistan v. Public at Large reported as P L D 1986 S C 240, already existed‑‑Question being whether the value of land to be acquired could be fixed by referring to the notification or to the date when what is intended is only survey of the land for determination of its suitability for acquisition and has not much to do with the actual acquisition of land; such aspect of the question has not at all , been taken into consideration‑‑Instead a notification under S.4 which only, expresses an intention or likelihood of acquisition of land coupled with appropriation of certain powers of the survey and entry on the land has been made the basis for determining the value of land‑‑As such question is already before the Federal Shariat Court for a further examination‑‑Supreme Court deemed it appropriate that the present case should also be remanded to Federal Shariat Court for examining the question in the light of the remand order in the case of Capital Development Authority referred to above‑‑Case remanded. Pakistan v. Public at Large P L D 1986 S C 240 ref.
Judgment & Decree
SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.‑‑The Province of Punjab has preferred this appeal under Article 203‑F of the Constitution against the decision of the Federal Shariat Court dated 27th of March, 1984 with regard to provisions of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
2. The specific findings of the Federal Shariat Court which have aggrieved the appellant are; firstly a direction that in addition to the compensation. fixed on the basis of market value as prevailing on the date of notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, an amount of 15% per annum shall be paid as additional compensation from the date of notification under section 4 of the date of payment of compensation. The second direction in the judgment which has aggrieved the appellant is that after publication of declaration under section 6 of the Act the Land Acquisition Collector is required to announce the award within a period of six months failing which the officials/officers found guilty for inordinate delay are required to reimburse the Government for the amount of additional compensation at the rate of 15 per cent per annum paid on account (if such inordinate delay.
3. The Federal Shariat Court undertook, as required under Article 203‑D of the Constitution, suo motu examination of a number of laws including the Act. While examining the Act, the Federal Shariat Court recorded number of findings including that compulsory acquisition was possible in Islam, that compensation, full, adequate or token was to be paid for it as the case may be and that such acquisition could take place not only for the requirement of the State but also for that of companies. The Federal Shariat Court gave the following directions after examination of the provisions of the Act‑‑ (1) The Notification under section 5 of the Act shall issue not later than one year from the date of publication of notification under section 4, failing which the acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have come to an end. However, any time spent in the prosecution of a judicial remedy during which the acquisition proceedings are stayed by the Government before the issuance of notification under section 5 shall be computed to the prescribed period. _‑ (2) After the publication of notification under section 5, the Commissioner shall within six months issue a declaration under section 6 of the Act, and if no notification of such declaration is issued within the said prescribed date, the acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have come to and 40 end. However any time spent in the prosecution of judicial proceedings in which a stay order is issued after the issuance of notification under section 5 and before the issuance of notification under section 6 shall be computed to the above period of six months. (3) Af1cr the publication of declaration under section 6 of the Act, the Land Acquisition Collector failing which the officials/officers found guilty for the inordinate delay shall reimburse the Government for the amount of additional compensation at the rate of 15% per annum paid on account of said inordinate delay. (4) Every objection received by the Collector under section 5‑A of the Act, shall be disposed of by the Collector with the least possible delay and his report under subsection (2) thereof or recommendations under subsection (3), as the case may be, shall be forwarded to the Commissioner within a period of ninety days from the date of publication f the Notification under section
5. The decision of the Commissioner on at these objections shall be announced by him within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the report or the recommendations of the Collector, as the case may be. If the report of the Collector or his recommendations, as the case may be, are not forwarded to the Commissioner, or if the decision of the Commissioner is not announced within the period specified in this rule, the objection shall be deemed to have been carried and the acquisition proceedings shall come to an end. (5) In addition to the compensation fixed on the basis of market value as prevailing on the date of notification under section 4, an amount of 15% per annum shall be paid as additional compensation from the date of notification under section 4 to the date of payment of compensation. (6) The person entitled to compensation shall be paid the cost incurred by him actually and reasonably for preparing his claim for compensation and putting his case before the Collector who may disallow, wholly or partly, the costs incurred by any person, if he considers that the claim made by such person for compensation is extravagant. Consequential amendments necessitated by the above para shall be made m sections 18, 19, 20 and section 31 to the following effect: (i) That full‑stop at the end of subsection (1) of section 18 be changed to comma and the words "or the amount of costs allowed" be added. (ii) After the words "amount of compensation" in clause (c) of section 19, the words "and of costs (if any)" be added. iii) After the words "amount of compensation" in clause (c) of section 20, the words "or costs" be inserted. (iv) After the words compensation in subsection (1) of section 31 and after the words "the compensation" in subsection (2) the words "and costs (if any)" be inserted."
4. Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Abbasi, Assistant Advocate‑General, Punjab. has contended before us that without establishing repugnancy of the existing provisions such directions as were given with regard to the amendment of the Act particularly on the two points taken note of, could not have been given. The mere desirability, betterment or improvement in the law could not have justified the Federal Shariat Court in exercising a jurisdiction which was conditioned arid made dependent on ascertainment and identification of repugnancy with the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet.
5. We have heard the learned Assistant Advocate‑General, at some length and find that the questions raised in this appeal directly relate to questions arising in Shariat Appeal No.4 of 1983 relating to Capital Development Authority (Ord. XXIII of 1960) on which our judgment of remand Pakistan v. Public at Large (P L D 1986 S C 240) already exists. The question common being whether the value of the land to be acquired could be fixed by relating it to the notification or to the date when what is intended is only survey of the land for determination of its suitability for acquisition and has not much to do with the actual acquisition of the land. In the judgment under appeal we find that this aspect of the question has not at all been taken into consideration. Instead a notification under section 4 which only expresses an intention or likelihood of acquisition of land coupled with appropriation of certain powers of the survey and entry on the land has been made the basis for determining the value of the land. As this question is already before the Federal Shariat Court for a fuller examination, we consider it more appropriate that this case should also be remanded to the Federal Shariat Court for examining the question in the light of the remand order in the earlier case of the Capital Development Authority referred to above.
6. The appeal is allowed, the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Federal Shariat Court for decision afresh on the points arising in this appeal in the light of our observations made in the case of the Capital Development Authority. AA./P‑86/S Case remanded.